

# TOO BIG TO FAIL

## *The Hazards of Bank Bailouts*

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## *Contents*

Foreword by Paul A. Volcker	vii
Preface	xi
1 Introduction: Our Message and Methods	1
<hr/>	
ONE	
WARNINGS	9
2 What Is the Problem?	11
3 Why Protection Is Costly	23
4 How Pervasive Is TBTF?	29
5 Why Protect TBTF Creditors?	43
6 The Growth of TBTF Protection	60
7 Testing Our Thesis: The Cases of Not Too Big to Fail	80

TWO

OPTIONS	87
8 Can the Problem Be Addressed?	89
9 Creating the Necessary Foundation	98
10 Reducing Policymakers' Uncertainty	111
11 Limiting Creditor Losses	124
12 Restricting Payment System Spillovers	132
13 Alternatives for Managing Too Big to Fail	141
14 Summary: Talking Points on Too Big to Fail	146

APPENDIXES

A FDICIA: An Incomplete Fix	149
B Penalizing Policymakers	159
C Supervision and Regulation	168
D Increasing Market Discipline	179

References	197
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Index	223
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