

Three Essays on the Theory of the Firm

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Table of Contents

| List of Figures | 4 |
|--|----|
| Acknowledgments | 5 |
| Chapter 1: Introduction | 7 |
| Chapter 2: Do New Brooms Sweep Clean? | 15 |
| 2.1 Introduction | 15 |
| 2.2 The Model | 18 |
| 2.3 The Incentive Problem | 21 |
| 2.4 Consequences of Dismissal | 24 |
| 2.4.1 The Effort Effect | 25 |
| 2.4.2 The Ability Effect | 27 |
| 2.4.3 The Optimal Dismissal Decision | 28 |
| 2.5 Conclusion | 31 |
| 2.6 Appendix | 34 |
| 2.6.1 Proofs | 34 |
| 2.6.2 Alternative Informational Assumptions | 42 |
| Chapter 3: Some Play Fair, Some Don't | 47 |
| 3.1 Introduction | 47 |
| 3.2 The Model | 49 |
| 3.2.1 The Basic Game | 49 |
| 3.2.2 Players, Timing, and Rationality Assumptions | 50 |
| 3.3 Learning Dynamics | 53 |
| 3.4 Comparative Statics | 56 |
| 3.4.1 The Firm Size m | 56 |
| 3.4.2 Impact of the Payoff Structure | 59 |
| 3.5 Discussion | 60 |
| 3.6 Appendix | 61 |
| Chapter 4: Interdependent Outside Options | 69 |
| 4.1 Introduction | 69 |
| 4.2 Benchmark with Independent Outside Options | 71 |
| 4.3 Interdependent Outside Options | 74 |
| 4.3.1 A Linear Demand Example | 79 |
| 4.4 Discussion | 80 |
| 4.5 Appendix | 81 |
| References | 85 |