

HANDBOOK OF DEFENSE ECONOMICS

VOLUME I

Edited by

KEITH HARTLEY University of York

and

TODD SANDLER

Iowa State University

1995

ELSEVIER

AMSTERDAM • LAUSANNE • NEW YORK • OXFORD • SHANNON • TOKYO

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J. PAUL DUNNE

Abstract

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