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# Table of Contents

Preface xviii

### PART 1 An Introduction to Microeconomics 1

Chapter	1 Microeconomics: A Working Methodology	2
1.1 $1.2$	Choice of Production Technique 3 The Water Shortage Problem 3 Common Property Problems 8	
1.3	Agricultural Price Support Programs 9 Competitive Equilibrium Price and Quantity 10 Price Supports 11	
1.4	Describing an Economy 14 A Resource Endowment 15 A Technology 15 Preferences of Individuals 15 Self-Interest and Economic Choice Making 16 Institutions 17	
1.5	The Equilibrium Method 18	
1.6	Positive and Normative Economics 19 The Pareto Criterion 20 Cost-Benefit Analysis 21	
1.7	The Market Economy 22 The Circular Flow of Economic Activity 23 The Plan of the Book 24	
	Summary 24 Exercises 25 Appendix: Model Building 27 References 37	
PART II	Individual Choice 39	

### Chapter 2 A Theory of Preferences 40

2.1 Completeness and Consistency of Preferences 40 The Two-Good Case 41

	A Preference Ordering 41 Completeness Assumption 42 Two-Term Consistency Assumption 42 Transitivity (or Three-Term Consistency) Assumption 42
2.2	Tradeoffs and Indifference Curves 44 Nonsatiation 46 The Slope of Indifference Curves 47 Non-Intersecting Indifference Curves 48
2.3	Tradeoffs and the Marginal Rate of Substitution 50 Diminishing Marginal Rate of Substitution 52 Kinked Indifference Curves 52 Shapes of Indifference Curves 53
2.4	Applications56Overtime Pay56Pollution57Snap Courses59
2.5	Utility Functions61Constructing a Utility Function61Many Utility Functions63The Meaning of Utility Numbers64
2.6	The Many-Goods Case 65
	Summary66Exercises67References68
Chapter	3 Getting and Spending: The Problem of Economic Choice Making 69
3.1	Economic Choices 69
3.2	The Budget Constraint 71 Attainable Consumption Bundles 71 Opportunity Cost 72
3.3	The Consumer's Choice Problem 73 The Choice Problem 73 The Solution: Demand Functions 74
3.4	Graphic Analysis of Utility Maximization 76 Interior Solutions 76 Corner Solutions 78
3.5	Elasticity 81 Elasticity of the Number of Smokers with Respect to Price

84

vi

3.6 3.7	Comparative Statics Analysis of Demand85Consumption Response to a Change in Income86Normal Goods and Inferior Goods86Engel Curves87Some Income Elasticities of Demand88
3.8	Consumption Response to a Change in Price 89 The Price-Consumption Path 91 The Demand Curve 91 Some Price Elasticities of Demand 91
3.9	Income and Substitution Effects92Income and Substitution Effects for a Price Increase93Income and Substitution Effects for a Price Decrease94The Negative Substitution Effect96The Ambiguous Income Effect96The Slope of the Demand Curve97
*3.10	The Compensated Demand Curve 97 The Substitution Effect Revisited 97 The Compensated Demand Function 99
3.11	Complements and Substitutes 101 Some Cross-Price Elasticities of Demand 102
3.12 *3.13	Composite Commodities 103 Two General Properties of Demand Functions 104 No Money Illusion 104 Engel's Aggregation Law 106
_	Summary 106 Exercises 107 References 109

### Chapter 4 Vicarious Problem Solving: Applications of the Theory of Choice 110

- 4.1 Lump-Sum Versus Excise Taxes 110 Excise Tax Versus Lump-Sum Tax 110 An Application to the Theory of Clubs 113 Government Subsidies 113
- 4.2 Measuring Benefits and Costs 114 Equivalent Variation for a New Good 114 Compensating Variation for a New Good 114 Equivalent Variation for a Price Change 117 Compensating Variation for a Price Change 117

vii

Comparing Equivalent Variation and Compensating Variation 117 Consumer's Surplus 118

- \*4.3 The Demand for Consumer Capital 121
- \*4.4 Two-Part Tariffs 124
- 4.5 The Demand for Leisure and the Supply of Labor 127 Work, Leisure, and Income 127 Time and Money Prices 128
- \*4. 6 The Tragedy of the Commons 129 Racquetball and the Tragedy of the Commons 130 First Come, First Served Allocation 130 Institutional Mechanisms for Allocation 131
- \*4.7 Index Numbers 133 Quantity Indexes 133 Price Indexes 135

Summary137Exercises137References139

#### Chapter \*5 Choice Making under Imperfect Information 140

5.1	Expected-Utility Theory 140 Calculating Expected Monetary Value 14 The Expected-Utility Hypothesis 142 The Expected-Utility Function 143	1
5.2	Generalizing the Expected-Utility Approach Subjective Probabilities 147 State-Dependent Preferences 148	146
5.3	Attitudes Towards Risk 148	
5.4	Shedding Risk 152 Informal Risk Pooling 152 The Market for Insurance 154 Risk Spreading 157 The Case for Risk Aversion 158	
5.5	The Economics of Asymmetric Information Hidden Characteristics 159 Adverse Selection: The "Lemons Principle"	158 161
	Signaling 162 Moral Hazard Problems: Hidden Actions	165
	Summary 167 Exercises 167	

Appendix: The Expected-Utility Theorem171The Substitution Assumption172The Ordering Assumption173Expected Utility Theorem174

References 175

### PART III The Firm 177

### Chapter \*6 The Theory of the Firm 178

6.1	Organizational Issues 178
	Three Structures of the Firm 179
	Cooperation from Noncooperative Behavior 180
	A Key to the Puzzle: Institutions 181
	The Existence of Multiperson Firms 182
6.2	Organizational Issues 183
	The One-Person Firm 183
	A Two-Person Alternative 185
	The Partnership Equilibrium 187
	Pareto Optimality and Choice of Institutions 189
6.3	Team Production 189
	Productivity of Teams 190
	Partnership with Team Production 190
	The Owner-Managed Team 192
	Contracting and Monitoring Costs 193
6.4	The Pareto-Preferred Organizational Forms 195
6.5	Specialization and the Division of Labor 197
	Transactions Costs 199
	Generic Inputs 199
	Specific Inputs 200
	Summary 201
	Exercises 202
	References 204

### Chapter 7 Production and Cost: One Variable Input 205

7.1	The Production Function 205	
	Defining the Production Function 206	
	A Fixed-Proportions Production Function	206
	Variable-Proportions Production Functions	207

ix

7.2	The Short- and Long-Run Cost-Minimization Problems209The Long-Run Cost-Minimization Problem209Input Prices210Short-Run Cost-Minimization Problems210
7.3	Production: One Variable Input 210 Total Product 211 Marginal Product 212 Diminishing Marginal Productivity 213 Average Product 216
7.4	Costs of Production: One Variable Input219The Variable Cost Function Illustrated220Deriving the Variable Cost Function221Average Variable Cost and Short-Run Marginal Cost221Average Product and Average Cost225Marginal Product and Marginal Cost225Fixed Cost226Short-Run Total Cost and Short-Run Average Cost226
*7.5	Applications: Traffic Congestion and Multiplant Firms228The Allocation of Output among Different Plants233Summary234Exercises235References237
Chapter	8 Production and Cost: Many Variable Inputs 238
8.1	Isoquants and Input Substitution 238 The Shape of Isoquants 239
8.2	Marginal Rate of Technical Substitution240Perfect Substitutes and Perfect Complements243Diminishing Marginal Rate of Technical Substitution243MRTS as a Ratio of Marginal Products244

- 8.3 Returns to Scale 245
- 8.4 The Cost-Minimization Problem: A Perspective 248
- 8.5 Solving Cost-Minimization Problems 249 The First Principle of Cost Minimization 251 The Second Principle of Cost Minimization 251
- 8.6 Comparative Statics for Input Prices 254
- 8.7 Comparative Statics for the Level of Output 256 Normal and Inferior Inputs 257 Long-Run Costs and Output 258

х

8.8 Comparing Long-Run and Short-Run Costs 261

8.9 A Theory of Market Structure 265

Summary267Exercises268

### Part IV Goods Markets 271

### Chapter 9 The Theory of Perfect Competition 272

- - -

9.1	Competitive Model of Exchange 272 Market Demand 273 Market Supply 274 The Walrasian Auctioneer 275 Competitive Equilibrium 275 Pareto Optimality, or Efficiency 277 The Bole of Initial Allocation 277
	The Function of Price 278
9.2	Potential Difficulties with the Competitive Model 279 Price Taking or Price Manipulating 279 Large Numbers and Price-Taking Behavior 281 Price Making: The Walrasian Auctioneer 281 Perfect Information 282 Robustness of the Competitive Model 282
9.3	The Assumptions of Perfect Competition 283
9.4	The Firm's Short-Run Supply Decision 284
9.5	Short-Run Competitive Equilibrium 290
	Aggregating Demand 290
	Aggregating Short-Run Supply 291
	Short-Run Competitive Equilibrium 292
9.6	Efficiency of the Short-Run Competitive Equilibrium 294
9.7	Long-Run Competitive Equilibrium 296 No-Exit, No-Entry, and Long-Run Equilibrium 296 Price Equal to Minimum Average Cost 297
	The Individual Firm in Long-Run Equilibrium 298
	The Constant-Cost Case 299
	A Dynamic Story 299
	The Increasing-Cost Case 301
	The Decreasing-Cost Case 304
~ ~	

9.8 Comparative Statics 304

- \*9.9 Rent Control 305 The Rent Control Model 305 Apparent Effects of Rent Control 307 Short-Run Effects 307 Long-Run Effects 309 Summary 310
  - Exercises 311 References 314

#### Chapter 10 Monopoly 315

10.1315Monopoly Defined 10.2316 The Monopolist's Revenue Functions 317Marginal Revenue Marginal Revenue and the Price Elasticity of Demand 319 Linear Demand Curve 319 10.3**Maximizing** Profit 32132410.4The Inefficiency of Monopoly 10.5Sources of Monopoly 327327 Government Franchise Monopoly Patent Monopoly 327**Resource-Based Monopoly** 327Technological (or Natural) Monopoly 327Monopoly by Good Management 330\*10.6 Regulatory Responses to Monopoly 330331 Divestiture in a Resource-Based Monopoly Responses to Patent Monopoly 331331Responses to Natural Monopoly Average Cost Pricing 331**Rate-Of-Return Regulation** 332 334Efficient Regulatory Mechanisms 338 Franchise Monopoly 10.7338 **Price Discrimination** Market Segmentation 338 Perfect Price Discrimination 339 **Ordinary Price Discrimination** 339 344 Market Segmentation Revisited Multipart or Block Pricing 345\*10.10 Patent Policy 348The Appropriability Problem 349

3

A Model of Inventions349Product Development in the Absence of Patents351The Effects of Patents352Optimal Patent Policy352

Summary355Exercises356References358

### Chapter 11 Game Theory and Oligopoly 359

11.1 11.2 11.3	Game Theory 360 Monopoly Equilibrium 361 Duopoly as a Prisoners' Dilemma 362 The Oligopoly Problem 363 The Prisoners' Dilemma 364
11.4	The Cournot Duopoly Model 364 Mock Dynamics in the Cournot Model 367 Generalizing Results 368 Isoprofit Curves 368
11.5 11.6	The Cournot Model with Many Firms371The Bertrand Model372Dynamics in the Bertrand Model374
11.7 11.8 11.9 11.10	The Collusive Model of Oligopoly 375 Experimental Evidence 377 Repeated Play, Supergames, and Richer Strategies 377 The Limit Output Model 379 Barriers to Entry 380 The Inducement to Entry 381 Strategic Choice of Industry Output 383 Critique of the Model 384
11.11 11.12	Refinements of Limit Output 384 Positioning and Reacting 388 Summary 389 Exercises 390 Appendix: Collusion in Supergames 392 Trigger Strategies 392 The Credibility Problem 395 Subgame Perfection 396 Critique of the Collusive Model 396
	Reterences 397

#### xiii

#### Chapter \*12 Product Differentiation 398

12.1	Chamberlin's Symmetrically Differentiated Products 399 Symmetric Preferences 400 Symmetric Demand Functions 401
12.2	Chamberlin's Small-Numbers Case 404 The Nash Price Equilibrium 405 The Collusive Price 405 The Oligopoly Problem Again 407 Entry 408
12.3	Chamberlin's Large-Numbers Case 409 Short-Run Equilibrium 409 Long-Run Equilibrium 409 Efficiency and the Chamberlin Model 409
12.4	Address Models of Monopolistic Competition 412 A Model of Spatial Competition 412 Short-Run Price Equilibrium 413 Long-Run Equilibrium 417 Profit in Long-Run Equilibrium 418 Product Proliferation 420 Generalizing the Model 420 Efficiency 421 Product Diversity: Equilibrium Versus Cost-Benefit Efficiency 422
	Floudet Diversity. Equilibrium versus Cost-Denemt Emclency 422
	Summary 422
	Exercises 424

### PART V Resource Markets and General Equilibrium 427

#### Chapter 13 Input Markets and the Allocation of Resources 428

- 13.1 The Role of Input Markets 428
- 13.2 Perfectly Competitive Input Markets 429
- 13.3 The Supply of Non-Labor Inputs 431
- 13.4 The Supply of Labor 431

References 424

Responses to Changes in Non-Work Income 433 Responses to a Change in the Wage Rate 434 Labor Supply Curves 435

13.5	The Firm's Demand for One Variable Input437Input Demand in a One-Good Economy437Value of the Marginal Product441
13.6	Input Demand with Many Variable Inputs 442 Downward-Sloping, Long-Run Input Demand Curve 442 A Comparison of Long-Run and Short-Run Input Demand 444
13.7 13.8	Competitive Equilibrium in an Input Market445Monopsony in Input Markets447The Monopsonist's Factor Cost Functions447The Short-Run Monopsony Equilibrium450The Inefficiency of Monopsony452
13.9	Sources of Monopsony Power 453 Immobility 454 Monopoly and Specialized Inputs 455
13.10	Monopsonistic Price Discrimination 455 Summary 458 Exercises 459 References 461
Chapter	14 The Distribution of Income 462
14.1	Distributive Justice 462 The Productivity Principle 463 Product Exhaustion 463 Thought Experiments for the Productivity Principle 464 Input Prices and Scarcity 465 The Redistributionist Principle 465
14.1 14.2	Distributive Justice 462 The Productivity Principle 463 Product Exhaustion 463 Thought Experiments for the Productivity Principle 464 Input Prices and Scarcity 465 The Redistributionist Principle 465 Minimum-Wage Legislation 468 Competitive Labor Markets 468 Monopsonistic Labor Markets 470 Union Wage Rates: Some Analogous Issues 472
14.1 14.2 14.3	<ul> <li>Distributive Justice 462</li> <li>The Productivity Principle 463</li> <li>Product Exhaustion 463</li> <li>Thought Experiments for the Productivity Principle 464</li> <li>Input Prices and Scarcity 465</li> <li>The Redistributionist Principle 465</li> <li>Minimum-Wage Legislation 468</li> <li>Competitive Labor Markets 468</li> <li>Monopsonistic Labor Markets 470</li> <li>Union Wage Rates: Some Analogous Issues 472</li> <li>Wage Floors in a Two-Sector Model 473</li> <li>The Underemployment Equilibrium 474</li> <li>The Unemployment Equilibrium 474</li> </ul>
14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4	Distributive Justice 462 The Productivity Principle 463 Product Exhaustion 463 Thought Experiments for the Productivity Principle 464 Input Prices and Scarcity 465 The Redistributionist Principle 465 Minimum-Wage Legislation 468 Competitive Labor Markets 468 Monopsonistic Labor Markets 470 Union Wage Rates: Some Analogous Issues 472 Wage Floors in a Two-Sector Model 473 The Underemployment Equilibrium 474 The Unemployment Equilibrium 474 Income Maintenance 476 The Efficient Transfer Mechanism 477 Topping Up and Welfare 478 The Negative Income Tax 480 Summary 482 Exercises 482

XV

### Chapter 15 Intertemporal Resource Allocation 485

15.1	Intertemporal Value Comparisons 486 A Perfect Market for Loanable Funds 487 The Separation Theorem 487 Present Value 488
15.2	The Life-Cycle Model489The Budget Line489The Intertemporal Allocation of Lifetime Income492Comparative Statics494Supply and Demand for Loanable Funds498
15.3 15.4	Human Capital 499 Intertemporal Allocation of Nonrenewable Resources 504 Individual Supply Behavior 505 Hotelling's Law 506 Determining the Competitive Equilibrium 506
$\begin{array}{c} 15.5\\ 15.6\end{array}$	The Firm's Demand for Capital Inputs 508 The Market for Loanable Funds 511
	Summary512Exercises513References515
Chapter	16 Efficiency and the Allocation of Resources: A General Equilibrium Approach 516
16.1	Efficiency in an Exchange Economy 517 The Edgeworth Box Diagram 517 Preference Assumptions 519 Efficiency in Consumption 520 The Contract Curve 521

- 16.2 Competitive Equilibrium in an Exchange Economy 522 Budget Lines in an Exchange Economy 522 Finding the Competitive Equilibrium 524 The First Theorem of Welfare Economics 526 The Second Theorem of Welfare Economics 526
- 16.3 Efficiency in General Equilibrium with Production 527 Production Assumptions 527 Efficiency in Consumption 528 Production Possibilities Set 528 Efficiency in Production 529 The Marginal Rate of Transformation 530 Efficiency in Product Mix 533

- Efficiency and General Competitive Equilibrium 16.4 535
- 16.5 Sources of Inefficiency 537The Inefficiency of Monopoly 537 Taxation and Efficiency 539 Summary 539Exercises 540 Appendix: Efficiency 541References 544

#### Chapter 17 Externalities and Public Goods 545

17.1 17.2	The Smoker's Externality546A Taxonomy of Externalities550Consumption-Consumption Externalities550Production-Production Externalities551Consumption-Production Externalities551Production-Consumption Externalities551
17.3	Responses to Externalities: An Overview 551 Private Negotiations 552 Internalization 552 Governmental Responses 552 Assigning Property Rights 552 Public Regulation 553 Nonintervention 553
17.4	Privately Negotiated Solutions 553
17.5	Internalizing the Externality 558
17.6	Regulatory Solutions 559
	Cost-Benefit Analysis 560
	Hitting the Regulatory Target 562
17.7	Public Goods 563 Nonrivalrous Goods 564 Nonexcludable Goods 564 Pure Public Goods 564 Public Provision of Nonrivalrous Goods 565
	Cost-Benefit Analysis and Revealed Preference 566
	Summary 567
	Exercises 568
	References 569

Answers to Problems 570 Index 595

xvii