

Prisoners of Reason

Game Theory and Neoliberal Political Economy

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Contents

<i>List of Tables</i>	<i>page</i> ^x
<i>List of Figures</i>	xi
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	xiii
<i>Prologue</i>	xv
PRELIMINARIES	
1 Neoliberalism	3
Defining Neoliberalism	5
Recalling Classical Liberalism	11
Neoliberalism and Nuclearized Sovereignty	17
2 Prisoner's Dilemma	24
The Standard Narrative	28
A More Formal Presentation	31
Prisoner's Dilemma Pedagogy and Neoliberal Subjectivity	41
Noncooperative Game Theory and the Shift to Coercive Bargaining	49
Conclusion	58
PART I: WAR	
Introduction	65
3 Assurance	69
Brief History of Game Theory	73
Rational Deterrence and Game Theory's Ascendance	76
Kahn's Defense of Nuclear Use Theory (NUTS)	79
Schelling's Defense of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)	84
Early US Responses to Strategic Nuclear Parity	93
Conclusion	96
4 Deterrence	99
NUTS and the Triumph of Prisoner's Dilemma Logic	102
Carter's Conversion from MAD to NUTS	105
Carter's Nuclear Security Dilemma	111
The Inescapable Irrationality of MAD	122
The Tacit Alliance between Offensive Realism and Game Theory	125
The Road Not Taken	135
Conclusion	138

PART II: GOVERNMENT

Introduction	143
5 Hobbesian Anarchy	153
Hobbes's <i>Leviathan</i> and the Prisoner's Dilemma	156
Traditional Hobbes	161
Hobbes's Foole and the Rational Actor	164
Conclusion	170
6 Social Contract	175
Buchanan's Social Contract and the Prisoner's Dilemma	177
Buchanan's Neoliberalism vs. Rawls's Classical Liberalism	182
Coercion vs. Inclusion	188
Conclusion	192
7 Unanimity	193
Unanimity vs. Unanimous Agreement to Terms	194
Unanimity Scrutinized	196
Coercive Bargaining and Unanimity	200
Conclusion	203
8 Consent	205
Consent in Posner's System of Justice as Wealth Maximization	207
Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency: No Need to Compensate Losers	212
Neoliberalism's Equation of <i>Ex Ante</i> and <i>Ex Post</i> Consent	216
Conclusion	220
9 Collective Action	224
A Planetary Prisoner's Dilemma: Game Theory Meets Global Warming	225
The Strategically Rational Failures of Collective Action	228
The Imperceptibility of Mancur Olson's <i>Logic of Collective Action</i>	232
The Malevolent Backhand of Neoliberal Governance	236
Conclusion	242

PART III: EVOLUTION

Introduction	247
10 Selfish Gene	252
Dawkins's <i>Selfish Gene</i> Theory	254
Selfish Gene Theory and Game Theory	257
Social Implications of Selfish Gene Theory	263
Conclusion	267
11 Tit for Tat	269
Almost Unlocking the Repeating Prisoner's Dilemma	272
Tit for Tat and Rule Following	279
Conclusion	280

CONCLUSION

12	<i>Pax Americana</i>	285
	Neoliberal Political Philosophy	288
	Retrospective and Prospective	291
	Resisting Neoliberal Subjectivity	294
	<i>Bibliography</i>	297
	<i>Index</i>	325