

The New Institutional Economics of Corruption

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Contents

<i>List of figures</i>	xii
<i>List of tables</i>	xii
<i>List of contributors</i>	xiv

i

1	Corrupt contracting: exploring the analytical capacity of New Institutional Economics and New Economic Sociology	1
	JOHANN GRAF LAMBSDORFF, MARKUS TAUBE AND MATTHIAS SCHIUMM	
2	Corruption - its spread and decline	16
	HARTMUT SCHWEITZER	
3	Why should one trust in corruption? The linkage between corruption, norms and social capital	40
	PETER GRAEFF	
4	Corruption trends	59
	CHRISTIAN BIØRNSKOV AND MARTIN TALDAM	
5	Trust and corruption	76
	ERIC M. USLANER	
6	Self-enforcing corruption: information transmission and organizational response	93
	LAMBROS PECHLIVANOS	
7	The use of intermediaries and other 'alternatives' to bribery	112
	JOHN BRAY	

x	<i>Contents</i>	
8	Corrupt relational contracting JOHANN GRAF LAMBSDORFF AND SITKI UTKU TEKSOZ	138
9	The governance mechanisms of corrupt transactions DONATELLA DELLA PORTA AND ALBERTO VANNUCCI	152
10	Private ordering of corrupt transactions: the case of the Chinese <i>guanxi</i> networks and their challenge by a formal legal system MATTHIAS SCHRAMM AND MARKUS TAUBE	181
11	Inefficient property rights and corruption: the case of accounting fraud in China SONJA OPPER	198
12	Corruption in international trade - pleading for a responsible WTO PETER EIGEN	218
13	The case of corruption in Nigeria SOJI APAMPA	236
	<i>Index</i>	253