# Critical Writings on Global Institutions

# Edited by Willem Molle

Volume I General

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	Acknowledgements	XV
	Chronological table of reprinted articles and chapters	xix
	General Introduction Introduction	1 13
VC	DLUME I GENERAL	
	RT 1 tionale	25
1	The demand for international regimes ROBERT O. IVEOHANE	27
2	The economics of international organizations MICHELE FRATIANNI AND JOHN PATTISON	59
3	Coordination and collaboration: regimes in an anarchic world ARTHUR A. STEIN	74
4	Reshaping the international order: a report to the Club of Rome J. TINBERGEN AND A. J. DOLMAN	102
5	The Case against the new international economic order	115
	HERBERT G. GRUBEL	
PAl	RT 2	
	inciples	137
6	'Introduction' to Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations C. F. AMRASINGHE	139

	PART 3 Organisations and structure	
7	How do international organizations function?  B. S. FREY	163
8	Governance and the limits of accountability: the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank NGAIRE WOODS AND AMRITA NARLIKAR	180
9	Principal-agent problems in international organizations ROLAND VAUBEL	202
10	Governing the global economy through government networks ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER	217
PART 4 Compliance		249
11	Extracts from 'Compliance & Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation' KAL RAUSTIALA	251
12	Compliance with international agreements BETH A. SIMMONS	263
13	International 'standards' and international governance KENNETH W. ABBOTT AND DUNCAN SNIDAL	282
14	The means of dispute settlement  JOHN MERRILLS	307
15	Legalized dispute resolution: interstate and transnational ROBERT O. KEOHANE, ANDREW MORAVCSIK. AND ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER	337
PART 5 Results		375
16	Evaluation and outlook WILLEM MOLLE	377

# VOLUME II TRADE

	Acknowledgement?	ix
	Introduction	1
PAF	T 1	
Rat	ionale	11
17	Extract from 'Trade in goods and services' WILLEM MOLLE	13
18	Extracts from <i>The Economic Development of Latin America</i> , and Its Principal Problems  R. PREBISCH <i>1CT AL</i> .	23
19	Does trade cause growth?  JEFFREY A. FRANKEL AND DAVID ROMER	40
20	Trade openness and economic growth: a cross-country empirica! investigation	72
	HALIT YANIKKAYA	
PAI	RT 2	
	nciples	111
21	The political aspect of discrimination in international economic relations  S. H. BAILEY , j	113
22		137
23	Multi-lateral trade negotiations and the Most Flavored Nation clause PHILLIP McCALMAN	186
24	Different and more favourable treatment - and graduation BRIAN HINDI.EY	213
25	Reciprocity, non-discrimination and preferential agreements in the multilateral trading system KYLE BAGWELL AND ROBERT W. STAIGER	226

	PART 3 Organisations and structure	
26	Transaction cost politics and economic policy: a framework and a case study  AVINASH DIXIT	275
27	The GATT as an international discipline over trade restrictions: a public choice approach  J. MICHAEL FINGER	303
28	A constitutional interpretation of the GATT/WTO GABRIELE ORCALLI	319
29	A game-theoretic view of international trade negotiations: implications for developing countries  JOHN MCMILLAN  I'	336
PART 4 Compliance		353
30	Market disruption, export market disruption, compensation and GATT reform  JAGDISH N. BIIAGWATI	355
31	Bargaining in the shadow of the law: early settlements in GATT/WTO disputes  MARC L. BUSCH AND ERIC REINHARDT	402
32	The WTO dispute settlement system: a first assessment from an economic perspective  MONIKA BUETLER AND HEINZ HAUSER	415
33	The WTO appellate body: legal formalism as a legitimation of global governance SOL PICCIOTTO	445
PART 5 Results		473
34	Do we really know that the WTO increases trade?	475

# VOLUME Hi FINANCE

	Acknowledgements	vii
	Introduction	1
PAR	RT 1	
Rat	tionale	13
35	International financial instability CHARLES WYPLOSZ	15
36	International institutions for reducing global financial instability KENNETH ROGOFF	50
37	The international monetary system MICHEL AGLIETTA	74
38	The IMF and international financial architecture: solvency and liquidity	83
	DAVID VINES AND CHRISTOPHER L. GILBERT	
PAF	RT 2	
Pri 39	nciples A theory of conditionality PAUL MOSLEY	111 113
40	Redesigning conditionality PAUL COLLIER, PATRICK GUILLAUMONT, SYLVIANE GUILLAUMONT AND JAN WILLEM GUNNING	135
41	A public choice perspective on IMF and World Bank lending and conditionality	151
	AXEL DREHER	
PA	RT 3	
Or 42	ganisations and structure The high politics of IMF lending STROM C. THACKER	171 173

43	The political economy of the International Monetary Fund: a public choice analysis ROLAND VAUBEL	209
44	Democratizing the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank: governance and accountability	248
	JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ	
PAR	RT 4	
	mpliance	279
45	International law and state behaviour: commitment and compliance in international monetary affairs BETH A: SIMMONS	281
46	IMF program compliance: aggregate index <i>versus</i> policy specific research strategies  JAMES R. VREELAND	313
47	Compliance and international soft law: why do countries implement the Basle accord?	337
	DANIEL E. HO	
PAF	RT 5	
Res	sults	381
48	The International Monetary Fund and the developing countries: a review of the evidence and policy options GRAHAM BIRD	383
49	Effectiveness of IMF-supported stabilization programs in developing countries  AY\$E Y. EVRENSEL	418

# VOLUME IV ENVIRONMENT

	Acknowledgements	ix
	Introduction	1
PAR Rat	et 1 cionale	13
50	The tragedy of the commons G. HARDIN	15
51	The limits to growth, a global challenge; a report for the Club of Rome Project on the predicament of mankind D. MEADOWS	29
52	The problem of global environmental protection SCOTT BARRETT	33
53	From one earth to one world: an overview WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT	51
54	The politics of international regime formation: managing natural resources and the environment ORAN R. YOUNG	65
55	Agenda 21 'UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT	92
	RT 2 nciples	99
56	'Note on the implementation of the polluter-pays principle' and 'The "polluter-pays" principle and the instruments for allocating environmental costs'  THE ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT	101

57	"The principle of "Polluter Pays" in Economics and Law', 'Commentary' and 'Summary of Discussion' HANS CUR. BUGGE, BRUCE ACKERMAN AND ENDRE STAVANG	119
58	Risk management: science and the precautionary principle KENNETH R. FOSTER, PAOLO VECCHIA AND MICHAEL H. REPACHOLI	156
59	The status of the precautionary principle in international law JAMES CAMERON.	162
60	Some aspects of the principle of 'Common but Differentiated Responsibilities' YOSHIRO MATSUI	181
61	The principle of common but differentiated responsibility and the balance of commitments under the climate regime	203
	LAVANYA RAJAMANI	
PAF	RT 3	
Org 62	ganisations and structure International institutions ELLEN HEY	225 227
63	International environmental agreements: incentives and political economy CARLO CARRARO AND DOMENICO SINISCALCO	247
64	Environmental consciousness and moral hazard in international agreements to protect the environment EMMANUEL PETRAKIS AND ANASTASIOS XEPAPADEAS	259
65	Governing the global environmental commons: the political economy of international environmental treaties and institutions  ROGER CONGLETON	275
66	Legitimacy and the privatization of environmental governance: how Non-State Market-Driven (NSMD) governance systems gain rule-making authority BENJAMIN CASHORE	300

	mplianas	329
CO	mpliance	329
67	Compliance theory: an overview RONALD B. MITCHELL	331
68	Conclusions KAL RAUSTIALA AND DAVID G. VICTOR	370
69	Self-enforcing international environmental agreements SCOTT BARRETT	405
70	Compliance with international environmental agreements MICHAEL FAURE AND JURGEN LEFEVERE	424
71	Cost of compliance with the Kyoto Protocol: a developing country perspective ROY BOYD AND MARJA E. IBARRARAN	444
PAF	RT 5	
Re	sults	467
72	The effectiveness of international environmental regimes ORAN R. YOUNG AND MARC A. LEVY, WITH GAIL OSHERENKO	469
	Index	497