APPOINTING CENTRAL BANKERS

The Politics of Monetary Policy in the United States and the European Monetary Union

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Contents

List c	of Figu	res	bage x			
List c	of Tab	les	xi			
		gments	xiii			
1	Intro	duction	I			
.1.	I.I	The Book's Main Questions				
		~	3			
	1.2	Question 1: Do Politicians Influence Monetary Policy	4			
		through Appointments?				
	1.3					
	1.4					
		Reserve Appointments?	10			
	1.5	Implications	14			
	1.6	The Plan of the Book	17			
2	A Fo	ormal Model of the Appointment Process	20			
	2.1	An Informal Description of the Appointment Process	20			
	2.2	The Appointment Process Model	21			
		2.2.1 Assumptions and Definitions	2.1			
		2.2.2 The Sequence	25			
		2.2.3 An Example	26			
		2.2.4 Possible Outcomes	27			
		2.2.5 Actual Outcomes: Adding the President and the				
		Senate	31			
	2.3	An Extension of the Model to Multiple Appointments	33			
	2.4	Summary				
	2.5	Appendix: The Board of Governors	35			
3	Estimating Monetary Policy Preferences					
	3.1	The Basic Problems	37			
		3.1.1 Problem 1: Economic Conditions	37			

Contents

		3.1.2 Problem 2: Comparisons across Time				
		and Institutions	38			
	3.2	The Preference Estimation Model	39			
		3.2.1 Assumptions	39			
		3.2.2 The Model	41			
		3.2.3 The α_i s as Ideal Point Estimates	42			
	3.3	Data, Estimated Model, and Results	43			
		3.3.1 The Data	43			
		3.3.2 The Estimated Model	46			
	3.4	Summary	54			
	3.5	Appendix: A Comparison with NOMINATE	55			
ł	Emp	Empirically Testing the Model's Predictions				
	4.1	The Data on Appointments				
	4.2	The Procedures for Testing the Model	62			
		4.2.1 Identifying PRED	63			
		4.2.2 Identifying ACTUAL	64			
		4.2.3 Comparing PRED to ACTUAL	65			
	4.3	Hypothesis Tests - FOMC	66			
		4.3.1 Hypothesis Tests 1: Political Influence on				
		Monetary Policy?	66			
		4.3.2 Hypothesis Tests 2: Who Influences?	71			
	4.4	Hypothesis Tests - BOG	78			
		4.4.1 Hypothesis Tests 1: Political Influence on				
	_	Monetary Policy?	78			
		4.4.2 Hypothesis Tests 2: Who Influences?	83			
	4.5	•	86			
	4.6		90			
5		Appointments to the European Central Bank				
	5.1	A Comparison of the United States and European				
		Monetary Union Monetary Systems	93			
		5.1.1 The Appointing Actors	94			
		5.1.2 The Institutions of Monetary Policy	90			
	5.2	The Model				
		5.2.1 The Model's Assumptions	99			
		5.2.2 Sequence	10			
		5.2.3 Possible Outcomes	10			
		5.2.4 Actual Outcomes: Adding the Heads of States	10			
		5.2.5 Extensions and Comparisons to the Fed	10			
	5.3	A Prediction	10			
		s a r Ideal Points	TO			

Contents

		5.3.2	May 1998: The Game, Equilibrium, and Policy			
			Outcome	110		
		5.3.3	The Enlargement of the European Monetary	•		
			Union	113		
	5.4	Summ	ary	114		
6	The Origins of the Federal Reserve Appointment Process					
	6.1	The Theoretical Framework				
		6.1.1	Assumptions and Definitions	116		
		6.1.2	The Theory: Relating Centralization and			
			Appointment Power	117		
	6.2	Background				
		6.2.1	The Pre-Federal Reserve Banking System	118		
		6.2.2	The Actors Behind Banking Reform	120		
	6.3	The Creation of the Federal Reserve				
		6.3.1	The First Legislative Attempts: The Republican			
			Plans	123		
		6.3.2	Bigger and Better Republican Plans	125		
		6.3.3	The Advent of the Federal Reserve System: The			
			First Democratic Plan	130		
		6.3.4	Restructuring the Federal Reserve: The Second			
			Democratic Plan	133		
	6.4	Summ	nary	137		
7	Con	clusion	s	139		
Bib	liograț	ohy		147		
Index						