

TAXING THE HARD-TO-TAX

Lessons from Theory and Practice

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CONTENTS

List of Contributors	xv
PART 1 THE LANDSCAPE OF THE HARD-TO-TAX	1
Chapter 1 Introduction to the Volume	3
<i>James Aim, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Sally Wallace</i>	
PART 2 THE MANY DIMENSIONS OF THE HARD-TO-TAX	9
Chapter 2 'Sizing' the Problem of the Hard-to-Tax	11
<i>James Aim, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Friedrich Schneider</i>	
2.1 Introduction	12
2.2 Identifying the hard-to-tax	13
2.2.1 Who are the hard-to-tax?	13
2.2.2 Defining and estimating the shadow economy	15
2.2.3 Some simple correlations	25
2.3 The impact of the hard-to-tax on revenues and tax structure	26
2.4 The impact of the hard-to-tax on the efficiency of resource allocation	33
2.4.1 The nature of the efficiency effects of the hard-to-tax	33
2.4.2 Measuring the static excess burden of the hard-to-tax	35
2.4.3 Estimating the dynamic impact of the hard-to-tax on economic growth	39
2.5 Equity and income distribution: what is the incidence of the hard-to-tax?	44
2.6 Summary and conclusions	48
Acknowledgements	49
References	50
Appendix A. Methods to estimate the size of the shadow economy	56
A.1 Direct approaches	56
A.2 Indirect approaches	57
A.2.1 The discrepancy between national expenditure and income statistics	57
A.2.2 The discrepancy between the official and actual labor forces	58
A.2.3 The transactions approach	58

A.2.4	The currency demand approach	59
A.2.5	The physical input (electricity consumption) method	61
A.3	The model approach	62
Appendix B.	Description of data in correlations	65
Appendix C.	Equations of general equilibrium model	66
Appendix D.	Data set for growth regressions	68
D.1	Countries	68
D.2	Definition of the variables	68
D.2.1	GDP per capita on PPP basis [gdpc]	68
D.2.2	Annual GDP per capita growth rate [growgdpc]	68
D.2.3	Shadow economy [shad]	71
D.2.4	Shadow economy industrialized countries [shadind]	72
D.2.5	Shadow economy developing countries [shaddev]	72
D.2.6	Openness [open] ,	72
D.2.7	Inflation rate [irifl]	72
D.2.8	Inflation rate other countries [inflrest]	72
D.2.9	Inflation rate transition countries [infltran]	72
D.2.10	Government consumption [gov]	73
D.2.11	Lagged GDP per capita growth rate [lastgrowth]	73
D.2.12	Total population in millions [pop]	73
D.2.13	Capital accumulation rate [caac]	73
D.2.14	Dummy industrialized countries [ind]	74
D.2.15	Dummy transition countries [tran]	74
D.2.16	Dummy OECD countries [oecd]	74
D.2.17	Foreign direct investment [fdi]	74
D.2.18	Annual FDI growth rate [fdigrowth]	74
D.2.19	Labor force [lab]	75
D.2.20	Annual labor force growth rate [labgrowth]	75

Chapter 3 Measuring Hard-to-Tax Income by Tax Compliance and National Accounts Information 77

Francois Vaillancourt

3.1	Introduction	77
3.2	HTTI and HTTY: socio-demographic determinants and importance by income type	78
3.2.1	Socio-demographic factors	79
3.2.2	Type of income	79
3.3	HTTY: measuring its importance	83
3.3.1	Canada, 1971-2001	83
3.3.2	An international estimation of compliant income	87

	IX
3.4 Policy implications and conclusions	92
3.4.1 Why the differences?	92
3.4.2 What consequences?	92
Acknowledgements	93
References	93
Discussant Comment: <i>Laura Sour</i>	95
PART 3 CAN - AND SHOULD - THE HARD-TO-TAX BE TAXED?	99
Chapter 4 Presumptive Taxation of the Hard-to-Tax <i>Victor Thuronyi</i>	101
4.1 Presumptive methods in general	103
4.2 Overall architecture , •	106
4.2.1 Thresholds to exclude hard-to-tax from tax net	107
4.2.2 What taxes should presumptive taxation replace?	108
4.2.3 How to define taxpayers eligible for presumptive regimes	109
4.2.4 Role of presumptive taxation in the system	110
4.3 Agriculture	111
4.4 Contractual method (forfait)	112
4.5 Percentage of gross receipts	114
4.6 Fixed amount based on profession or trade (patente)	116
4.7 Standard assessment guide (tachshiv)	118
4.8 Conclusion	120
Chapter 5 Is it Really so Hard to Tax the Hard-to-Tax? The Context and Role of Presumptive Taxes <i>Richard M. Bird and Sally Wallace</i>	121
5.1 Introduction	121
5.2 Presumptive taxation: objectives and approaches	125
5.2.1 Varieties of HTT and objectives of HTT policy	126
5.2.2 Approaches to taxing the HTT	129
5.2.2.1 Legitimize HTT status	129
5.2.2.2 Enforce the law	129
5.2.2.3 The indirect approach	131
5.2.2A The presumptive approach	133
5.3 Simplified tax regimes in transitional countries	138
5.3.1 Ukraine	138
5.3.2 Russia	141
5.4 The design and effects of presumptive taxes	143
5.4.1 The threshold issue	143

5.4.2	Rebuttable or not?	145
5.4.3	How effective are presumptive taxes?	145
5.4.3.1	Simplified taxes revisited	148'
5.4.3.1.1	Ukraine	148
5.4.3.1.2	Russia	151
5.5	Options for taxing the HTT in developing and transitional countries	152
5.6	Conclusions	155
	Acknowledgements	155
	References	155
Discussant Comment:	<i>William Randolph</i>	159
PART 4	REACHING THE HARD-TO-TAX	165
Chapter 6	Mapping the US Tax Compliance Continuum	167
	<i>Brian Erard and Chin-Chin Ho</i>	
6.1	Introduction	167
6.2	Data sources	169
6.2.1	TCMP filer data	170
6.2.2	TCMP non-filer data	170
6.2.3	Combined sample	172
6.3	Imputation of undetected non-compliance	172
6.3.1	General approach	173
6.3.2	Undeclared tip income	173
6.3.3	Undeclared informal supplier income	175
6.3.3.1	University of Michigan study	175
6.3.3.2	From gross sales to net underreported income	176
6.3.4	Expanded estimate of tax non-compliance	177
6.4	Results: mapping the compliance continuum	178
6.4.1	Overall non-compliance by occupation	178
6.4.2	Non-filers	184
6.5	Some possible explanations for the findings	184
6.6	Conclusions	185
	Acknowledgements	186
	References	186
Chapter 7	Costs and Benefits of Marginal Reallocation of Tax Agency Resources in Pursuing the Hard-to-Tax	187
	<i>Dmitri Romanov</i>	
7.1	Introduction	187
7.2	The hard-to-tax: a classification	189

7.3	A cost-benefit analysis of the hard-to-tax	191
7.4	The shadow price of auditing resources	193
7.5	Detection controlled estimation of evasion	201
7.5.1	The model	202
7.5.2	Explanatory variables	205
7.5.3	Estimation results	207
7.6	Conclusions	209
	Acknowledgements	210
	References	210
	Appendix A	213

Discussant Comment:	<i>Mark Rider</i>	215
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PART 5 SECTOR EXPERIENCES IN THE TAXATION OF THE HARD-TO-TAX **219**

Chapter 8	Sales Taxation in a Global Economy	221
	<i>William F. Fox and Matthew N. Murray</i>	

8.1	Introduction	221
8.2	Role of sales and use taxes in US sub-national government finance	223
8.3	Sales tax structure and administration in the US	227
8.4	Current scope of the HTT problem	230
8.4.1	Tax enforcement: auditing	230
8.4.2	Tax avoidance	231
8.4.3	Tax evasion	232
8.5	An alternative view of the HTT problem	235
8.5.1	Limited taxation of services	235
8.5.2	Legislated exemptions	236
8.5.3	Cross-border shopping	237
8.5.4	Technology changes	238
8.6	Globalization and sales taxation	238
8.7	Conclusion	241
	References	242

Chapter 9	Taxing Agriculture in a Developing Country: A Possible Approach	245
	<i>Indira Rajaraman</i>	

9.1	Introduction	245
9.2	Is agriculture hard-to-tax: cross-country evidence	248
9.3	Land-based levies: theory and Indian evidence	251
9.4	The design for a feasible crop-specific levy	254
9.5	Advantages of local taxation of agriculture	260

9.6 Conclusion	263
References	265
Discussant Comment: Kelly Edmiston	269
PART 6 COUNTRY EXPERIENCES FOR THE TAXATION OF THE HARD-TO-TAX	273
Chapter 10 Creating a Favorable Tax Environment for Small Business	275
<i>Michael Engelschalk</i>	
10.1 Small business development and compliance	276
10.2 System design	278
10.2.1 The spread of presumptive systems	278
10.2.2 Choice of system	282
10.2.2.1 Turnover/gross income-based presumptive systems	283
10.2.2.2 Indicator-based systems	285
10.2.2.3 General patents	286
10.3 Other design issues	287
10.3.1 Treatment of individuals versus legal persons	287
10.3.2 Determination of the system threshold	288
10.3.3 The dispute over a revised threshold in Russia	290
10.3.4 Number of taxes replaced by the simplified system	291
10.4 Operation of the systems	291
10.4.1 Stability and predictability of the taxation regime	292
10.4.1.1 Simplified taxation in the Tax Code of Georgia	293
10.4.1.2 Presumptive taxation in Albania	294
10.4.2 Clarity and simplicity of simplified systems	296
10.4.2.1 Presumptive taxation in Ukraine	296
10.4.3 Reducing the compliance burden for taxpayers	298
10.5 Tax burden and revenue potential	302
10.5.1 Broadening the tax net	305
10.5.2 Business perception	308
10.6 Conclusion	309
References	310
Chapter 11 Taxing the Urban Unrecorded Economy in Sub-Saharan Africa	313
<i>Catherine Araujo-Bonjean and Gerard Chambas</i>	
11.1 Introduction	313
11.2 The importance of unrecorded activities	314
11.2.1 Informal activities vs. tax evasion activities: an important distinction	314

11.2.1.1	Informal activities	315
11.2.1.2	Tax evasion activities	315
11.2.2	Estimating the size of the unrecorded sector in Africa	317
11.3	The justifications for taxing the unrecorded sector	318
11.3.1	Tax revenue objective	318
11.3.2	Incentive objective	319
11.3.3	Equity objective	319
11.4	Tax potential of the unrecorded sector: an evaluation	320
11.4.1	Tax potential of informal activities	320
11.4.2	Tax potential of the tax evasion activities	321
11.5	Taxation strategies for unrecorded activities	322
11.5.1	Taxation of 'tax evasion activities'	322
1 1.5.1.1	Tax enforcement vis-a-vis 'tax evasion activities'	322
I 1.5.1.2	Withholding profit tax	323
11.5.2	Taxation of informal activities: a unified business tax	325
11.5.2.1	Foundations of a unified business tax	325
1 1.5.2.2	Experiences of simplified taxation of informal activities	325
11.5.2.3	Implementing a unified business tax on informal activities	326
11.5.3	Conclusion	327
References		328
Discussant Comment:	<i>Milka Casanegra</i>	331
PART 7 STRATEGIES FOR TAXING THE HARD-TO-TAX IN THE 21ST CENTURY		335
Chapter 12 Reaching the Hardest to Tax: Consequences and Possibilities		337
	<i>Roy Bahl</i>	
12.1	Who are the hard-to-tax?	338
12.2	Should the HTT sector be taxed?	342
12.3	The HTT and revenue mobilization	345
12.4	Can the HTT sector be taxed?	348
12.4.1	Voluntary compliance	348
12.4.2	Exemption	350
12.4.3	Presumptive taxation	351
12.4.4	Tax policy	352
12.5	Conclusion	353
References		354
Subject Index		355