



# **Regulation Without the State**

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# Contents

	<b>Foreword</b>	<i>Martin Ricketts</i>	5
	<b>The Authors</b>		9
	<b>Acknowledgements</b>		11
<b>1</b>	<b>Government versus Voluntary Regulation</b>		13
<b>2</b>	<b>Some Problems of Principle</b>		14
<b>3</b>	<b>A Question of Costs</b>		16
<b>4</b>	<b>Who Bears the Costs of Regulation?</b>		17
<b>5</b>	<b>Over-Regulation</b>		18
<b>6</b>	<b>Interest Groups and Regulation</b>		21
<b>7</b>	<b>Problems Inherent in Regulated Markets</b>		22
	Regulatory Bodies Tend to Expand		22
	Some Firms Seek Regulation and Competition Is Suppressed		23
	Firms May Capture Regulators		23
	Regulation Is Popular with Politicians		24
<b>8</b>	<b>High Costs and Perverse Consequences</b>		24
<b>9</b>	<b>Regulation Without the State</b>		27
<b>10</b>	<b>Changing the Incentives of Regulators</b>		28
<b>11</b>	<b>Voluntary Forms of Regulation</b>		30
	Standard-Setting and Compliance Procedures		30
	The Case of Underwriters Laboratories		30
	Green Seal, Scientific Certification Systems, and Eco-Rating		31
	Consumer Information and Rating Agencies		32
	Engineering Insurance		32
	<i>Box 1: The Birth and Development of Engineering Insurance Companies</i>		34

	The North Sea	35
	Alcohol Self-Regulation in Britain	36
	<i>Box 2: Voluntary Regulation in Tesco</i>	37
	Voluntary Regulation in British Retailing	37
	Transport in New Zealand	38
	<i>Box 3: Transport in New Zealand</i>	39
<hr/>		
<b>12</b>	<b>The Case for More Voluntary Regulation</b>	<b>38</b>
<hr/>		
<b>13</b>	<b>Conclusions</b>	<b>41</b>
<hr/>		
	<b>Summary</b>	<b>Back cover</b>
<hr/>		