

The Political Economy of Capital Controls

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<i>List of figures</i>	<i>figures</i>	<i>page</i> x
<i>List of tables</i>		xii
<i>Preface</i>		xiii
	I'	
1 Introduction		1
1 The reasons for capital controls		
2 Political-economic determinants of capital controls		9
2.1 The inefficiency of capital controls and their prevalence		• 9
2.2 Traditional reasons for capital controls		14
2.3 The relevance of a social planner's perspective and the political-economic approach		24
2.4 Political-economic reasons for capital controls		31
2.5 Concluding remark		54
3 Capital controls in a small open economy		56
3.1 Introduction		56
3.2 A simple model of international capital movements		58
3.3 Individual's optimal tax rate		60
3.4 Formation of capital controls via majority voting		63
3.5 The specific factors model		65
3.6 On the relevance of the median voter model		72
4 Extensions: Large open economy and unemployment		86
4.1 Introduction		86
4.2 Two-country model with full employment		88
4.3 Capital export and unemployment		92
4.4 Conclusion		100
		vii

II	The evasion of capital controls	
5	Ways and means to escape the restrictions	105
5.1	Introduction	105
5.2	The existing literature	108
5.3	Our approach	114
6	Misinvoicing international trade: Imports	119
6.1	Investigation and detection	120
6.2	The importer's optimal evasion	127
6.3	Comparative static results	136
6.4	Policy implications	141
7	Misinvoicing international trade: Exports	145
7.1	The economic problem	146
7.2	The probability of detection and the equilibrium misdeclaration	148
7.3	Comparative statics and policy considerations	152
III	Empirical measurement of the effectiveness of capital controls	
8	The effects of capital controls - unexploited profit opportunities?	159
	Return differentials	166
9.1	Introduction	166
9.2	Capital controls and the covered interest rate parity	167
9.3	The model of Dooley and Isard	171
9.4	A case study for Norway	173
9.5	Other return differentials	177
9.6	Conclusion	180
10	The correlation of saving and investment	182
10.1	Introduction	182
10.2	The "Feldstein-Horioka puzzle"	184
10.3	Measuring the correlation of saving and investment: Methodological issues	192
10.4	A case study for Norway	199
10.5	Conclusion	208
11	Finale	211

Appendix A Notation and abbreviations	216
A.1 Notation used in part I	216
A.2 Notation used in part II	218
A.3 Notation used in part III	219
A.4 Abbreviations	220
Appendix B Appendices to part II	221
B.1 Qualitative analysis of the importer's expected-profit function	221
B.2 The effect of tax and tariff rates and the strictness of capital controls on misdeclaration and evasion	227
B.3 Qualitative analysis of the exporter's expected-profit function	234
Appendix C Appendices to part III	240
C.1 Data sources	240
C.2 Explanation of the test statistics in the tables	240
C.3 Sensitivity analysis for the results on the oil sector	241
<i>References</i>	244
<i>Index</i>	276