

Marko Lindroos COOPERATION AND CONFLICTS IN HIGH SEAS FISHERIES

HELSINKI SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION ACTA UNIVERSITATIS OECONOMICAE HELSINGIENSIS

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