

Limiting Leviathan

Edited by

Dr. Donald P. Racheter

*Executive Director, Public Interest Institute
and Professor of Political Science, Central College, USA*

Dr. Richard E. Wagner

*Public Interest Institute Academic Advisory Board Chairman
and Holbert L. Harris Professor of Economics, George Mason
University, USA*

Edward Elgar

Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA

Contents

<i>List, of Figures and Tables</i>	vii
<i>List of Contributors</i>	viii
<i>Preface</i>	x

1. Faustian Bargains and Constitutional Governance
Donald P. Racheter and Richard E. Wagner

PART ONE: WHY SHOULD GOVERNMENT BE LIMITED?

2. The Purpose and Limits of Government <i>Roger Pilon</i>	13
3. Constitutionally-limited Government Versus Popular Democracy <i>William C. Mitchell</i>	38
4. Government: An Expensive Provider <i>William S. Peirce</i>	56

PART TWO: WHICH LIMITS ON GOVERNMENT ARE APPROPRIATE?

5. Constitutional Limits Versus Statutory Rules <i>Randy T. Simmons</i>	77
6. Constitutional Spending Limitations and the Optimal Size of Government <i>Richard K. Vedder and Lowell E. Gallaway</i>	96
7. Tax Limits <i>Randall G. Holcombe</i>	115
8. Regulatory Limits <i>Eugenia F. Toma</i>	140

9. The Case for Congressional Term Limits is the Same
as the Case for Pollution Control ' 1 6 1
Dwight R. Lee
10. Electoral Limits 176
Gary M. Anderson

PART THREE: ARE AUXILIARY PRECAUTIONS NEEDED?

11. Federalist Theory and Polycentricity:
Learning from Local Governments 203
Robert L. Bish
12. Searching for Order:
The Costly Interaction of Formal and Informal Systems 221
Bnice Yandle
13. Technological and Economic Limitations on Governments 238
Richard B. McKenzie

- Index* s 257