

The Political Economy of Predation

Manhunting and the Economics of Escape

MEHRDAD VAHABI

University Paris 8 and Centre
d'Economie de la Sorbonne

CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Contents

<i>List of Tables and Figures</i>	page x
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	xiii
<i>Prologue</i>	xvii
1 Introduction	1
1.1 Problem Statement	1
1.2 Predation and Conflictual Costs	6
1.3 Predation and Domination	14
1.4 Predation and the Economics of Escape	21
1.5 Economic Rationale of the State Space	28
1.6 Tyranny as Inclusive Predation and Democracy	35
2 The Meaning of Predation	41
Introduction	41
2.1 Interspecific Predation	45
2.2 Intraspecific Cannibalistic Predation	50
2.3 Intraspecific Non-cannibalistic Predation	52
2.4 Dominance Drive and the Roots of Human Predatory Violence	56
2.5 <i>Homo CEconomicus</i> and Predatory Activity	61
2.6 Human Species as the Master Predator	69
2.7 Manhunting and Cynegetic Power	76
Conclusion	88
3 Domination, Manhunting and Conflictual Costs and Benefits	90
Introduction	90
3.1 Domination Assumption and Two Types of Warfare	90

3.2	Domination: Predator as Protector	101
3.3	Flight versus Fight	105
3.4	Exclusive Manhunting: Conflictual Costs and Benefits	110
3.5	Empirical Economic Literature and Missing Conflictual Benefits	124
3.6	Exclusive Manhunting: Absolute and Differential Protection Rents (Type II)	135
3.7	Inclusive Manhunting: Absolute and Differential Protection Rents (Type I)	149
	Conclusion	154
4	Rational Conflict Theory, Paradox of War and Strategic Manhunting	156
	Introduction	156
4.1	Modelling Individual Predators and Rent-Seeking: Greed versus Grievance	156
4.2	Predation Models and Missing Conflictual Costs	164
4.3	Rational Conflict as an Economic Transaction	166
4.4	Paradox of War and Rationalist Explanations of War	170
4.5	Bargaining Model of War and Manhunting: Pre-emptive and Preventive Wars	175
4.6	A Theory of Destructive Entrepreneurship and Strategic Manhunting	184
4.7	Economic Benefits of Destructive Entrepreneurship and an Illustration	191
	Conclusion	197
5	Appropriation, Violent Enforcement and Transaction Costs	198
	Introduction	198
5.1	Transaction Costs and Coase Theorem	200
5.2	Transaction Costs and Conflictual Costs	202
5.3	In the Beginning There Were Markets	204
5.4	In the Beginning There Was a Hobbesian State	208
5.5	Coase Theorem and Appropriative Activity	213
5.6	Extension of the Coase Theorem to Coercive Power	219
	Conclusion	228
6	Appropriation, the State Space and the Economics of Escape	231
	Introduction	231

6.1	Property Rights and the Booty Value of an Asset	232
6.2	Escape and Captive Assets	236
6.3	Dimensions of Escape Assets	243
6.4	Appropriation, Entitlements and Legitimacy Costs	254
6.5	Economic Rationale of the State Space: The Prey's Perspective	260
6.6	Economic Rationale of the State Space: The Predator's Perspective	268
6.7	Confiscatory Regime and Indeterminate Property Rights: Bonyads	276
6.8	Protection Costs and Assets Structure: <i>Setad</i>	284
	Conclusion	289
7	Predatory Nature of the State and Democracy	291
	Introduction	291
7.1	The Nature of Protection as a Good	292
7.2	Tyranny and Olson's Idea of Encompassing Interest	297
7.3	Sellers' versus Buyers' Protection Market	303
7.4	Coercive Redistribution: Welfare-Degrading or Welfare-Enhancing	311
7.5	Democracy as a Buyers' Protection Market	320
7.6	Transition to the Buyers' Protection Market: The Limits of Exit	326
7.7	State Protective Capacity and Protection Market Variation	331
7.8	The Sources of Predation in Democracy	335
	Conclusion	343
	<i>Epilogue</i>	345
	<i>References</i>	351
	<i>Index</i>	391