

# THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE, AID AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT POLICIES

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2004



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Amsterdam - Boston - Heidelberg - London - New York - Oxford - Paris - San Diego San Francisco - Singapore - Sydney - Tokyo

# **Contents**

Forew	ord	vii
Preface	2	ix
Contri	butors	xi
Chapte	er 1	Introduction
		Devashish Mitra and Arvind Panagariya
1.1		
1.2		4
1.3		6
1.4		7
Refere	nces	
		Part I. Making of Trade Policy: Theory
Chapt	er 2	Trade Policy Making by an Assembly
2.1	Introdu	ction
2.2		fic-factors model14
2.2	2.2.1	Basic structure. 14
	2.2.2	Voters' preferences and equilibrium
	2.2.3	Comparative statistics
2.3		er-Heckscher-Ohlin Model
2.4		ctoral college
2.5		sions and open questions
		ents
	_	28
Chant	2	Charld Beller, Malana be Conserved About Adjustment Costs 9 2.1
Chapter 3		<b>Should Policy Makers be Concerned About Adjustment Costs?</b> . 3 1 <i>Carl Davidson and Steven J. Matusz</i>
3.1	Introdu	ction
3.2	The mo	del
	3.2.1	Background
	3.2.2	Formalizing the model and finding the initial steady state 37

	3.2.3	Adjustment	
	3.2.4	Strengths and weaknesses of our n	
3.3	Aggre	gate adjustment costs	
3.4	Adjust	ment costs and labor market	flexibility 53
3.5	Conclu	ısion	
Ackr	owledgei	ments	
Appe	endix A.		
Appe	endix B		
1 1			
Refe	rences		
Chap	oter 4	Non-Tariff Barriers as a Test of P	colitical Economy Theories69
		Philip I. Levy	
4.1		uction	
4.2		oping testable implications of the theo	•
4.3		ical evidence	
	4.3.1	Existing tests	
	4.3.2		
4.4	4.3.3		
4.4 4.5		ative explanations	
		ısion	
	_	ments	
Keie	rences		
CI.		What Daniel Dalle and East and	C NI A EVEN A .
Cna	pter 5	The Peculiar Political Economy o Complexity, Uncertainty and Foot	
		H. Keith Hall and Douglas R. Nelso	
5.1	The f	act: footloose aggregate preferences o	
5.2		complexity, social learning and footl	
5.3		ustrative model	
5.4		usion: on economists as participants	
		le policy	
Ack		ments	
Refe	erences		
		Part II. Making of Trade Policy:	Empirical Analysis
Cho	pter 6	Interest and Ideology in the 1988	Omnibus Trade Act
Ciia	pur u	A Bayesian Multivariate Probit A	
		Alok K. Bohara and Kishore Gawa	
6.1	Introd	luction	
6.2		ground: the Trade Omnibus Act.	

6.3	Analysi	is of the multivariate probit model	119
6.4	Theory	and measurement	122
6.5	Data		126
6.6 Empirica		cal analysis	130
	6.6.1	Substantive issues of focus.	130
	6.6.2	Analysis of MVP estimates from HOUSE voting	131
	6.6.3	Analysis of MVP estimates from SENATE voting	137
	6.6.4	Sensitivity analyses	
6.7	Model	comparisons: Ideology versus interest	143
6.8	Conclus	sion	150
	_	nents.	
		Bayesian analysis of the multivariate probit model	
Refere	ences		155
Chapt		Industry and Factor Linkages Between Lobby Groups Christopher Magee	
7.1		ction	
7.2	-		
7.3	_	cal analysis	
7.4	Conclu	sion	174
Refere	ences		175
Chap	ter 8	Sweetening the Pot: How American Sugar Buys Protection_	177
-		Omer Gokcekus, Justin Knowles and Edward Tower	
8.1	Introdu	uction	178
8.2	The US	S sugar program	179
	8.2.1	Price support loans	179
	8.2.2	Import restrictions	180
8.3	Consec	quences of the program	180
	8.3.1	Increases users' costs	
	8.3.2	Benefits for producers	181
	8.3.3	Net effect	182
8.4	Sugar i	interest groups' contributions	182
8.5	Detern	ninants of sugar's campaign contributions	184
8.6		nal effects of different attributes on the probability of getting	
	money	and the amount of money received by incumbent senators	188
8.7	Conclu	ding remarks	192
Ackn	owledgen	nents	193
Refer	ences		193

# Part III. Inter-Country Interactions

Chapter 9		Unilateralism in Trade Policy: A Survey of Alternative			
		Political-Economy Approaches	197		
		Pravin Krishna and Devashish Mitra			
9.1		ction			
9.2		s of reciprocated unilateralism			
	9.2.1	A median-voter model	200		
	9.2.2	A model with trade policy lobbying and endogenous			
		lobby formation			
	9.2.3	A model of leadership in trade policy negotiations			
9.3	Models	s of endogenous unilateralism	209		
	9.3.1	Unilateral commitment to free trade as a means of			
		preventing capital misallocation	209		
	9.3.2	Unilateral commitment to free trade as a means of			
		preventing wasteful political (organizational) activity	209		
9.4		ding remarks: the current state of the literature and issues			
	for futu	ıre research	210		
Refere	ences		212		
Chapt	ter 10	Trade Creation and Residual Quota Protection in a			
Спарі	ICI 10	Free Trade Area with Domestic Monopoly	213		
		David H. Feldman and Martin Richardson	213		
10.1	Introdu	action.	214		
10.1		domestic firm			
10.2	10.2.1	An FTA may not lead to any trade creation			
	10.2.1	Welfare effects.			
10.3		olitical economy of FTA formation.			
10.5	10.3.1	FTA is politically unattractive when profits and revenues			
	10.5.1	are equally valued	222		
	10.3.2	FTA can only be politically attractive if profits are more			
	10.5.2	highly valued than revenues.	225		
10.4	Conalu	sions.			
		ISIOIIS.			
Keier	ences		231		
Chap	ter 11	The Political Economy of Trade Sanctions Against			
r		South Africa: A Gravity Model Approach	233		
		William H. Kaempfer and Martin Ross			
11.1	Introd	uction: the law of demand for sanctions	234		
11.2		African trade during the 1980s			

			XIX
11.3	The gra	vity model of trade	238
11.4	Empiric	al results	241
11.5	Conclud	ling remarks	243
	_	ents	
Refere	ences		244
		Part IV. Aid and Foreign Investment Policies	
Chapt	ter 12	The Political Economy of Unconditional and Conditional	
		Foreign Assistance: Grants vs. Loan Rollovers	249
		Wolfgang Mayer and Alex Mourmouras	
12.1		etion	
12.2		mmon agency model	
	12.2.1	Decision makers and their objectives.	
	12.2.2	Political equilibrium with unconditional assistance	
	12.2.3	Political equilibrium with conditional assistance	
12.3		ents of assistance: loan rollovers vs. a final grant	
12.4		litional assistance: the IFI should use a grant	
	12.4.1 12.4.2	Unconditional loan decisions.	
12.5		Unconditional grant decisions	
12.3	12.5.1	Conditional loan decisions.	
	12.5.1	Conditional grant decisions.	
12.6		ding remarks.	
		ients.	
		Derivation of Equation 18.	
		Derivation of Equation 19.	
		of Equation 15.	
Chap	ter 13	Crowding Out and Distributional Effects of FDI Policies.	.277
		Amy Jocelyn Glass and Kamal Saggi	
13.1		ction	
13.2			
13.3		ervention and national treatment	
13.4		ninatory treatment	
	13.4.1	Equilibrium.	
	13.4.2	Policy.	
13.5	13.4.3 Most fe	Discriminatory versus national treatment	
13.3	13.5.1	Equilibrium	
	13.5.1	Policy	
	10.0.2	* VIIV 1, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	

	13.5.3	Discriminatory versus MFN treatment.	290
		MFN versus national treatment	
13.6	Anothe	er basis for discrimination	291
13.7	Conclu	ısion	292
Ackno	owledgen	ments	293
• •		Proof of Proposition 1	
	A.2.	Proof of Proposition 2	294
	A.3.	Proof of Proposition 3	
	A.4.	Proof of Proposition 4	
	A.5.	Proof of Proposition 5.	
	A.6.	Proof of Proposition 6	
Refer	ences	*	
Inday			301