

COALITIONS IN OLIGOPOLIES

An Introduction to the Sequential Procedure

Murray Brown, Emeritus
Slate University of New York
at Buffalo, 441: Fronczak Hall,
North Campus-, Buffalo,
NY 14260, USA .

and

Shin-Hwan Chiang
Department of Economics,
York University, Toronto,
Ontario, Canada, M3J1P3

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