## Fighting for Credibility

US Reputation and International Politics

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## Contents

## Acknowledgments ix

Reconsidered 71

11chnowledgments 1X	
Introduction 3	
Chemical Weapons in Syria, 2012–13 5	
Credibility and International Politics: The Case for Reputations 5	
Credibility and International Politics: The Case against Reputations 14	•
Coercive Outcome in Syria 21	
Syria as a Deterrence/Compellence "Success"? 23	
Postscript 25	
Outline and Objectives 28	
1 Reputations Research and Premature Closure of Inquiry 30	
The Press-Mercer-Hopf Consensus 31	
1.1 Hopf (1994) "Peripheral Visions" 38	
1.2 Press (2005) "Calculating Credibility" 41	
1.3 Mercer (1996) "Reputation and International Politics"	46
Premature Closure of Inquiry: An Illustration 50	
1.4 Application of P-M-H Consensus Excludes Important	
Research on International Reputations 54	
The Missing Scholarship 55	
Conclusion 69	

2 Reputations Matter: Rational Deterrence Theory and Credibility

2.1 Four Core Prerequisites of Credible Coercive Threats

RDT and Necessity and Sufficiency 76

Reassessing Fearon 79

- 2.2 Reputations and Imperfect Information 82
- 2.3 Similarity and Transferability of Reputations and Credibility 88
- 2.4 Reputations and Miscalculations 93
- 2.5 General versus Specific Reputations 96
- 2.6 Reputations, Credibility, and Transferability Are in the Eyes of the Beholder 99

Conclusion 104

- 3 US Reputation Building in Deterrence Encounters, 1991–2003 105
  - Case 1 Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992–5) 108

Case 2 – Kosovo (1998–9) 120

Case 3 – Iraq (1991–2003) 135

Conclusion 148

- 4 The Strategic Logic of US Coercion: Explaining Deterrence Failures and Successes in Syria, 2011–13 149
  - 4.1 Defining Success in Syria 150
  - 4.2 Syria: RDT versus P-M-H 157

US Reputations and Past Actions 162

Escalation and Mission Creep 164

- 4.3 Protracted Crises, Probes, and Tipping Points 168Assad's Miscalculations 171
- 4.4 Credibility Paradox Punishments and Promises 175
- 4.5 Summary and Conclusions 177

Extremes Are Wrong 177

Relevant Reputations (and Credibility) Are in the Eyes of the Beholder 178

Similarities, Differences, and Relevant Cases 179

- 5 RDT, Domestic Politics, and Audience Costs 181
  - 5.1 Domestic Politics, US Credibility, and the Eyes of the Beholder 185

Domestic Politics, Past Actions, and Reputations 187

- 6 Reputations, Credibility, and Transferability: Reconsidering Syria's Relevance to Iran, North Korea, and Beyond 191
  - 6.1 Why Transferability Matters 197
  - 6.2 Complex Credibility and Transferability 202 Complex Credibility in Syria 202
    - 6.3 Iran, Transferability, and the Credibility Paradox Revisited 210

- 7 Responding to Critics: Alternative Explanations and Competing Policy Recommendations 212
  - 7.1 Alternative Explanations for the Syria Disarmament Deal 212
  - 7.2 The Real Costs of Bluffing in Syria 216
    P-M-H Consensus: Reputations Are Irrelevant so l
    - P-M-H Consensus: Reputations Are Irrelevant, so Bluffing Is Costless 217
  - 7.3 Bluffing and Bad Poker Analogies: What the Critics Miss 221

Why Bluffing Matters 221

When Bluffing Matters 224

Why Bluffing in International Politics Is Not Like Poker 225 Unintended Consequences of Congressionally Endorsed Bluffing 229

- 8 Expanding Theory-Policy Gaps in International Relations 232
  - 8.1 Theory-Policy Gap(s) and Confirmation Bias(es) 233
  - 8.2 Theory-Policy Gaps and Confirmation Bias: The Case of Post-Iraq Intelligence Reform 237
  - 8.3 Theory-Policy Gaps and Confirmation Bias: The Case of Coercive Diplomacy in Syria, 2013 240

Richard Price on Syria 241

Jonathan Mercer on Syria 244

Stephen Walt on Syria 246

Establishing Continuity in US Foreign Policy 251

8.4 From Policy to Theory: The "MIT School" and Syria 255

References 265

Index 293