UNELECTED POWER

The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State

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CONTENTS

Pref	ace	ix
1.	Introduction: Power, Welfare, Incentives, Values	1
PAR	RT I. WELFARE: The Problem, and a Possible Solution	25
2.	The Evolution of the Administrative State	27
3.	The Purposes and Functional Modes of the Administrative State: Market Failure and Government Failure	48
4.	The Structure of the Administrative State: A Hierarchy from Simple Agents to Trustees (and Guardians)	72
5.	Principles for Whether to Delegate to Independent Agencies: Credible Commitment to Settled Goals	92
6.	Design Precepts for How to Delegate to Independent Agencies	109
7 .	Applying the Principles for Delegation	127
PART II. VALUES: Democratic Legitimacy for Independent Agencies		
8.	Independent Agencies and Our Political Values and Beliefs (1): Rule of Law and Constitutionalism	173
9.	Independent Agencies and Our Political Values and Beliefs (2): The Challenges to Delegation-with-Insulation Presented by Democracy	195
10.	Credible Commitment versus Democracy: Agencies versus Judges	221
11.	The Political-Values-and-Norms Robustness Test of the Principles for Delegation	236

12.	Insulated Agencies and Constitutionalism: Central Bank Independence Driven by the Separation of Powers but Not a Fourth Branch	272		
PART III. INCENTIVES: The Administrative State in the Real World; Incentives and Values under Different Constitutional Structures				
13.	States' Capacity for Principled Delegation to Deliver Credible Commitment	307		
14.	The Problem of Vague Objectives: A Nondelegation Doctrine for IAs	334		
15.	Processes, Transparency, and Accountability: Legal Constraints versus Political Oversight	349		
16.	The Limits of Design: Power, Emergencies, and Self-Restraint	378		
PART IV. POWER: Overmighty Citizens? The Political Economy of Central Banking; Power, Legitimacy, and Reconstruction				
17.	Central Banking and the Politics of Monetary Policy	405		
18.	The Shift in Ideas: Credibility as a Surprising Door to Legitimacy	414		
19.	Tempting the Gods: Monetary Regime Orthodoxy before the Crisis	426		
20.	A Money-Credit Constitution: Central Banks and Banking Stability	438		
21.	Central Banking and the Regulatory State: Stability Policy	461		
22.	Central Banking and the Fiscal State: Balance-Sheet Policy and the Fiscal Carve-Out	482		
23.	Central Banks and the Emergency State: Lessons from Military/Civilian Relations for the Lender of Last Resort	503		

24. Overmighty Citizens After All? Threats a Reconfigurations	and 525
Conclusion: Unelected Democrats: Citizens in Not in Charge	in Service,
Appendix: The Principles for Delegation to Ind Insulated from Day-to-Day Politics	ependent Agencies 569
Acknowledgments	573
Bibliography	579
Index	. 611