

Recent Developments in the Economics of Executive Compensation Volume I

Edited by

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Contents

<i>Acknowledgements</i>	ix
<i>Introduction</i> Robert W. Kolb	xiii
PART I AN OVERVIEW OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION	
1. Steven N. Kaplan (2013), 'CEO Pay and Corporate Governance in the U.S.: Perceptions, Facts, and Challenges', <i>Journal of Applied Corporate Finance</i> , 25 (2), Spring, 8-25	3
2. John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay and David F. Larcker (2003), 'Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey', <i>Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review</i> , 9 (1), April, 27-50	21
3. Brian J. Hall and Kevin J. Murphy (2003), 'The Trouble with Stock Options', <i>Journal of Economic Perspectives</i> , 17 (3), Summer, 49-70	45
4. Arantxa Jarque (2008), 'CEO Compensation: Trends, Market Changes, and Regulation', <i>Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly</i> , 94 (3), Summer, 265-300	67
5. Carola Frydman and Dirk Jenter (2010), 'CEO Compensation', <i>Annual Review of Financial Economics</i> , 2 (1), December, 75-102	103
6. Michael Faulkender, Dalida Kadyrzhanova, N. Prabhala and Lemma Senbet (2010), 'Executive Compensation: An Overview of Research on Corporate Practices and Proposed Reforms', <i>Journal of Applied Corporate Finance</i> , 22 (1), Winter, 107-18	131
PART II THE GROWTH AND MAGNITUDE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION	
7. Lucian Bebchuk and Yaniv Grinstein (2005), 'The Growth of Executive Pay', <i>Oxford Review of Economic Policy</i> , 21 (2), Summer, 283-303	145
8. Xavier Gabaix and Augustin Landier (2008), 'Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?', <i>Quarterly Journal of Economics</i> , 123 (1), February, 49-100	166
9. Carola Frydman and Raven E. Saks (2010), 'Executive Compensation: A New View from a Long-Term Perspective, 1936—2005', <i>Review of Financial Studies</i> , 23 (5), May, 2099-138	218
10. Richard A. Lord and Yoshie Saito (2010), 'Trends in CEO Compensation and Equity Holdings for S&P 1500 Firms: 1994—2007', <i>Journal of Applied Finance</i> , 20 (2), 40-56	258

11. Martin J. Conyon, John E. Core and Wayne R. Guay (2011), 'Are U.S. CEOs Paid More Than U.K. CEOs? Inferences from Risk-adjusted Pay', *Review of Financial Studies*, **24** (2), February, 402-38 275
12. Nuno Fernandes, Miguel A. Ferreira, Pedro Matos and Kevin J. Murphy (2013), 'Are U.S. CEOs Paid More? New International Evidence', *Review of Financial Studies*, **26** (2), February, 323-67 312
13. Xavier Gabaix, Augustin Landier and Julien Sauvagnat (2014), 'CEO Pay and Firm Size: An Update after the Crisis', *Economic Journal*, **124**(574), February, F40-F59 357

PART III THE STRUCTURE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

14. Eli Ofek and David Yermack (2000), 'Taking Stock: Equity-Based Compensation and the Evolution of Managerial Ownership', *Journal of Finance*, **LV** (3), June, 1367-84 379
15. Brian J. Hall and Kevin J. Murphy (2000), 'Optimal Exercise Prices for Executive Stock Options', *American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings*, **90** (2), May, 209-14 397
16. Anil Arya and Brian Mittendorf (2005), 'Offering Stock Options to Gauge Managerial Talent', *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, **40** (1-3), December, 189-210 403
17. Bo Becker (2006), 'Wealth and Executive Compensation', *Journal of Finance*, **LXI**(1), February, 379-97 425
18. Jayant R. Kale, Ebru Reis and Anand Venkateswaran (2010), 'Promotion Incentives and Corporate Performance: Is There a Bright Side to "Overpaying" the CEO?', *Journal of Applied Corporate Finance*, **22** (1), Winter, 119-28 444
19. Radhakrishnan Gopalan, Todd Milbourn, Fenghua Song and Anjan V. Thakor (2014), 'Duration of Executive Compensation', *Journal of Finance*, **LXIX** (6), December, 2777-817 454
20. Lucian A. Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson, Jr. (2005), 'Executive Pensions', *Journal of Corporation Law*, **30** (4), 823-55 495

PART IV ARE HIGHLY PAID CEOs THE WINNERS OF AWAGE TOURNAMENT?

21. Lucian A. Bebchuk, K.J. Martijn Cremers and Urs C. Peyer (2011), 'The CEO Pay Slice', *Journal of Financial Economics*, **102** (1), October, 199-221 531
22. Zhihong Chen, Yuan Huang and K.C. John Wei (2013), 'Executive Pay Disparity and the Cost of Equity Capital', *Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis*, **48** (3), June, 849-85 554
23. Omesh Kini and Ryan Williams (2012), 'Tournament Incentives, Firm Risk, and Corporate Policies', *Journal of Financial Economics*, **103** (2), February, 350-76 591

24. Steven N. Kaplan and Joshua Rauh (2013), 'It's the Market: The Broad-Based Rise in the Return to Top Talent', *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 27 (3), Summer, 35-55 618
25. Olubunmi Faleye, Ebru Reis and Anand Venkateswaran (2013), 'The Determinants and Effects of CEO-Employee Pay Ratios', *Journal of Banking and Finance*, 37 (8), August, 3258-72 639

PART V EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

26. Kevin J. Murphy (2002), 'Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options', *University of Chicago Law Review*, 69 (3), Summer, 847-69 657
27. Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried (2003), 'Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem', *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 17 (3), Summer, 71-92 680
28. Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan (2000), 'Agents With and Without Principals', *American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings*, 90 (2), May, 203-8 702
29. Jay C. Hartzell and Laura T. Starks (2003), 'Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation', *Journal of Finance*, LVIII (6), December, 2351-74 708
30. Vidhi Chhaochharia and Yaniv Grinstein (2009), 'CEO Compensation and Board Structure', *Journal of Finance*, LXIV (1), February, 231-61 732
31. Henrik Cronqvist and Riidiger Fahlenbrach (2013), 'CEO Contract Design: How Do Strong Principals Do It?', *Journal of Financial Economics*, 108 (3), June, 659-74 763
32. Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan (2003), 'Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences', *Journal of Political Economy*, 111 (5), October, 1043-75 779
33. Martin J. Conyon (2014), 'Executive Compensation and Board Governance in US Firms', *Economic Journal*, 124 (574), February, F60-F89 812

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Contents

Acknowledgements

ix

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PART I PAY AND PERFORMANCE: ARE THEY RELATED?

1. Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried (2005), 'Pay without Performance'. Overview of the Issues', *Journal of Corporation Law*, **30** (4), Summer, 647-73 3
2. John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay and Randall S. Thomas (2005), 'Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay without Performance?', *Michigan Law Review*, 103, May, 1142-85 30
3. Adair Morse, Vikram Nanda and Amit Seru (2011), 'Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs?', *Journal of Finance*, **LXVI** (5), October, 1779-821 74
4. Alex Edmans and Xavier Gabaix (2009), 'Is CEO Pay Really Inefficient? A Survey of New Optimal Contracting Theories', *European Financial Management*, 15 (3), June, 486-96 117

PART II COMPENSATION AND RISK TAKING: INCENTIVIZING AND RESTRAINING

5. Richard T. Holden (2005), 'The Original Management Incentive Schemes', *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, **19** (4), Fall, 135—44 131
6. Patrick Bolton, Hamid Mehran and Joel Shapiro (2010), 'Executive Compensation and Risk Taking', *Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports*, No. 456, June, i, 1-41, tables 141
7. Jennifer N. Carpenter (2000), 'Does Option Compensation Increase Managerial Risk Appetite?', *Journal of Finance*, **LV** (5), October, 2311-31 185
8. Stephen A. Ross (2004), 'Compensation, Incentives, and the Duality of Risk Aversion and Riskiness', *Journal of Finance*, **LIX** (1), February, 207-25 206
9. Jeffrey L. Coles, Naveen D. Daniel and Lalitha Naveen (2006), 'Managerial Incentives and Risk-Taking', *Journal of Financial Economics*, **79** (2), February, 431-68 225
10. John McCormack and Judy Weiker (2010), 'Rethinking "Strength of Incentives" for Executives of Financial Institutions', *Journal of Applied Corporate Finance*, **22** (3), Summer, 65-72 263

11. Zhiyong Dong, Cong Wang and Fei Xie (2010), 'Do Executive Stock Options Induce Excessive Risk Taking?', *Journal of Banking and Finance*, 34 (10), October, 2518-29 271
12. Neil Brisley (2006), 'Executive Stock Options: Early Exercise Provisions and Risk-taking Incentives', *Journal of Finance*, **LXI** (5), October, 2487-509 283
13. George J. Benston and Jocelyn D. Evan (2006), 'Performance Compensation Contracts and CEOs' Incentive to Shift Risk to Debtholders: An Empirical Analysis', *Journal of Economics and Finance*, 30 (1), Spring, 70-92 306
14. Cory A. Cassell, Shawn X. Huang, Juan Manuel Sanchez and Michael D. Stuart (2012), 'Seeking Safety: The Relation between CEO Inside Debt Holdings and the Riskiness of Firm Investment and Financial Policies', *Journal of Financial Economics*, **103** (3), March, 588-610 329
15. Yixin Liu, David C. Mauer and Yilei Zhang (2014), 'Firm Cash Holdings and CEO Inside Debt', *Journal of Banking and Finance*, **42**, May, 83-100 352
16. Divya Anantharaman, Vivian W. Fang and Guojin Gong (2014), 'Inside Debt and the Design of Corporate Debt Contracts', *Management Science*, **60** (5), May, 1260-80 370

PART III EXECUTIVE INCENTIVES AND FIRM MANAGEMENT

17. Efraim Benmelech, Eugene Kandel and Pietro Veronesi (2010), 'Stock-Based Compensation and CEO (Dis)incentives', *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, **125** (4), November, 1769-820 393
18. Patrick Bolton, Jose Scheinkman and Wei Xiong (2006), 'Executive Compensation and Short-Termist Behaviour in Speculative Markets', *Review of Economic Studies*, **73** (3), July, 577-610 445
19. Henrik Cronqvist, Fredrik Heyman, Mattias Nilsson, Helena Svaleryd and Jonas Vlachos (2009), 'Do Entrenched Managers Pay Their Workers More?', *Journal of Finance*, **LXIV** (1), February, 309-39 479
20. Ronald W. Masulis and Syed Walid Reza (2015), 'Agency Problems of Corporate Philanthropy', *Review of Financial Studies*, **28** (2), February, 592-636 510

A Managing Assets

21. Tom Nohel and Steven Todd (2004), 'Stock Options and Managerial Incentives to Invest', *Journal of Derivatives Accounting*, 1 (1), March, 29^6 557

22. Ulrike Malmendier and Geoffrey Tate (2005), 'CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment', *Journal of Finance*, LX (6), December, 2661-700 575
23. Ulrike Malmendier and Geoffrey Tate (2008), 'Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the Market's Reaction', *Journal of Financial Economics*, 89 (1), July, 20-43 615
24. Jie Cai and Anand M. Vijh (2007), 'Incentive Effects of Stock and Option Holdings of Target and Acquirer CEOs', *Journal of Finance*, LXII (4), August, 1891-933 639
25. Eliezer M. Fich, Jie Cai and Anh L. Tran (2011), 'Stock Option Grants to Target CEOs during Private Merger Negotiations', *Journal of Financial Economics*, 101 (2), May, 413-30 682
26. Yixin Liu and David C. Mauer (2011), 'Corporate Cash Holdings and CEO Compensation Incentives', *Journal of Financial Economics*, 102 (1), October, 183-98 700

B Managing Liabilities

27. Hernan Ortiz-Molina (2006), 'Top Management Incentives and the Pricing of Corporate Public Debt', *Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis*, 41 (2), June, 317-40 719
28. Katharina Lewellen (2006), 'Financing Decisions when Managers are Risk Averse', *Journal of Financial Economics*, 82 (3), December, 551-89 743
29. Hernan Ortiz-Molina (2007), 'Executive Compensation and Capital Structure: The Effects of Convertible Debt and Straight Debt on CEO Pay', *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, 43 (1), March, 69-93 782
30. Paul Brockman, Xiumin Martin and Emre Unlu (2010), 'Executive Compensation and the Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt', *Journal of Finance*, LXV (3), June, 1123-61 807
31. Sudheer Chava, Praveen Kumar and Arthur Warga (2010), 'Managerial Agency and Bond Covenants', *Review of Financial Studies*, 23 (3), March, 1120-48 846

Recent Developments in the Economics of Executive Compensation Volume III

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Contents

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vii

An introduction to all three volumes by the editor appears in Volume I

PART I MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES, INSIDE INFORMATION, AND EARNINGS

A Exploiting Inside Information

1. J. Carr Bettis, John M. Bizjak and Michael L. Lemmon (2005), 'Exercise Behavior, Valuation, and the Incentive Effects of Employee Stock Options', *Journal of Financial Economics*, 76 (2), May, 445-70 5
2. David Aboody, John Hughes, Jing Liu and Wei Su (2008), 'Are Executive Stock Option Exercises Driven by Private Information?', *Review of Accounting Studies*, 13 (4), December, 551-70 31
3. Robert Brooks, Don M. Chance and Brandon Cline (2012), 'Private Information and the Exercise of Executive Stock Options', *Financial Management*, 41 (3), Fall, 733-64 51
4. Jennifer N. Carpenter, Richard Stanton and Nancy Wallace (2010), 'Optimal Exercise of Executive Stock Options and Implications for Firm Cost', *Journal of Financial Economics*, 98 (2), November, 315-37 83

B Manipulating Earnings and Disclosure for Personal Profit

5. Daniel Bergstresser and Thomas Philippon (2006), 'CEO Incentives and Earnings Management', *Journal of Financial Economics*, 80(3), June, 511-29 109
6. Keith J. Crocker and Joel Slemrod (2007), 'The Economics of Earnings Manipulation and Managerial Compensation', *RAND Journal of Economics*, 38 (3), Autumn, 698-713 128
7. Christopher S. Armstrong, Alan D. Jagolinzer and David F. Larcker (2010), 'Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting Irregularities', *Journal of Accounting Research*, 48 (2), May, 225-71 144
8. Lin Peng and Ailsa Roell (2014), 'Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation', *Journal of Finance*, LXIX (2), April, 487-526, appendix 191

PART II OPTION DATING GAME

9. Randall A. Heron and Erik Lie (2007), 'Does Backdating Explain the Stock Price Pattern around Executive Stock Option Grants?', *Journal of Financial Economics*, 83 (2), February, 271-95
10. M.P. Narayanan and H. Nejat Seyhun (2008), 'The Dating Game: Do Managers Designate Option Grant Dates to Increase Their Compensation?', *Review of Financial Studies*, 21 (5), September, 1907—45
11. M.P. Narayanan, Cindy A. Schipani and H. Nejat Seyhun (2007), 'The Economic Impact of Backdating of Executive Stock Options', *Michigan Law Review*, 105 (8), June, 1597-641
12. Jesse M. Fried (2008), 'Option Backdating and Its Implications', *Washington and Lee Law Review*, 65, 853-86

PART III OPTION VALUATION: OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE

13. Don M. Chance and Tung-Hsiao Yang (2005), 'The Utility-Based Valuation and Cost of Executive Stock Options in a Binomial Framework: Issues and Methodologies', *Journal of Derivatives Accounting*, 2 (2), September, 165-88
14. Jie Cai and Anand M. Vijh (2005), 'Executive Stock and Option Valuation in a Two State-Variable Framework', *Journal of Derivatives*, 12(3), Spring, 9-27
15. Jonathan E. Ingersoll, Jr. (2006), 'The Subjective and Objective Evaluation of Incentive Stock Options', *Journal of Business*, 79(2), 453-87
16. Ronnie Sircar and Wei Xiong (2007), 'A General Framework for Evaluating Executive Stock Options', *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control*, 31 (7), July, 2317—49
17. Jaksa Cvitanic, Zvi Wiener and Fernando Zapatero (2008), 'Analytic Pricing of Employee Stock Options', *Review of Financial Studies*, 21 (2), April, 683-724
18. Jonathan E. Ingersoll, Jr. (2006), 'Valuing Reload Options', *Review of Derivatives Research*, 9(1), January, 67-105
19. L.C.G. Rogers and Jose Scheinkman (2007), 'Optimal Exercise of Executive Stock Options', *Finance and Stochastics*, 11 (3), July, 357-72
20. Frank D. Hodge, Shiva Rajgopal and Terry Shevlin (2009), 'Do Managers Value Stock Options and Restricted Stock Consistent with Economic Theory?', *Contemporary Accounting Research*, 26 (3), Fall, 899-932