# Recent Developments in the Economics of Executive Compensation Volume I

Edited by

### Robert W. Kolb

Professor of Finance and Frank W. Considine Chair of Applied Ethics Quinlan School of Business, Loyola University Chicago, USA

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# Recent Developments in the Economics of Executive Compensation Volume III

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