Pablo Coto-Millan

quilibrium

With 45 Figures and 42 Tables

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Contents

Introduction

1	General Equilibrium				
	1.1	Forma	al Interpretations of General Equilibrium (GE)	5	
		1.1.1	GE Model in Pure Exchange (Robinson		
			Crusoe and Viernes): 2 Consumers	5	
		1.1.2	GE Model with Production: 2 Consumers	8	
			and 2 Producers		
			1.1.2.1 Approach from the Agents as Producers	8	
			1.1.2.2 Approach from the Agents as Consumers	11	
	1.2	First Stage of GE: From the Invisible Hand to the Walrasian Notion			
		1.2.1	The Walrasian GE Model with Production	13	
			1.2.1.1 Walras'Law	15	
		1.2.2	Walrasian GE Model with Production and Niimerane Money	17	
		1.2.3	Walrasian GE Model with Production and Circulating and		
			Fiduciary Money	19	
	1.3	nd Stage of GE: From the Walrasian Notion to the			
		Existe	ence Demonstration	23	
		1.3.1	The GE Model Extended by Arrow-Debreu	23	
			1.3.1.1 Existence Theorem (Canonic Approach) 2	5	
			1.3.1.2 Demonstration (Canonic Approach: Arrow-Debreu)	25	
			1.3.13 Existence Theorem (Game Theory Approach)	25	
			1.3.1.4 Existence Theorems (Topological Approach: Brower		
			and Kakutani)	26	
			1.3.1.5 Existence Demonstration	26	
	1.4	The 7	Third Stage of GE: Unicity and Stability	27	
		1.4.1	The Walrasian GE Model Extended by Arrow-Debreu and		
			Gale-Nikaido	28	
			1.4.1.1 The Gale-Nikaido Unicity Theorem (Canonic		
			Approach)	28	
			1.4.1.2 Demonstration (Canonic Approach: Gale-Nikaido)	28	
			1.4.1.3 The Unicity Theorem (Revealed Preference		
			Approach)	29	
			1.4.1.4 Demonstration (Revealed Preference Approach)	• 29	
			1.4.1.5 Proposition of Perfect Static Stability	30	

2

		1.4.1.6 The Perfect Static Stability Theorem (Canonic			
		Approach: Hicks) •	30		
		1.4.1.7 'Demonstration (Canonic Approach)	30		
		1.4.1.8 The Local Dynamic Stability (Canonic Approach)	31		
		1.4.1.9 The Local Dynamic Stability Theorem (Canonic	22		
		Approach)	32 22		
		1.4.1.10 Demonstration (Canonic Approach)	32		
		Approach)	32		
		1 4 1 12 Demonstration (Canonic Approach)-	33		
		1.4.1.13 The Global Dynamic Stability Theorem (Revealed	00		
		' Preference Approach)	34		
		1.4.1.14 Demonstration (Revealed Preference Approach)	34		
	Bibli	ographic References	35		
2	Oth	er Models of General Equilibrium	37		
			~-		
	2.1	Model 1	37		
		2.1.1 Assumptions	3/		
		2.1.2 Development of the Model	38 38		
		2.1.5 The Solution u 2.1.4 The Li-Vorke Theorem (Baumol and Benhabid's Version)	30 12		
	22	Model 2	43		
	2.2	2.2.1 Assumptions of the Model	43		
		2.2.2 Development of the Model	44		
		2.2.2.1 Individuals'Behavior: Inter-temporal Maximization	44		
		2.2.2.2 Equilibrium Dynamics and State	45		
		2.2.3 The Solution	46		
	2.3	Final Remarks .	47		
	Bibl	iographic References	47		
~	0.				
3	Ger	neral Equilibrium and Main Functional Forms of Utility and	40		
	FIU		49		
	31	The Pure Exchange Model for Cobb-Douglas Utility Function	49		
	3.2	The Pure Exchange Model for Two Agents with Cobb-Douglas Utility	.,		
		Functions and Constant.Returns to Scale in Consumption, Different			
	п	Initial Assignments of (x, y) and Distinct Parameters in			
		Consumptron (a, P)	50		
	3.3	The Pure Exchange Model with Cobb-Douglas Utility Functions,			
		Returns to Scale and a Price for One Good as Numerarie	52		
	3.4	The Pure Exchange Model for a Specific Utility Function	53		
	3.5	The General Equilibrium Model with a Representative Agent with a			
	2.6	Producer-Consumer (or of Robinson Crusoe) 5	6		
	5.0 27	The Equilibrium Production Model with Constant Returns to Scale	5/ 50		
	J./ Rih	liographic References	50 50		

4	Computable General Equilibrium				
	4.1	The Le	contief Model .	'61	
	4.2	Applic	cations. Economic Impact Models: Economic Impact Study	64	
		4.2.1	Introduction	64	
		4.2.2	Direct Effects of Port Industry	67	
			4.2.2.1 ' Port Authority	67	
			4.2.2.2 Customs	67	
			4.2.2:3 Other Port Industry	67	
			4.2.2.4 Direct Effects of Port Industry	68	
		4.2.3	Indirect and Induced Effects of Port Industry	69	
			4.2.3.1 Regionalization of the National Input-Output Table	72	
			4.2.3.2 Indirect and Induced Impact Vectors	76	
			4.2.3.3 Indirect and Induced Effects of Port Industry	80	
		1.2.4	4.2.3.4 Total Effects of Port Industry	82	
		4.2.4	Direct Effects of the Industry Depending on the Port	82	
		4.2.5	Indirect and Induced Effects of the Industry Depending on the	05	
			Port I	85	
			4.2.5.1 Indirect and Induced Impact vectors	86	
			4.2.5.2 Indirect and induced Effects of the Industry	00	
		126	Total Effects of the Industry Depending on the Port	09	
		4.2.0	Feenomic Impact Study	92	
		4.2.7	Final Remarks	92 97	
		Biblio	ographic References	94	
		Dient	Scupile references	,	
5	We	lfare		95	
	5.1	Positi	ive Properties of the GE Model	95	
5.2 The First Welfare Theorem .			First Welfare Theorem .	96	
	5.3	The S	Second Welfare Theorem	96	
	5.4	Com	pensation Criteria	97	
	5.5	The Tl	heory of the "Second Best"	100	
	'5.6	Probl	ems of the GE Model	101	
		5.6.1	Problems of Property Rights Allocation	102	
			5.6.1.1 . Public Goods	102	
			5.6.1.2 Natural Resources	109	
			5.6.1.3 Common Property Resources	133	
		5 ()	5.6.1.4 Externalities	135	
		5.6.2	Negotiation and Election Problems between Agents	140	
			5.6.2.2 Non-Convexities and Constal Equilibrium	140	
		562	J.0.2.2 Non-Convexities and General Equilibrium	147	
		5.0.5	Asymmetries and Anonymity	140	
			5631 Universality: The Conventional Theory of the Firm	147	
			and the Incomplete Contracts	149	
			5632 The Theory of the Firm: Transaction Approach	151	
			5.6.5.2 The theory of the tinn, transaction Approach	1.51	

			5.6.3.3	The Theory of the Firm: Information Asymmetries Approach	151	
5.6.4			Anonym	ity •	163	
Bibliographic References						
6	Soc	ial Ch	oice and	d Individual Freedom: A Thematic Guide	165	
	6.1	Marke	t Failures	s and Government Failures	165	
		6.1.1	The Gov	vernment's Problems in Property Rights Allocation	165	
		6.1.2	Informa	tion Problems	165	
		6.1.3	The Go	vernment's Problems in Negotiation and Choice	165	
			6.1.3.1	The Voting Order Paradox	166	
			6.1.3.2	Impossibility of Aggregation of Personal Preferences	166	
			6.1.3.3	Problems in the Majority, Simple and Proportional		
				Choice Systems	167	
			6.1.3.4	The Average Voter Paradox	167	
			6.1.3.5	Key Parties and Political Coalitions	168	
			6.1.3.6	The Maximizing Bureaucrat Paradox	168	
			6.1.3.7	The Non-Representative Democracy Paradox	168	
			6.1.3.8	The Taxes Paradox	168	
			6.1.3.9	The Theory of Pressure Groups	170	
	6.2 Problems of Collective Action: One of the Commonest Collective					
		Action	ns is Voti	ng	170	
		6.2.1	The Vo	ting Paradox ,	171	
		6.2.2	Strategi	c Voting •	171	
		6.2.3	The Re	volution Paradox and the Theory of the Coup d'Etat	171	
		6.2.4	The Mi	gration Paradox	171	
	6.3	From	the Anar	chy and Equilibrium in the "Natural State " to the		
		Const	itutional	Democracy	171	
		6.3.1	The Inv	visible Hand and the Minimal State	172	
		6.3.2	The Sta	te and its Institutions	172	
		6.3.3	The Sta	te Origins '	172	
			6.3.3.1	Contractual Theories	173	
			6.3.3.2	Utility Theories	175	
6.4 Final Remarks					175	
	Bibliographic References				176	