

Evaluation Report

Fiscal Adjustment in IMF-Supported Programs

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The following symbols have been used throughout this report:

- between years or months (e.g. 2000-01 or January-June) to indicate the years or months covered, including the beginning and ending years or months;
- / between years (e.g. 2000/01) to indicate a fiscal (Financial) year).

"Billion" means a thousand million.

Minor discrepancies between constituent figures and totals are due to rounding.

Some of the documents cited and referenced in this report were not available to the public at the time of publication of this report. Under the current policy on public access to the IMF's archives, some of these documents will become available five years after their issuance. They may be referenced as EBS/YY/NN and SM/YY/NN, where EBS and SM indicate the series and YY indicates the year of issue. Certain other documents are to become available ten or twenty years after their issuance depending on the series.