

# Efficiency, Equality and Public Policy

With a Case for Higher Public Spending

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# Contents

<i>Preface</i>	x
1 Introduction	1
1.1 A dollar is a dollar: a simple solution to the big efficiency–equality tradeoff	1
1.2 A partial resurrection of the old ‘new welfare economics’?	1
1.3 Introductory summary	2
1.4 A case for higher public spending	4
1.5 The misguided consensus	5
1.6 Three basic problems of social choice/public policy	7
1.7 Some specific points made <sup>1</sup>	9
1.8 A methodological note	9
1.9 What this book is not about	10
<b>Part I The Foundation of Public Economic Policy</b>	<b>13</b>
2 The Necessity of Interpersonal Cardinal Utility	15
2.1 An intuitive explanation using a parent’s choice	15
2.2 Economists’ misplaced hostility against cardinal utility	17
2.3 The impossibility of social choice based on ordinal utilities	21
3 Welfarism	24
3.1 The Sen–Ng debate on welfarism: an appraisal	24
3.2 Another argument for welfarism	30
3.3 Rational individualism implies welfarism	32
4 Utility, Informed Preference, or Happiness	36
4.1 Non-affective altruism: the pure concern for the welfare of others	37
4.2 Irrational preferences	45
4.3 Autonomous desires	52
4.4 Why is happiness fundamental?	54
5 Utilitarianism	57
5.1 Compelling arguments for utilitarianism	57

5.2	Rational individualistic egalitarianism implies utilitarianism	62
5.3	A defence of Harsanyi against some recent criticisms	66
5.4	A defence of using just perceptible increments	72
5.5	Utilitarianism and process fairness	76
6	A Dollar is a Dollar: Solution to the Paradox of Interpersonal Cardinal Utility	82
6.1	The paradox of interpersonal cardinal utility	82
6.2	The proposed solution	83
6.3	Economists should be in favour of reversed weighting!	90
6.4	Some qualifications	92
6.5	Concluding remarks	97
7	Economics versus Politics	99
<b>Part II How Much Should the Government Spend?</b>		<b>103</b>
8	A Case for Higher Public Spending	105
8.1	Some simple theories of government spending	105
8.2	Inefficiency in public spending may increase its optimal level	108
8.3	General taxation may be more corrective than distortive	111
8.4	Diamond effects and burden-free taxes	111
8.5	Relative-income effects bias against public expenditure	113
8.6	The unimportance of absolute income	115
8.7	Welfare-improving public expenditures	119
8.8	Concluding remarks	120
9	The Appropriate Benefit–Cost Ratio for Public Spending	124
9.1	The conventional view	124
9.2	Kaplow's argument and the principle of 'a dollar is a dollar'	126
9.3	Reconciling Kaplow and Feldstein	130
9.4	Concluding remarks	134
10	Concluding Remarks	135
<i>Appendix A Electrical Brain Stimulation: a Case Showing the Importance of Public Spending in Research</i>		137
A1.	Misconceptions on the costs of public spending	137
A2.	Direct access to intense pleasure	137

A3. Enormous benefits	138
A4. Safe and long-lasting pleasure	138
<i>Appendix B Pure Egalitarianism: a Critique</i>	141
B1. Why is happiness the only ultimate consideration?	141
B2. Equality in the welfare weights	143
B3. The libertarians	143
B4. Rawls	144
B5. Pure and welfare egalitarianism	145
B6. Sen and capability egalitarianism	148
B7. Concluding remark	150
<i>Appendix C Economic Growth Increases the Optimal Share of the Public Sector</i>	151
<i>Appendix D Non-Affective Altruism: When the Pareto Principle is Unacceptable</i>	158
D1. The Pareto principle	158
D2. When the weak Pareto principle is unacceptable	159
D3. The case of affective altruism	161
D4. Should voters be asked to suppress their non-affective altruism?	162
<i>Appendix E The Bergson–Samuelson Tradition Implies Individualism, Independence, and Ordinalism</i>	163
<i>Appendix F Inefficiency in Provision May Increase Optimal Public Spending</i>	164
Notes	165
References	169
Name Index	184
Subject Index	188