# The Economic Theory of Incentives Volume I

Edited by

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## **Contents**

Acknowled Introduction		ents David Martimort	ix xiii
PART I		LLECTIVE DECISION PROBLEMS UNDER ASYMMETRIC ORMATION	
	A.	Public Goods and the Free Riding Problem	
	1.	Claude d'Aspremont and Louis-André Gérard-Varet (1979), 'Incentives and Incomplete Information', <i>Journal of Public Economics</i> , 11 (1), February, 25–45	5
	2.	Jerry Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont (1977), 'Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for	3
	3.	Public Goods', <i>Econometrica</i> , <b>45</b> (2), March, 427–38 Theodore Groves (1973), 'Incentives in Teams', <i>Econometrica</i> ,	26
	4.	41 (4), July, 617–31 Jean-Jacques Laffont and Eric Maskin (1979), 'A Differential	38
		Approach to Expected Utility Maximizing Mechanisms', in Jean-Jacques Laffont (ed.), Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences, Studies in Public Economics: Volume 2, Part IV, Chapter 16, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, New York, NY, USA and	
	5.	Oxford, UK: North-Holland Publishing Company, 289–308 Jean-Jacques Laffont and Eric Maskin (1980), 'A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms', <i>Econometrica</i> ,	53
	6.	48 (6), September, 1507–20 George J. Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite (1990), 'Asymmetric	73
	0.	Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents', Review of Economic Studies, 57 (3), July, 351–67	87
	В.	Incentive Compatibility and the Revelation Principle	
	7.	Allan Gibbard (1973), 'Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General	107
	8.	Result', Econometrica, 41 (4), July, 587–601 Partha Dasgupta, Peter Hammond and Eric Maskin (1979), 'The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility', Review of Economic Studies, 46 (2), April, 185–216	107
	9.	Roger B. Myerson (1979), 'Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem', <i>Econometrica</i> , 47 (1), January, 61–73	154

10.	Roger B. Myerson (1982), 'Optimal Coordination Mechanisms in Generalized Principal—Agent Problems', <i>Journal of Mathematical Economics</i> , <b>10</b> (1), June, 67–81	167
C.	Full Implementation	
11.	Joel S. Demski and David Sappington (1984), 'Optimal Incentive Contracts with Multiple Agents', <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> ,	
12.	33 (1), June 152–71 Eric Maskin (1999), 'Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality', Review of Economic Studies, Special Issue: Contracts, 66 (1),	185
13.	January, 23–38 Eric Maskin and John Moore (1999), 'Implementation and	205
	Renegotiation', Review of Economic Studies, Special Issue: Contracts, 66 (1), January, 39–56	221
14.	John Moore and Rafael Repullo (1988), 'Subgame Perfect Implementation', <i>Econometrica</i> , <b>56</b> (5), September, 1191–220	239
15.	John Moore and Rafael Repullo (1990), 'Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization', <i>Econometrica</i> , <b>58</b> (5), September, 1083–99	269
16.	Thomas R. Palfrey and Sanjay Srivastava (1989), 'Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies',	
17.	Econometrica, 57 (1), January, 115–34 Dilip Mookherjee and Stefan Reichelstein (1990), 'Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms', Review of Economic	286
	Studies, 57 (3), July, 453–75	306
D.	Interim Efficiency	
18.	Bengt Holmström and Roger B. Myerson (1983), 'Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information',	
19.	Econometrica, <b>51</b> (6), November, 1799–819 John O. Ledyard and Thomas R. Palfrey (1999), 'A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods', Econometrica, <b>67</b> (2),	331
	March, 435–48	352
E.	Auctions	
20.	Jacques Crémer and Richard P. McLean (1988), 'Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions',	
21.	Econometrica, <b>56</b> (6), November, 1247–57 Philippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu (2001), 'Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations', Econometrica, <b>69</b> (5), September,	369
	1237–59	380

22.	Eric Maskin and John Riley (1989), 'Optimal Multi-unit Auctions', in Frank Hahn (ed.), <i>The Economics of Missing Markets, Information, and Games</i> , Chapter 14, Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press,	
	312–35	403
23.	Roger B. Myerson (1981), 'Optimal Auction Design', <i>Mathematics of Operations Research</i> , <b>6</b> (1), February, 58–73	427
24.	John G. Riley and William F. Samuelson (1981), 'Optimal	72/
	Auctions', American Economic Review, 71 (3), June, 381-92	443
F.	Robust Mechanism Design	
25.	Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris (2005), 'Robust Mechanism	
	Design', Econometrica, 73 (6), November, 1771–813	457
26.	Philippe Jehiel, Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn, Benny Moldovanu and William R. Zame (2006), 'The Limits of Ex Post Implementation',	
	Econometrica, 74 (3), May, 585-610	500
27.	Dilip Mookherjee and Stefan Reichelstein (1992), 'Dominant	
	Strategy Implementation of Bayesian Incentive Compatible	
	Allocation Rules', <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , <b>56</b> (2), April, 378–99	526
28.	Zvika Neeman (2004), 'The Relevance of Private Information in	320
20.	Mechanism Design', Journal of Economic Theory, 117 (1), July,	
	55–77	548
29.	Robert Wilson (1987), 'Game-Theoretic Analyses of Trading	
	Processes', in Truman F. Bewley (ed.), Advances in Economic	
	Theory: Fifth World Congress, Chapter 2, Cambridge, UK, New	
	York, NY, USA and Melbourne, Australia: Cambridge University	571
	Press, 33–70	3/1
G.	The Coase Theorem under Asymmetric Information: Scope and Value	
30.	Roger B. Myerson and Mark A. Satterthwaite (1983), 'Efficient	
	Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading', <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , <b>29</b> (2), April, 265–81	611
31.	Peter Cramton, Robert Gibbons and Paul Klemperer (1987),	011
	'Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently', Econometrica, 55 (3), May,	
	615–32, Erratum	628
32.	Steven R. Williams (1999), 'A Characterization of Efficient,	
	Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms', <i>Economic Theory</i> ,	617
	<b>14</b> (1), July, 155–80	647

### PART II COLLECTIVE DECISION PROBLEMS UNDER MORAL HAZARD

4.	Moral	Hazard	in Teams
<b>7.</b>	IVIUI AI	II azai u	ili icanis

33.	Bengt Holmström (1982), 'Moral Hazard in Teams', Bell Journal of	
<b>.</b> .	Economics, 13 (2), Autumn, 324-40	677
34.	Patrick Legros and Steven A. Matthews (1993), 'Efficient and	
	Nearly-Efficient Partnerships', Review of Economic Studies, 68 (3),	
	July, 599-611	694
35.	Eric Rasmusen (1987), 'Moral Hazard in Risk-Averse Teams',	
	RAND Journal of Economics, 18 (3), Autumn, 428-35	707
36.	David Rahman (2012), 'But Who Will Monitor the Monitor?',	
	American Economic Review, 102 (6), October, 2767-97	715
В.	The Firm as a Hierarchy: Relative or Joint Performance	
-	Evaluations?	
37.	Yeon-Koo Che and Seung-Weon Yoo (2001), 'Optimal Incentives	
	for Teams', American Economic Review, 91 (3), June, 525-41	749
38.	Edward P. Lazear and Sherwin Rosen (1981), 'Rank-Order	
	Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts', Journal of Political	
	Economy, 89 (5), October, 841-64	766
39.	Hideshi Itoh (1991), 'Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations',	700
٥,٠	Econometrica, 59 (3), May, 611–36	790
40.	Dilip Mookherjee (1984), 'Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many	170
τυ,	Agents', Review of Economic Studies, LI (3), July, 433–46	816
41	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	010
41.	Barry J. Nalebuff and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1983), 'Prizes and	
	Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and	000
	Competition', Bell Journal of Economics, 14 (1), Spring, 21–43	830
42.	Ching-To Ma (1988), 'Unique Implementation of Incentive	
	Contracts with Many Agents', Review of Economic Studies, LV (4),	
	October, 555–71	853

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## **Contents**

Acknowle Introducti	_	ents An introduction to both volumes by the editor appears in Volume I	ix
PART I		LLECTIVE DECISION PROBLEMS: INCOMPLETE NTRACTING AND THE NON-VERIFIABILITY PARADIGM	
	A.	Property Rights, Authority and Capital Structure	
	1.	Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton (1992), 'An Incomplete	
		Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting', Review of Economic Studies, 59 (3), July, 473–94	5
	2.	Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole (1997), 'Formal and Real Authority	5
	_,	in Organizations', Journal of Political Economy, 105 (1), February,	
		1–29	27
	3.	Aaron S. Edlin and Stefan Reichelstein (1996), 'Holdups, Standard	
		Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment', American Economic	56
	4.	Review, 86 (3), June, 478–501  Mathias Dewatripont and Jean Tirole (1994), 'A Theory of Debt and	30
	т.	Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder	
		Congruence', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109 (4), November,	
		1027–54	80
	5.	Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart (1986), 'The Costs and	
		Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration',	108
	6.	Journal of Political Economy, 94 (4), August, 691–719 Oliver Hart and John Moore (1990), 'Property Rights and the Nature	108
	0.	of the Firm', Journal of Political Economy, 98 (6), December,	
		1119–58	137
	7.	Jean Tirole (1986), 'Procurement and Renegotiation', Journal of	
		Political Economy, 94 (2), April, 235–59	177
	В.	The Foundations of Incomplete Contracts	
	8.	Ilya Segal (1999), 'Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for	
	0.	Incomplete Contracts', Review of Economic Studies, Special Issue:	
		Contracts, 66 (1), January, 57–82	205
	9.	Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole (1999), 'Unforeseen Contingencies and	
		Incomplete Contracts', Review of Economic Studies, Special Issue:	
		Contracts, 66 (1), January, 83–114	231

	C.	Relational Contracts and Subjective Evaluations	
	10.	Jonathan Levin (2003), 'Relational Incentive Contracts', American Economic Review, 93 (3), June, 835–57	265
	11.	W. Bentley MacLeod and James M. Malcomson (1989), 'Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment',	•
	12.	Econometrica, <b>57</b> (2), March, 447–80 W. Bentley MacLeod (2003), 'Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation', American Economic Review, <b>93</b> (1), March, 216–40	288 322
PART II		LLECTIVE DECISION PROBLEMS: THE MULTI- NTRACTING ORGANIZATION	
	<b>A.</b>	Collusion: When Agents Share Information and Coordinate Actions	
	13.	Hideshi Itoh (1993), 'Coalitions, Incentives, and Risk Sharing', Journal of Economic Theory, <b>60</b> (2), August, 410–27	351
	14.	Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort (1999), 'Separation of Regulators Against Collusive Behavior', RAND Journal of	
	15.	Economics, 30 (2), Summer, 232–62 Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole (1991), 'The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture',	369 ⁄
	16.	Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106 (4), November, 1089–127 Jean Tirole (1986), 'Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations', Journal of Law, Economics, and	400
	17.	Organization, 2 (2), Fall, 181–214 Hal R. Varian (1990), 'Monitoring Agents With Other Agents',  Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 146 (1), March,	439
		153–74	473
	В.	Collusion with Asymmetric and Soft Information	
	18.	Yeon-Koo Che and Jinwoo Kim (2006), 'Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation', <i>Econometrica</i> , <b>74</b> (4), July, 1063–107	497
	19.	Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort (1997), 'Collusion under Asymmetric Information', <i>Econometrica</i> , <b>65</b> (4), July, 875–911	542
	C.	Hierarchies and Decentralization	
	20.	Sandeep Baliga and Tomas Sjöström (1998), 'Decentralization and Collusion', <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , <b>83</b> (2), December, 196–232	581
	21.	David P. Baron and David Besanko (1992), 'Information, Control, and Organizational Structure', <i>Journal of Economics and</i>	-01
		Management Strategy, 1 (2), Summer, 237-75	618

22.	Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort (1998), 'Collusion and Delegation', <i>RAND Journal of Economics</i> , <b>29</b> (2), Summer, 280–305	657
23.	Nahum D. Melumad, Dilip Mookherjee and Stefan Reichelstein (1995), 'Hierarchical Decentralization of Incentive Contracts',	ν
	RAND Journal of Economics: Symposium on the Economics of Organization, 26 (4), Winter, 654–72	683
24.	Dilip Mookherjee and Masatoshi Tsumagari (2004), 'The Organization of Supplier Networks: Effects of Delegation and	
	Intermediation', Econometrica, 72 (4), July, 1179–219	702
D.	Multilateral Contracting and Common Agency	
25.	B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston (1986), 'Menu	
	Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence', <i>Quarterly Journal of Economics</i> , CI (1), February, 1–31	745
26.	B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston (1986), 'Common	143
20.	Agency', Econometrica, 54 (4), July, 923–42	776
27.	David Martimort and Lars Stole (2002), 'The Revelation and	
	Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games', Econometrica,	
	<b>70</b> (4), July, 1659–73	796
28.	David Martimort and Lars Stole (2009), 'Market Participation in Delegated and Intrinsic Common-Agency Games', RAND Journal of	
	Economics, 40 (1), Spring, 78-102	811
29.	Ilya Segal (1999), 'Contracting with Externalities', Quarterly	
	Journal of Economics, CXIV (2), May, 337–88	836
E.	Endogenous Common Agency	
30.	B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston (1998), 'Exclusive	
	Dealing', Journal of Political Economy, 106 (1), February, 64-103	891
31.	David Martimort (1996), 'Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency, and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory', <i>RAND Journal of Economics</i> ,	
	<b>27</b> (1), Spring, 1–31	· 931

22.	Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort (1998), 'Collusion and Delegation', <i>RAND Journal of Economics</i> , <b>29</b> (2), Summer, 280–305	657
23.	Nahum D. Melumad, Dilip Mookherjee and Stefan Reichelstein (1995), 'Hierarchical Decentralization of Incentive Contracts', RAND Journal of Economics: Symposium on the Economics of	007
	Organization, 26 (4), Winter, 654–72	683
24.	Dilip Mookherjee and Masatoshi Tsumagari (2004), 'The Organization of Supplier Networks: Effects of Delegation and	
	Intermediation', Econometrica, 72 (4), July, 1179–219	702
D.	Multilateral Contracting and Common Agency	
25.	B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston (1986), 'Menu	
	Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence', Quarterly	
	Journal of Economics, CI (1), February, 1–31	745
26.	B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston (1986), 'Common	
07	Agency', Econometrica, 54 (4), July, 923–42	776
27.	David Martimort and Lars Stole (2002), 'The Revelation and	
	Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games', <i>Econometrica</i> , 70 (4), July, 1659–73	796
28.	David Martimort and Lars Stole (2009), 'Market Participation in	190
20.	Delegated and Intrinsic Common-Agency Games', RAND Journal of	
	Economics, 40 (1), Spring, 78–102	811
29.	Ilya Segal (1999), 'Contracting with Externalities', Quarterly	011
-,.	Journal of Economics, CXIV (2), May, 337–88	836
E.	Endogenous Common Agency	
30.	B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston (1998), 'Exclusive	
	Dealing', Journal of Political Economy, 106 (1), February, 64–103	891
31.	David Martimort (1996), 'Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency, and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory', RAND Journal of Economics,	
	<b>27</b> (1), Spring, 1–31	931