

Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

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Contents

Preface

page xi

PART ONE. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

1. Paths of Political Development	1
1. <i>Britain</i>	2
2. <i>Argentina</i>	5
3. <i>Singapore</i>	8
4. <i>South Africa</i>	10
5. <i>The Agenda</i>	14
2. Our Argument	15
1. <i>Democracy versus Nondemocracy</i>	16
2. <i>Building Blocks of Our Approach</i>	19
3. <i>Toward Our Basic Story</i>	22
4. <i>Our Theory of Democratization</i>	23
5. <i>Democratic Consolidation</i>	30
6. <i>Determinants of Democracy</i>	31
7. <i>Political Identities and the Nature of Conflict</i>	42
8. <i>Democracy in a Picture</i>	43
9. <i>Overview of the Book</i>	46
3. What Do We Know about Democracy?	48
1. <i>Measuring Democracy</i>	48
2. <i>Patterns of Democracy</i>	51
3. <i>Democracy, Inequality, and Redistribution</i>	58
4. <i>Crises and Democracy</i>	65
5. <i>Social Unrest and Democratization</i>	65
6. <i>The Literature</i>	75
7. <i>Our Contribution</i>	80

PART TWO. MODELING POLITICS

4. Democratic Politics	89
1. <i>Introduction</i>	89
2. <i>Aggregating Individual Preferences</i>	91
3. <i>Single-Peaked Preferences and the Median Voter Theorem</i>	92
4. <i>Our Workhorse Models</i>	99
5. <i>Democracy and Political Equality</i>	113
6. <i>Conclusion</i>	117
5. Nondemocratic Politics	118
1. <i>Introduction</i>	118
2. <i>Power and Constraints in Nondemocratic Politics</i>	120
3. <i>Modeling Preferences and Constraints in Nondemocracies</i>	128
4. <i>Commitment Problems</i>	133
5. <i>A Simple Game of Promises</i>	144
6. <i>A Dynamic Model</i>	151
7. <i>Incentive-Compatible Promises</i>	161
8. <i>Conclusion</i>	171

PART THREE. THE CREATION AND CONSOLIDATION
OF DEMOCRACY

6. Democratization	173
1. <i>Introduction</i>	173
2. <i>The Role of Political Institutions</i>	173
3. <i>Preferences over Political Institutions</i>	176
4. <i>Political Power and Institutions</i>	177
5. <i>A Static Model of Democratization</i>	181
6. <i>Democratization or Repression?</i>	186
7. <i>A Dynamic Model of Democratization</i>	193
8. <i>Subgame Perfect Equilibria</i>	201
9. <i>Alternative Political Identities</i>	203
10. <i>Targeted Transfers</i>	207
11. <i>Power of the Elites in Democracy</i>	207
12. <i>Ideological Preferences over Regimes</i>	211
13. <i>Democratization in a Picture</i>	214
14. <i>Equilibrium Revolutions</i>	215
15. <i>Conclusion</i>	218
7. Coups and Consolidation	221
1. <i>Introduction</i>	221
2. <i>Incentives for Coups</i>	224
3. <i>A Static Model of Coups</i>	225
4. <i>A Dynamic Model of the Creation and Consolidation of Democracy</i>	231
5. <i>Alternative Political Identities</i>	246
6. <i>Targeted Transfers</i>	246

7. <i>Power in Democracy and Coups</i>	247
8. <i>Consolidation in a Picture</i>	249
9. <i>Defensive Coups</i>	251
10. <i>Conclusion</i>	253

PART FOUR. PUTTING THE MODELS TO WORK

8. The Role of the Middle Class	255
1. <i>Introduction</i>	255
2. <i>The Three-Class Model</i>	259
3. <i>Emergence of Partial Democracy</i>	262
4. <i>From Partial to Full Democracy</i>	267
5. <i>Repression: The Middle Class as a Buffer</i>	273
6. <i>Repression: Softliners versus Hardliners</i>	278
7. <i>The Role of the Middle Class in Consolidating Democracy</i>	283
8. <i>Conclusion</i>	285
9. Economic Structure and Democracy	287
1. <i>Introduction</i>	287
2. <i>Economic Structure and Income Distribution</i>	290
3. <i>Political Conflict</i>	292
4. <i>Capital, Land, and the Transition to Democracy</i>	293
5. <i>Costs of Coup on Capital and Land</i>	296
6. <i>Capital, Land, and the Burden of Democracy</i>	300
7. <i>Conflict between Landowners and Industrialists</i>	307
8. <i>Industrialists, Landowners, and Democracy in Practice</i>	312
9. <i>Economic Institutions</i>	313
10. <i>Human Capital</i>	316
11. <i>Conjectures about Political Development</i>	317
12. <i>Conclusion</i>	319
10. Globalization and Democracy	321
1. <i>Introduction</i>	321
2. <i>A Model of an Open Economy</i>	325
3. <i>Political Conflict – Democratic Consolidation</i>	331
4. <i>Political Conflict – Transition to Democracy</i>	334
5. <i>Financial Integration</i>	338
6. <i>Increased Political Integration</i>	343
7. <i>Alternative Assumptions about the Nature of International Trade</i>	344
8. <i>Conclusion</i>	347

PART FIVE. CONCLUSIONS AND THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY

11. Conclusions and the Future of Democracy	349
1. <i>Paths of Political Development Revisited</i>	349
2. <i>Extensions and Areas for Future Research</i>	355
3. <i>The Future of Democracy</i>	358

PART SIX. APPENDIX

12. Appendix to Chapter 4: The Distribution of Power in Democracy	361
1. <i>Introduction</i>	361
2. <i>Probabilistic Voting Models</i>	361
3. <i>Lobbying</i>	367
4. <i>Partisan Politics and Political Capture</i>	373
<i>Bibliography</i>	381
<i>Index</i>	401