

GAME THEORY

Critical Concepts in the Social Sciences

Edited by
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Volume I
Foundations



CONTENTS

<i>Acknowledgements</i>	•	•	xiii
<i>Chronological table of reprinted articles and chapters</i>			xviii
General introduction			1
VOLUME 1 FOUNDATIONS			
Introduction			21
PART A			
Precursors			25
1 Of the competition of producers			27
A. COURNOT			
2 The Cournot-Bertrand debate: a historical perspective			35
J. MAGNAN DB BORNIER			
3 The theory of play and integral equations with skew symmetric kernels			66
E. BOREL			
4 On games that involve chance and the skill of the players			71
E. BOREL			
5 On the theory of games of strategy			86
J. VON NEUMANN			
6 Economic warfare			112
F. ZEUTHEN			

CONTENTS

PART B

Pioneers of game theory	129
7 Non-cooperative games J. NASH	131
8 Equilibrium points in n -person games J. NASH	143
9 Extensive form games and the problem of information H. KUHN	145
10 A value for n -person games L. SHAPLEY	166
11 Solutions of n -person games with ordinal utilities L. SHAPLEY AND M. SHUBIK	176
12 A general theory of rational behavior in game situations J. HARSANYI	178
13 Isolation, assurance and the social rate of discount A. SEN	202
14 Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies R. AUMANN	214

PART C

Pioneers of modern bargaining theory	247
15 The bargaining problem J. NASH	249
16 Two-person cooperative games J. NASH	258
17 A simplified bargaining model for the n -person cooperative game J. HARSANYI	270
18 On the rationality postulates underlying the theory of cooperative games J. HARSANYI	299
19 A Zeuthen-Hicks theory of bargaining R. BISHOP	322
20 Other solutions to Nash's bargaining problem E. KALAI AND M. SMORODINSKY	331

CONTENTS

21 Individual rationality and Nash's solution to the bargaining problem	337
A. ROTH	

VOLUME II REFINEMENTS

Introduction	1
PART A	
Nash's project embellished with (Bayesian) uncertainty	9
22 Games with incomplete information played by 'Bayesian' players: Parts I, II and III	11
J. HARSANYI	
23 Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium' points	73
.I. HARSANYI	
24 The tracing procedure: a Bayesian approach to defining a solution for M-person noncooperative games	102
J. HARSANYI	
25 Correlated equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian rationality	139
R. AUMANN	
26 Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept	159
R. MYERSON	
PART B	
Dynamic games	167
27 Repeated games with absorbing states	169
E. KOHLBERG	
28 Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games	188
R. SELTEN	
29 Sequential equilibria	222
D. KREPS AND R. WILSON	
30 Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma	260
D. KREPS, P. MILGROM, J. ROBERTS AND R. WILSON	
31 The Folk Theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information	268
D. FUDENBERG AND E. MASKIN	

CONTENTS

32	Structural consistency, consistency, and sequential rationality D. KREPS AND G. RAMEY	293
33	Equilibrium selection in signaling games J. BANKS AND J. SOBEL	314
PART C		
Dynamic bargaining		333
34	A generalized Nash solution for two-person bargaining games with incomplete information J. HARSANYI AND R. SELTEN	335
35	Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model A. RUBINSTEIN	371
36	A bargaining model with incomplete information about time preferences A. RUBINSTEIN	386
37	The Nash bargaining solution in economic modelling K. BINMORE, A. RUBINSTEIN AND A. WOLINSKY	409
38	Strategic delay in bargaining A. ADMATI AND M. PERRY	427
39	On delay in bargaining with one-sided uncertainty F. GUL AND H. SONNENSCHNEIDER	452
PART D		
Evolutionary games		465
40	The theory of games and the evolution of animal conflicts J. MAYNARD SMITH	467
41	Equilibrium in evolutionary games: some experimental results D. FRIEDMAN	482
42	An evolutionary model of bargaining H. YOUNG	512
PART E		
Psychological games		535
43	Economics, or the art of self-management T. SCHELLING	537

CONTENTS

44	Psychological games and sequential rationality	543
	.I. GEANAKOPLIS, D. PEARCE AND E. STACCHETTI	
45	Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics	562
	M. RABIN	

VOLUME III ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS GAME THEORY AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

BOOK I		
ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS		1
Introduction		3
PART A		
Oligopolistic games		7
46	The chain store paradox	9
	R.SELTEN	
47	Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives	• 39
	R. RADNER	
48	The role of investment in entry-deterrence	60
	A. DIXIT	
49	Reputation and imperfect information	74
	D. KREPS AND R. WILSON	
50	A 'signal-jamming theory' of predation	101
	D. FUDENBERG AND .I. TIROLE	
51	Cheap talk, coordination, and entry	117
	J. FARRELL	
PART B		
Auctions		125
52	Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders	127
	W. VICKREY	
53	Common-value auctions with discrete private information	157
	R. WANG	

CONTENTS

PART C

Macroeconomic games	177
54 Wage bargaining and employment I. MCDONALD AND R. SOLOW	179
55 Inflation and reputation D. BACKUS AND J. DRIFFILL	199
56 A supergame-theoretic model of price wars during booms J. ROTEMBERG AND G. SALONER	212

PART D

General equilibrium and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem	239
57 A limit theorem on the core of an economy G. DEBREU AND H. SCARF)	241
58 Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions M. SATTERTHWAITE	253

BOOK II

GAME THEORY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 283

Introduction	285
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PART A

Political science	289
59 Can the maximin principle serve as a basis for morality? A critique of John Rawls's theory J. HARSANYI	291
60 Rational cooperation D. GAUTHIER	314
61 The entry of game theory into political science W. RIKER	325
62 Rawls, Edgeworth, Shapley, Nash: theories of distributive justice re-examined M. YAARI	340
63 Dominance solvable voting schemes H. MOULIN	378

CONTENTS

PART B	
Analytical Marxism	395
64 New directions in the Marxian theory of exploitation and class J. ROEMER	397
65 Marxism, functionalism and game theory J. ELSTER	429
66 Rational choice Marxism: is the game worth the candle? E. WOOD	460
PART C	
Sociology and anthropology	511
67a Measurement of social power, opportunity costs, and the theory of two-person bargaining games J. HARSANYI	513
67b Measurement of social power in // -person reciprocal power situations .I. HARSANYI	534
68 A bargaining model for social status in informal groups and formal organizations J. HARSANYI	551
69 Gifts as economic signals and social symbols C. CAMERER	570
VOLUME IV DISCONTENTS	
Introduction	1
PART A	
The trouble with consistently aligned beliefs	5
70 Agreeing to disagree R. AUMANN	7
71 Rationalizable strategic behavior B. BERNHEIM	11
72 Common knowledge J. GEANAKOPOLOS	36

CONTENTS

PART B

The problem with backward induction _	67
73 Modeling rational players: Part I K. BINMORE	69
74 The backward induction paradox P. PETTIT AND R. SUGDEN	103
75 Backward induction, normal form perfection and explicable equilibria P. RENY	117

PART C

The problem with bargaining solutions	145
76 Convention, creativity and conflict R. SUGDEN	147
77 Rational bargaining R. SUGDEN	174

PART D

Philosophical queries	211
78 How to make sense of game theory W. SPOHN	213
79 Penny pinching and backward induction M. HOLLIS	242
80 Rationality in action M. HOLLIS AND R. SUGDEN	257
<i>Index</i>	293