

# Recent Developments in Law and Economics

*Edited by*

**Robert D. Cooter**

*Herman F. Selvin Professor of Law  
University of California, Berkeley, USA*

*and*

**Francesco Parisi**

*Oppenheimer Wolff and Donnelly Professor of Law  
University of Minnesota, USA  
and Professor of Economics  
University of Bologna, Italy*

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**Robert D. Cooter**

*Herman F. Selvin Professor of Law  
University of California, Berkeley, USA*

*and*

**Francesco Parisi**

*Oppenheimer Wolff and Donnelly Professor of Law  
University of Minnesota, USA  
and Professor of Economics  
University of Bologna, Italy*

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# Recent Developments in Law and Economics Volume III

*Edited by*

**Robert D. Cooter**

*Herman F. Selvin Professor of Law  
University of California, Berkeley, USA*

*and*

**Francesco Parisi**

*Oppenheimer Wolff and Donnelly Professor of Law  
University of Minnesota, USA  
and Professor of Economics  
University of Bologna, Italy*

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