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HELSINKI SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS

ACTA UNIVERSITATIS OECONOMICAE HELSINGIENSIS

A-240

## Contents

1	INTRODUCTION	1
1.1	Matching Functions	2
1.2	The Questions Answered to in the Present Thesis	5
	1.2.1 Multiple Unemployment Equilibria?	6
	1.2.2 Who Searches Whom?	11
	1.2.3 Price Distribution	13
	1.2.4 Supply of Pollution Permits	14
Refe	erences	16
Ι	Search Intensities, Returns to Scale, and Uniqueness	
	of Unemployment Equilibrium	
1	Introduction	1
2	A Model with a Multiplicative Matching Function	4
	2.1 Strategic Complementarity	8
	2.2 Common Pool Externality	11
	2.3 Condition for Unique Equilibrium with	
_	Multiplicative Matching Function	13
3	Additive Matching Function	14
	3.1 Reaction Functions	15
	3.2 Common Pool Externality	17
	3.3 Condition for Unique Equilibrium with Additive	
	Matching Function	17
4	A Modified Howitt-McAfee Model	18
	4.1 Howitt and McAfee's Method of Analysis	20
	4.2 Strategic Complementarity in the Modified Model	22
	4.3 Common Pool Externality in the Modified Model	23
	4.4 Condition for Unique Equilibrium in the Modified	
	Howitt-McAfee Model	25
5	Conclusion	26
6	Appendix	27
Refe	erences	29
Π	Search, Entry, and Unique Equilibrium	1
1	Introduction	1
2	The Model	3
3	Equilibrium	4
4	Uniqueness of Equilibrium	7
	4.1 Unique Number of Vacancies	7
	4.2 Strategic Complementarity	8
_	4.3 Common Pool Externality	14
5	Conclusion	20
6	Appendix	22
Ref	erences	27
III	Physical Search	-
1	Introduction	2
2	Ine Model	4
3	Auction	6

4	Bargaining	9
5	Efficiency	11
	5.1 Relative Efficiency of Auction and Bargaining	
	in Two-Sided Search	11
	5.2 Relative Utility of a Buyer and a Seller in Two-sided Search	12
	5.3 Efficiency of Two-sided versus One-Sided Search	13
	5.4 Efficiency in One-Sided Search	14
6	Stability of Two-Sided Search	15
	6.1 Stability of Two-Sided Search in Case of Auction	15
	6.2 Stability of Two-Sided Search in Case of Bargaining	18
7	Conclusion	20
8	Appendix	22
Refere	ences	33
IV	Price Distribution in a Symmetric Economy	
1	Introduction	1
2	The Model	3
3	No Pure-Strategy Equilibrium Exists	4
4	Existence of Equilibrium	8
	4.1 Existence of a Symmetric Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium	
	when the Number of Buyers and Sellers is Finite	8
	4.2 Properties of a Symmetric Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium	
	when the Number of Buyers and Sellers is Infinite	10
5	Conclusion	11
6	Colophon	12
7	Appendix	12
	7.1 Proofs related to Subsection 4.1	12
	7.2 Proof of Proposition 4	15
Refere	ences	18
V	Frictions in Project-Based Supply of Permits	347
1	Introduction	347
2	The Model	349
	2.1 Matching: Market for Projects	349
	2.2 Technologies and Allocations	351
	2.3 Permit Market	351
	2.4 Projects	352
3	Decomposition of Losses from Frictions	354
	3.1 Decomposition of Losses for Project Hosts	354
	3.2 Decomposition of Losses for Permit Buyers	355
	3.3 Market-Level Losses	357
4	Application	357
5	Conclusion	359
Ackn	owledgements	360
Notes		360
Refer	ences	363
Appe	ndix: Proofs	364