The dhaMgnmig Face off Central Bsumkning Evolutionary Trends Since World War II

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List of Figures	page xii
List, of Tables	xiv
Preface '<	xvii
The Institutional Make-Up and Evolution of	
Central Bank-Government Relations:	
An Introduction	1
Introduction	1
Inflation Then and Now	3
Governing Structures	6
Conflicts and Conflict Resolution	10
Objectives and Responsibilities in Monetary Policy:	
From Experimentation and Autonomy to	
Accountability and Disclosure	12
The Central Bank and the State	21
Tire Domain of Central Banking	23
Summary	24
Legislation Alone Does Not a Central Bank	
Make: Political Structure, Governance, and	
Reputation in Monetary Policy	26
Introduction	26
Political Structure and Central Bank Autonomy	27
The Role of Governance and Contracts for Central	
Bankers	32
Common Features in Monetary and Fiscal Policies and	
Indicators of Central Bank Performance	38
Central Banks and Conflicts with Government	73
Credibility and Reputation of Monetary Policy	75

Contents

The Fiscal and Monetary Policy Nexus: Do We	
Need a Central Bank at All?	. 78
Summary	80
Central Bank Personalities and Monetary	
Policy Performance	81
Introduction	81
Legacies of the Past	82
Friedman's Hypothesis	83
CEOs of Central Banks	85
Case Studies	90
The Threat to Monetary Policy in the	
Twenty-First Century. Financial Instability	118
Summary	127
Econometric Analysis of Central Bank	
Behavior: An Evolutionary Approach	128
Introduction	128
Varieties of Reaction Functions	130
The Policy Paradox	145
New Estimates of Central Bank Reaction Functions:	
Specification and Econometric Considerations	147
Empirical Evidence	164
Summary	191
Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative	
Assessments of Central Bank Behavior and the	
Evolution of Monetary Policies	193
Introduction	193
Reconciling the Econometric and Qualitative	
Evidence	196
The Emergence of Common Features in	
Monetary Policy: The Triumph of Policies?	200
A Half Century of Experimentation	204
An Assessment	218
Summary	219
Accountability, Disclosure, and Conflict	
Resolution	220
Introduction	220
How Much to Talk? Central Bank Signaling and	
Credibility	223
The Meaning of Accountability	227

Contents ' xi

The Value of Disclosure	235
The Importance of Conflict Resolution Procedures	
and Governance	238
Measuring Central Bank Accountability and	
Disclosure	247
Summary	264
Inflation Targets versus Other Inflation Control	
Measures: Two Sides of the Same Coin?	265
Introduction	265
The End of Personalities and the Emergence of	
a Framework for Monetary Policy	267
Exchange Rate Regimes, Money, Inflation, and	
Targeting: Which One is a Coherent Policy	
Framework?	272
Disclosure versus Flexibility Redux	282
The Appeal of "Communication" as an Instrument	
of Monetary Policy	283
Communicating Monetary Policy	294
Practical Issues with Inflation Targets: The Crucial	
Role of the Institutional Framework	295
Summary	298
TTie Changing Face of Central Banking: Epilogue	300
Introduction	300
De lure or De Facto Autonomy: Does It Matter?	301
Whither Central Bank Personalities?	303
Qualitative versus Quantitative Forms of Analysis of	
Central Bank Performance	304
Toward the Holy Grail in Monetary Policy?	306
Bibliography	309
Index	34