

HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE

VOLUME 1

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Edited by

KENNETH J. ARROW Stanford University

AMARTYA K. SEN Trinity College

and

KOTARO SUZUMURA Hitotsubashi University



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