

# **Liberalism Against Populism**

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**A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy  
and the Theory of Social Choice**

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# Contents

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Preface ix

Analytical Table of Contents xi

## 1

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### The Connection Between the Theory of Social Choice and the Theory of Democracy 1

- 1.A The Attainability of Justice 3
- 1.B The Elements of Democracy 4
  - Participation 5
  - Liberty 6
  - Equality 7
- 1.C The Meaning of Democracy 8
- 1.D The Liberal Interpretation of Voting 8
- 1.E The Populist Interpretation of Voting 11
- 1.F Differences Between Liberal and Populist Interpretations of Voting 12
- 1.G The Vitality of the Liberal and Populist Interpretations of Voting 14
- 1.H The Paradox of Voting 16

## 2

---

### Different Choices from Identical Values 21

- 2.A Evidence from Elections 22
- 2.B Evidence from Experiment 29

## 3

---

### Simple Majority Decision 41

- 3.A Introductory Definitions 42
- 3.B Properties of Simple Majority Decision: Monotonicity 45

- 3.C Violations of Monotonicity 47
  - Social Choices Operating on Two Alternatives 47
  - Social Choices Operating on More Than Two Alternatives 48
- 3.D Properties of Simple Majority Decision:
  - Undifferentiatedness (Anonymity) 51
- 3.E Properties of Simple Majority Decision: Neutrality 56
- 3.F Simple Majority Decision and Fairness 58
- 3.G Democratic Thought About Simple Majority Decision 59

---

 4
 

---

**Voting Methods with Three  
or More Alternatives 65**

- 4.A Some Preliminaries 66
- 4.B Majoritarian Methods of Voting 67
- 4.C Examples of Majoritarian Methods 69
  - The Amendment Procedure 69
  - The Successive Procedure 73
  - Runoff Elections 74
  - The Copeland Rule 76
  - The Schwartz Rule 76
  - The Kemeny Rule 76
  - Conclusions 81
- 4.D Positional Methods of Voting 81
- 4.E Examples of Positional Methods 85
  - Plurality Voting 85
  - Approval Voting 88
  - The Borda Count 90
  - Conclusions 91
- 4.F Utilitarian Methods of Voting 95
- 4.G Examples of Utilitarian Methods 98
  - Summation of Cardinal Utility 98
  - Demand-revealing Methods 98
  - Multiplication of Utilities 98
  - Conclusions 98
- 4.H Criteria for Judging Voting Methods 99
  - Undifferentiatedness 99
  - Neutrality 99
  - Monotonicity 100
  - The Condorcet Criterion 100
  - Consistency 100
  - Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives 101
- 4.I Judgments on Voting Methods 101
  - Minor Violations of Fairness 101
  - Violation of Consistency by Majoritarian Methods 102
  - Violation of Independence by the Borda Count 105
  - Violation of Undifferentiatedness by Approval Voting 105
  - Violation of Independence by Utilitarian Methods 110

**4.J The Absence of True and Fair Amalgamations 111**

**5**

---

**The Meaning of Social Choices 115**

- 5.A Arrow's Theorem 115  
 5.B The Practical Relevance of Arrow's Theorem:  
 The Frequency of Cycles 119  
 5.C The Practical Relevance of Arrow's Theorem:  
 Conditions for Condorcet Winners 123  
 5.D The Theoretical Invulnerability of Arrow's Theorem: Independence 129  
 5.E The Theoretical Invulnerability of Arrow's Theorem: Transitivity 130  
 5.F The Theoretical Invulnerability of Arrow's Theorem:  
 Conditions on Social Choice 132  
 5.G The Absence of Meaning 136

**6**

---

**The Manipulation of Social Choices:  
 Strategic Voting 137**

- 6.A The Elements of Manipulation 138  
 6.B The Universality of Strategic Voting 141  
 6.C Examples of Strategic Voting 145  
 In Plurality Voting 145  
 In an Open Primary 145  
 In Union Elections 151  
 In the U.S. House of Representatives 152  
 6.D The Consequences of Strategic Voting 156  
 6.E Vote-trading 157  
 6.F The Ineradicability of Strategic Voting 167

**7**

---

**The Manipulation of Social Choices:  
 Control of the Agenda 169**

- 7.A The Universality of Agenda Control 170  
 7.B Examples of Agenda Control 173  
 In the Roman Senate 173  
 In a Contemporary Laboratory 174  
 7.C The Paucity of Equilibria 181  
 Disequilibrium in Three Dimensions 182  
 Conditions for Equilibrium 185  
 Complete Disequilibrium 186  
 7.D Practical Stability and Theoretical Instability 188  
 7.E The Fragility of Equilibria: An Example of the Introduction  
 of New Alternatives to Generate Disequilibrium 192

## 8

---

**The Natural Selection of Political Issues:  
An Interpretation of  
Political Disequilibrium 197**

- 8.A** Disappointments with Disequilibria 198  
**8.B** Voting Disequilibrium: What It Means to Lose 201  
 Losing Economically 201  
 Losing Politically 202  
**8.C** Voting Disequilibrium: The Quantity and Quality  
 of Political Dissatisfaction 206  
**8.D** The Consequences of Dissatisfaction: A Model of Political Change 208  
**8.E** The Natural Selection of Issues 209  
**8.F** Structural Regularities in Natural Selection 211

## 9

---

**Manipulation and the Natural Selection  
of Issues: The Development of the  
Issue of Slavery as a Prelude to the  
American Civil War 213**

- 9.A** The Appearance of Slavery as a National Political Issue 214  
**9.B** Slavery as an Issue from the Ratification of the Constitution  
 Through the Missouri Compromise 215  
**9.C** From the Missouri Compromise to the Gag Rule 219  
**9.D** The Wilmot Proviso 223  
**9.E** From the Wilmot Proviso to the Civil War 227

## 10

---

**Liberalism, Populism, and the Theory of Social Choice 233**

- 10.A** The Adequacy of Voting 233  
**10.B** The Rejection of Populism 238  
**10.C** The Survival of Liberalism and Democracy 241  
**10.D** Are Liberal and Populist Interpretations Compatible? 246  
**10.E** The Preservation of Liberal Democracy 249

**Notes 255**

**Glossary 293**

**Bibliography 299**

**Index 307**