

Federalism and the Market

Intergovernmental Conflict and Economic Reform in the Developing World

> ERIK WIBBELS University of Washington



Contents

Ac	Acknowledgments	
I	Intergovernmental Bargaining and Economic Policy in Federations	I
2	From Market-Preserving to Market-Distorting Federalism: Divergent Incentives and Economic Reform in Developing Nations	17
3	Federalism and the Decentralized Politics of Macroeconomic Policy and Performance	53
4	Testing the Model: Macroeconomic Reform Beyond the Federal-Unitary Distinction	86
5	Partisan Harmony, Intergovernmental Coordination, and Market Transitions: The Case of Argentina	123
6	Regional Competition, Fiscal Dependence, and Incentives in the Argentine Provinces	162
7	The View from Below: The Politics of Public Sector Reform in Three Argentine Provinces	197
8	Conclusion: Federalism, Reform, and Enduring Puzzles	223
References		249
Inc	Index	