

Conflict, Negotiation

CHRISTINA J. SCHNEIDER

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Contents

<i>List of Illustrations</i>	<i>page</i>	x
<i>List, of Tables</i>		xi
<i>List of Acronyms</i>		xiii
<i>Acknowledgements</i>		xv
i i		
1 Introduction		1
1.1 The politics of EU enlargement		5
1.2 Organization of the book		8
2 EU enlargements and transitional periods		12
2.1 Timeline of European Union enlargement		13\
2.2 The formal EU enlargement process		16
2.3 Accession negotiations and enlargement outcomes		19
2.3.1 Implementation of the <i>acquis communautaire</i>		20
2.3.2 The formulation of a common EU position		24
2.4 Conclusion	•	30
2.5 Appendix		31
3 A rationalist puzzle of EU enlargement?		33
3.1 Widening and deepening: two pillars of EU integration		34
3.1.1 Functionalism and neo-functionalism		35
3.1.2 Intergovernmentalism		36
3.1.3 New institutionalism		37
3.2 Integration theories and the calculus of EU enlargement		38
3.2.1 The gains of EU enlargement		41
3.2.2 The costs of EU enlargement		44
3.3 The puzzle of EU expansion		47

3.4	Alternative explanations of EU enlargement	•	49
3.5	Conclusion		52
4	A theory of discriminatory membership		55
4.1	Basic assumptions of the theoretical model		56
4.2	The calculus of EU enlargement		57
4.2.1	The emergence of distributional conflicts		61
4.2.2	The resolution of distributional conflicts		65
4.2.3	The transitional nature of discrimination		69
4.3	Hypotheses on expansion and differentiated membership		73
4.4	Conclusion		76
5	EU enlargement, distributional conflicts, and the demand for compensation		77
5.1	Research design		79
5.1.1	Dependent variables		81
5.1.2	Model specification		83
5.2	Free movement of workers		85
5.2.1	Variables and data sources		86
5.2.2	Estimation results		91
5.2.3	Predicted probabilities	•	94
5.2.4	Conclusion		103
5.3	Common Agricultural Policies		104
5.3.1	Variables and data sources		108
5.3.2	Estimation results		110
5.3.3	Predicted probabilities		113
5.3.4	Conclusion		120
5.4	Common Structural Policies		120
5.4.1	Variables and data sources		121
5.4.2	Estimation results		122
5.4.3	Predicted probabilities		126
5.4.4	Conclusion		131
5.5	The demand for compensation: conclusion		132
5.6	Appendix		134
6	The discriminatory of membership		138
6.1	Research design		139
6.1.1	Dependent variable		140
6.1.2	Explanatory variables.		140
6.1.3	Model specification		143

6.2	Estimation results	144
6.3	Predicted probabilities	151
6.4	Conclusion	155
6.5	Appendix	157
7	Discriminatory membership and intra-union redistribution	158
7.1	The puzzle	160
7.2	ERDF/ESF and the second Mediterranean enlargement	162
7.3	ERDF/ESF and EU Eastern enlargement	165
7.4	Comparison of the two cases	172
7.5	Conclusion: structural transfers and discriminatory membership	177
8	Conclusion	182
<i>Bibliography</i>	I'	189
<i>Index</i>		205