THE SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTION

JUDICIAL COMPETENCE AND INDEPENDENCE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

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CONTENTS

Acknowledgements page xi Table of cases **xii**

Introduction 1

The contemporary separation of powers

PA RT I Separation of powers, the Human Rights Act and the European Convention on Human Rights 7

1

1 9 A doctrine of uncertain scope and application The meaning(s) and aim(s) of separation of powers 9 Separation of powers in the United Kingdom constitution 16 The supremacy of Parliament 20 "Theory, as usual, followed upon fact ... ' 21 A relationship of equal branches? 22 A descriptive, or normative, device? 24 The centrality of judicial independence 26 The contemporary separation of powers 31 2 The Human Rights Act 1998 and the separation of 33 powers Introduction 33 Rights as questions of law and/or politics 34 The parliamentary bill of rights model 42 The Human Rights Act in the United Kingdom constitution 44 Intergrating rights concerns into the legislative process 46 Interpretations and declarations of incompatibility 48 Separation of powers at the macro-level: an inter-institutional dialogue on rights? 50 Strong form review by stealth? 52 Operating in the shadow of Strasbourg 54 The separation of powers implications of the dialogic model 56

CONTENTS

70

3 The Strasbourg influence 60 Introduction 60 The standard of review and requirement of proportionate interference 63 The inadequacy of Wednesbury review 65 Proportionate interference 66 The Strasbourg jurisprudence on separated governmental functions Executive involvement in 'judicial' decisions - sentencing 74 Judicial review of administrative' decisions 76 The Strasbourg jurisprudence on separated institutions 78 An independent and impartial tribunal 79 The circumstantial approach to impartiality 80 The strict separation approach to impartiality 82 Conclusion 84 PART II Judicial engagement with the 'political' branches 87 4 Justiciability 89 The extended range of review 89 The justiciability of the Convention rights 90 Public resources 93 National security 96 'High policy' and prerogative powers 99 Deployment of the armed forces 100 Foreign relations and the power to enter into treaties 101 The withering of non-justiciability doctrines 103 Towards legislative review? 105 Conclusion 113 Deference and proportionality 5 115 Introduction 115 Deference 116 Deference or a margin of appreciation? 117 Constraining judicial power under a statutory bill of rights 119 Deference under the Human Rights Act 121 '... servility, or perhaps gracious concession'? 123 A fig leaf for non-justiciability? 125 An autonomous or an integrated concept? 128 Proportionality and the intensity of review 129 The structure of proportionality review 132 The integration of proportionality and deference 135 Proportionality, legitimacy and merits review 139 Conclusion 141

V111

PART III The creative powers of courts 143

Statutory interpretation and declarations of incompatibility 145 Introduction 145 The judge as law-maker 146 Interpretative latitude under the Human Rights Act 151 Interpretative law-making on the Human Rights Act model 154 A power of invalidation through interpretation? 156 Implied terms and additional words Deference to the legislature and the limitations of judicial interpretation 163 Democratic dialogue in practice: parliamentary and executive responses to incompatibility 168 Conclusion 176 Developing the common law and the meaning of the Convention rights' 181 Introduction 181 The incremental nature of common law development 181 The Human Rights Act and law-making at common law 183 The transformative potential of models of horizontality 183 The modification of breach of confidence 186 Towards directly effective rights to privacy and expression at common law? 189 The meaning and application of the Convention rights' 191 'The Convention rights' in domestic law 192 The scope for creative judicial interpretation of the Convention rights' 199 Conclusion 202 PART iv The separation of the judicial branch 205The independence of the judiciary 207 Introduction 207The institutional independence of the judiciary 208 The distinction between institutional and individual independence 208 The pressure for increased institutional autonomy 212 The office of Lord Chancellor 214 The Lords of Appeal in Ordinary 216 Structural independence secured? The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 219 Independence of the executive 221 Independence of the legislature 225

CONTENTS

Independence, legitimacy and the separation of functions227The emergence of a separation of powers jurisprudence?229Asserting the division between legislator and judge: procedural
fairness at common law232Endorsing the Convention's circumstantial approach232Towards a 'strict' separation of functions at common law?236The reach of separation by fair process239Towards a constitutionally separate judicial branch?242

Towards constitutional separation 245

Descriptive or substantive principles of separation? 245

Select bibliography 254 Index 267