

Berichte aus der Volkswirtschaft

WielandMuDler

Commitment: Experimental studies on games
with (im)perfectly observable actions

C

Shaker Verlag
Aachen 1999

Contents

Stackelberg beats Cournot	1
1.1 Introduction	1
1.2 Markets, treatments, and predictions.	4
1.3 Methods and procedures.	6
1.4 Experimental results'.	8
1.5 Conclusion.	13
To commit or not to commit	15
2.1 Introduction.	15
2.2 Theoretical background	17
2.3 Experimental procedures.	20
2.4 Experimental results (large matrix).	21
2.4.1 Aggregated results.	22
2.4.2 Group effects.	27
2.4.3 Individual behavior.	29
2.4.4 Discussion.	30
2.5 Experimental results (small matrix).	31
2.5.1 Aggregated results.	32
2.5.2 Group effects.	34
2.5.3 Individual behavior.	35
2.5.4 Discussion.	36
2.6 Conclusion.	36
Perfect versus imperfect observability	39
3.1 Introduction	39
3.2 Experimental design and predictions.	40
3.3 Method and procedure.	43
3.4 Results.	45
3.4.1 No NOISE.	45

3.4.2	Low NOISE.	47
3.4.3	MEDIUM NOISE.	47
3.4.4	HIGH NOISE.	50
3.4.5	Bagwell's claim.	50
3.4.6	Van Damme and Hurkens's claim.	51
3.5	Two further treatments.	52
3.5.1	Results.	54
3.6	Discussion.	56
4	A study on dynamic decision making	59
4.1	Introduction.	59
4.2	The Experiment.	61
4.3	How to solve the decision problem?.	63
4.3.1	Economic theory.	63
4.3.2	(Simple) Strategies and Heuristics.	64
4.4	Observed Behavior.	67
4.4.1	Average observed behavior.	67
4.4.2	Behavioral patterns.	67
4.5	Attitudes towards risk.	75
4.5.1	Aggregated behavior.	75
4.5.2	Behavior in the fifth period.	78
4.6	Summary.	84
A	Additional material for Chapter 1	87
A.1	Instructions.	87
A.2	Payoff table.	89
A.3	Further data.	89
B	Additional material for Chapter 2	93
B.1	Instructions.	93
C	Additional material for Chapter 3	95
C.1	Instructions.	95
D	Additional material for Chapter 4	97
D.1	Instructions.	97
D.2	Areas of risk-aversion.	99
	References	99