

The ECB: Safe at Any Speed ?

Monitoring the European Central Bank 1

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The research underlying this publication was supported by Citibank, N.A. and Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A. The views expressed in the report are those of the authors writing in their personal capacity; neither CEPR nor the funders take institutional positions regarding the contents of the report.

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