

INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS
AND
ORGANIZATION

Theory and Evidence

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Contents

<i>List of Journal Abbreviations</i>	ix		
PART I INTRODUCTION			
1 A PERSPECTIVE OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS	3	4 PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION	102
1.1 Introduction	3	4.1 Introduction	102
1.2 The early theory of the firm	3	4.2 Monopolistic competition revived	103
1.3 Monopolistic competition	7	4.3 Product differentiation: alternative frameworks	106
1.4 Developments after Chamberlin	12	4.4 Pricing and equilibrium in differentiated product markets	115
1.5 A framework of industrial economics	18	4.5 Strategic responses to potential competition in differentiated markets	122
1.6 Passive and active behaviour of firms	21	4.6 Evidence	124
1.7 Outline of the book	22	4.7 Conclusions	126
		5 ADVERTISING	128
		5.1 A model of advertising expenditures	128
		5.2 Advertising and consumer behaviour	131
		5.3 Advertising and market structure	139
		5.4 Advertising and barriers to entry	142
		5.5 Other aspects of advertising	148
		5.6 Conclusions	150
PART II THE ANALYSIS OF MARKETS		6 VERTICAL MARKET RELATIONSHIPS AND PRICE DISCRIMINATION	152
2 COSTS AND SUPPLY CONDITIONS	27	6.1 Vertical relationships in markets	152
2.1 Production costs, and economies of scale at plant level	27	6.2 Price discrimination	161
2.2 Economies of scale and the firm	38	6.3 Conclusions	168
2.3 Empirical cost curves	47		
2.4 The survivor technique	54	7 PRICING IN PRACTICE	170
2.5 Conclusions	56	7.1 Introduction	170
		7.2 Predictions of price theory	172
3 STRATEGY AND PRICING IN OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKETS	58	7.3 Pricing under uncertainty	175
3.1 Introduction	58	7.4 Empirical evidence on pricing: case studies	180
3.2 Classical oligopoly theory and the one-period model	59	7.5 Inventories and order books	185
3.3 Extensions of the basic model	62	7.6 Empirical evidence on pricing: econometric analysis	189
3.4 Oligopolistic competition in multi-period models	67	7.7 Price behaviour and market structure	195
3.5 Collusion and cartels	75	7.8 Conclusions	200
3.6 Strategic responses to potential competition	85	Appendix	201
3.7 Conclusions	100		

xii / Contents

8 MARKET STRUCTURE AND PROFITABILITY	204	10.8 Growth and profitability	360
8.1 Introduction	204	10.9 Steady-state methodology	362
8.2 Industrial structure and profitability: a summary of theory	204	10.10 The size and growth of firms	365
8.3 Measurement of concentration	207	10.11 Problems in the theory of the growth of firms	367
8.4 Measurement of profitability	216	10.12 Implications and conclusions	372
8.5 Concentration and industry profitability: early studies	223		
8.6 Entry and profitability	224	11 COMPANY FINANCE	375
8.7 Other influences on profitability	232	11.1 The analysis of financial decisions	375
8.8 Simultaneous studies of the structure-performance relation	239	11.2 The flow of funds	378
8.9 Discontinuities in the concentration-profitability relation	245	11.3 The cost of funds	379
8.10 Further specification and measurement problems	246	11.4 Gearing	384
8.11 Interpretation of structure-profitability relationships	254	11.5 The retention ratio	404
8.12 Conclusions	259	11.6 Financial intermediaries	419
Appendix	261	11.7 Conclusions	422
		Appendices	423
PART III THE BEHAVIOUR OF FIRMS		12 INVESTMENT EXPENDITURE	433
9 THE FIRM: OBJECTIVES, ORGANISATION & CONTROL	271	12.1 Investment decisions	433
9.1 Introduction	271	12.2 A framework for analysing investment behaviour	435
9.2 Characteristics of industrial companies	273	12.3 The theory of investment	438
9.3 Ownership and control of firms	276	12.4 Empirical studies of investment	446
9.4 Firms as resource-allocating organizations	281	12.5 Government policy impact	456
9.5 The profit maximization assumption	292	12.6 The investment decision process	459
9.6 Non-profit-maximizing objectives	296	12.7 Conclusions	465
9.7 Constraints on non-profit-maximizing behaviour	305		
9.8 Non-profit-maximizing models of the firm	317	13 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND INNOVATION	466
9.9 Conclusions	324	13.1 Definitions	466
		13.2 R and D expenditure as an investment decision	467
10 THE GROWTH OF FIRMS	327	13.3 Markets and the returns to R and D	473
10.1 Introduction	327	13.4 Diffusion of new techniques	490
10.2 The Marris growth model	328		
10.3 The demand constraint	335	14 TAKEOVERS, MERGERS, AND THE STOCK MARKET	496
10.4 Growth through vertical integration	340	14.1 Introduction	496
10.5 The managerial constraint	347	14.2 The stock market valuation of firms	499
10.6 The finance constraint	351	14.3 The pure theory of mergers	510
10.7 Empirical evidence on managerial objectives	356	14.4 Allocational takeovers	512
		14.5 Managerial takeovers	516
		14.6 Acquisitional takeovers	521
		14.7 Conglomerate mergers	522

14.8 Empirical evidence on takeovers	524	16.6 Concentration measurements and welfare losses	587
14.9 Conclusions	531		
15 THE DEVELOPMENT OF FIRMS, AND MARKET AND INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE	532	17 PUBLIC POLICY TOWARDS MARKET STRUCTURE, CONDUCT, AND PERFORMANCE: II	590
15.1 Models of market structure	533	17.1 Product differentiation	590
15.2 Stochastic models of concentration	537	17.2 Advertising and information	593
15.3 Inter-industry differences in growth rate variance	541	17.3 Policy aspects of vertical relations in markets, and of vertical integration	597
15.4 Scale economies, growth, and concentration	543	17.4 Price discrimination	600
15.5 Technical change, product change, and changes in concentration	547	17.5 The framework for policy	604
15.6 New entry and the development of market structure	550	17.6 Competition policy in the UK, the EEC, and the USA	612
15.7 Mergers and market concentration	553	17.7 Regulation	622
15.8 Diversification	556		
15.9 Industrial concentration	558	18 PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF FIRMS	638
PART IV ISSUES FOR PUBLIC POLICY		18.1 The dynamic Pareto conditions	638
16 PUBLIC POLICY TOWARDS MARKET STRUCTURE, CONDUCT, AND PERFORMANCE: I	565	18.2 Environmental uncertainty	639
16.1 The static Pareto framework	566	18.3 Time and environmental uncertainty in the context of a price system	640
16.2 The supposed optimality of perfect competition	568	18.4 A constrained Pareto optimum	644
16.3 A piecemeal approach	570	18.5 Imperfections of the capital market	646
16.4 The costs of monopoly: theoretical issues	573	18.6 Investment	647
16.5 The social costs of monopoly: measuring welfare losses	581	18.7 Growth by merger	650
		18.8 Research and development	652
		18.9 Conclusions	660
		Appendix: A Formal Analysis of Pareto Optimality	661
		<i>Index</i>	665