

# THE GOALS OF MACROECONOMIC POLICY

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# Contents

<i>List of Charts, Figures and Tables</i>	vii
<i>Preface</i>	ix
<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>1 The Theory of Macroeconomic Goals</b>	<b>5</b>
1.1 The Pareto Optimality of Macroeconomic Goals	5
1.2 The Benefits of Full Employment	9
1.3 The Welfare Costs of Inflation	19
1.4 The Trade-off between Unemployment and Inflation	23
1.5 Summary	30
<b>2 The Achievement of Macroeconomic Targets: U.S. Experience, 1948-90</b>	<b>33</b>
2.1 U.S. Macroeconomic Performance, 1948-90	33
2.2 The Effectiveness of Stabilization Policy	40
2.3 Legislative Intent for Stabilization Policy	44
2.4 Implementation of Stabilization Policy	48
2.5 Concluding Remarks	88
<b>3 The Market for Labor Services and the Macroeconomy</b>	<b>93</b>
3.1 The Supply of Labor	95
3.2 The Demand for Labor	103
3.3 Equilibrium in the Labor Market	109
3.4 Disequilibrium and Unemployment	112
3.5 Stabilization Policy and the Labor Market	115
3.6 Types of Unemployment	117
3.7 The Empirical Relevance of the Model	118
3.8 Conclusions about Labor-Market Characteristics	121

<b>4</b>	<b>The Welfare Economics of Macropolicy</b>	<b>123</b>
4.1	Welfare Analysis in the Labor Market	123
4.2	The Possibility of Pareto Improvements	131
4.3	The Welfare Effects of Stabilization Policy	137
4.4	The Equity Argument	139
4.5	Democratically Determined Wages	140
4.6	Democratically Determined Macropolicy	146
4.7	Conclusions	149
<b>5</b>	<b>Public Expenditures and the Private Interest</b>	<b>151</b>
5.1	Government Demand and Industry Welfare	152
5.2	The Welfare of Producing Agents	155
5.3	A Measure of Industry Welfare Changes	157
5.4	A Case Study of Federal Government Purchases	159
5.5	An Alternative Explanation	170
5.6	Conclusion	171
<b>6</b>	<b>The Macroeconomic Policy Apparatus</b>	<b>173</b>
6.1	Individual Support for Public Choices	174
6.2	Government Activity as Zero-sum Games	177
6.3	Bias in Stabilization Policies	180
6.4	Improving the Policy Apparatus	184
6.5	Exploitation of Stabilization Policies	192
6.6	Conclusion	196
	<b>Epilogue</b>	<b>199</b>
	<i>Bibliography</i>	203
	<i>Index</i>	209

## Charts

2-1	The U.S. inflation rate measured by GNP deflator, 1948-90	34
2-2	The U.S. output gap, 1948-90	39
2-3	The full-employment budget surplus and the output gap, 1948-90	41
2-4	The growth rate of real M1 money balances and the output gap, 1948-90	42
2-5	The period of a stable Phillips curve, 1948-68	61
2-6	The transition to higher inflation, 1969-73; the oil-price shocks, 1974-80; and the aftermath, 1981-90	67
3-1	Actual and natural rates of unemployment, 1948-90	95
5-1	The voting profile among U.S. workers, 1982	166

## Figures

1-1	Phillips curves and reaction functions	25
3-1	Determining the reservation wage	98
3-2	Aggregating two individual labor-supply decisions	100
3-3	Adjustment and disequilibrium costs of employment	107
3-4	Equilibrium in the labor market	110
4-1	Welfare positions in the labor market	126
4-2	Welfare of the employed and the unemployed	129
4-3	Ranking workers by the security of their employment	130
4-4	Welfare and excess demand or excess supply	138
5-1	Welfare of two producing agents	156

## Tables

2-1	Projected unemployment and inflation rates in <i>Economic Report of the President</i> for 1979-81	72
3-2	Projected unemployment and inflation rates in <i>Economic Report of the President</i> for 1982-90	87
5-1	Industry effects of reducing federal government expenditures, 1982	162-5
8»2	The effect of voting costs on the size of the electorate and the distribution of votes	168