

GAMES OF STRATEGY

THIRD EDITION



Avinash Dixit

Princeton University

Susan Skeath

Wellesley College

David Reiley

University of Arizona and Yahoo! Research



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Contents

Preface to the Third Edition

xx

PART ONE

Introduction and General Principles

1	Basic Ideas and Examples	3
	1 WHAT IS A GAME OF STRATEGY?	4
	2 SOME EXAMPLES AND STORIES OF STRATEGIC GAMES	6
	A. Which Passing Shot?	6
	B. The GPA Rat Race	7
	C. "We Can't Take the Exam, Because We Had a Flat Tire"	9
	D. Why Are Professors So Mean?	10
	E. Roommates and Families on the Brink	11
	F. The Dating Game	13
	3 OUR STRATEGY FOR STUDYING GAMES OF STRATEGY	14

2 How to Think About Strategic Games 17

- 1 DECISIONS VERSUS GAMES 18
- 2 CLASSIFYING GAMES 20
 - A. Are the Moves in the Game Sequential or Simultaneous? 20
 - B. Are the Players' Interests in Total Conflict, or Is There Some Commonality? 21
 - C. Is the Game Played Once or Repeatedly, and with the Same or Changing Opponents? 22
 - D. Do the Players Have Full or Equal Information? 23
 - E. Are the Rules of the Game Fixed or Manipulable? 25
 - F. Are Agreements to Cooperate Enforceable? 26
- 3 SOME TERMINOLOGY AND BACKGROUND ASSUMPTIONS 27
 - A. Strategies 27
 - B. Payoffs 28
 - C. Rationality 29
 - D. Common Knowledge of Rules 31
 - E. Equilibrium 33
 - F. Dynamics and Evolutionary Games 34
 - G. Observation and Experiment 35
- 4 THE USES OF GAME THEORY 36
- 5 THE STRUCTURE OF THE CHAPTERS TO FOLLOW 38
- SUMMARY 41
- KEY TERMS 42
- EXERCISES 42

PART TWO

Concepts and Techniques

3 Games with Sequential Moves 47

- 1 GAME TREES 48
 - A. Nodes, Branches, and Paths of Play 48
 - B. Uncertainty and "Nature's Moves" 48
 - C. Outcomes and Payoffs 50
 - D. Strategies 50
 - E. Tree Construction 51
- 2 SOLVING GAMES BY USING TREES 52

3	ADDING MORE PLAYERS	57
4	ORDER ADVANTAGES	62
5	ADDING MORE MOVES	63
	A. Tic-Tac-Toe	63
	B. Chess	65
	C. Checkers	69
6	EVIDENCE CONCERNING ROLLBACK	71
7	STRATEGIES IN THE <i>SURVIVOR</i> GAME	74
	SUMMARY	79
	KEY TERMS	80
	EXERCISES	80

4

Simultaneous-Move Games with Pure Strategies I: Discrete Strategies

89

1	DEPICTING SIMULTANEOUS-MOVE GAMES WITH DISCRETE STRATEGIES	90
2	NASH EQUILIBRIUM	92
	A. Some Further Explanation of the Concept of Nash Equilibrium	93
	B. Nash Equilibrium As a System of Beliefs and Choices	95
3	DOMINANCE	97
	A. Both Players Have Dominant Strategies	98
	B. One Player Has a Dominant Strategy	99
	C. Successive Elimination of Dominated Strategies	102
4	BEST-RESPONSE ANALYSIS	104
5	THE MINIMAX METHOD FOR ZERO-SUM GAMES	106
6	THREE PLAYERS	108
7	MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA IN PURE STRATEGIES	111
	A. Will Harry Meet Sally? Pure Coordination	111
	B. Will Harry Meet Sally? And Where? Assurance	113
	C. Will Harry Meet Sally? And Where? Battle of the Sexes	115
	D. Will James Meet Dean? Chicken	116
8	NO EQUILIBRIUM IN PURE STRATEGIES	118
	SUMMARY	120
	KEY TERMS	121
	EXERCISES	121

5	Simultaneous-Move Games with Pure Strategies II: Continuous Strategies and III: Discussion and Evidence	133
1	PURE STRATEGIES THAT ARE CONTINUOUS VARIABLES	134
	A. Price Competition	134
	B. Some Economics of Oligopoly	138
	C. Political Campaign Advertising	139
	D. General Method for Finding Nash Equilibria	142
2	EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE CONCERNING NASH EQUILIBRIUM	143
	A. Laboratory and Classroom Experiments	143
	B. Real-World Evidence	146
3	CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM CONCEPT	150
	A. The Treatment of Risk in Nash Equilibrium	151
	B. Multiplicity of Nash Equilibria	154
	C. Requirements of Rationality for Nash Equilibrium	156
4	RATIONALIZABILITY	157
	A. Applying the Concept of Rationalizability	158
	B. Rationalizability Can Take Us All the Way to Nash Equilibrium	159
	SUMMARY	163
	KEY TERMS	163
	EXERCISES	163
	APPENDIX: Finding a Value to Maximize a Function	173

6	Combining Sequential and Simultaneous Moves	177
1	GAMES WITH BOTH SIMULTANEOUS AND SEQUENTIAL MOVES	178
	A. Two-Stage Games and Subgames	178
	B. Configurations of Multistage Games	182
2	CHANGING THE ORDER OF MOVES IN A GAME	184
	A. Changing Simultaneous-Move Games into Sequential-Move Games	185
	B. Other Changes in the Order of Moves	192
3	CHANGE IN THE METHOD OF ANALYSIS	193
	A. Illustrating Simultaneous-Move Games by Using Trees	193
	B. Showing and Analyzing Sequential-Move Games in Strategic Form	195

4 THREE-PLAYER GAMES 199

SUMMARY 202

KEY TERMS 203

EXERCISES 203

7

Simultaneous-Move Games with Mixed Strategies I: Two-by-Two Games 213

1 WHAT IS A MIXED STRATEGY? 214

2 UNCERTAIN ACTIONS: MIXING MOVES TO KEEP THE OPPONENT
GUESSING 215

- A. The Benefit of Mixing 216
- B. Equilibrium in Mixed Strategies 221
- C. The Minimax Method 222

3 NASH EQUILIBRIUM AS A SYSTEM OF BELIEFS AND RESPONSES 224

4 MIXING IN NON-ZERO-SUM GAMES 226

- A. Will Harry Meet Sally? Assurance, Pure Coordination, and Battle of the
Sexes 226
- B. Will James Meet Dean? Chicken 229

5 GENERAL DISCUSSION OF MIXED-STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA 230

- A. Weak Sense of Equilibrium 230
- B. Counterintuitive Changes in Mixture Probabilities in Zero-Sum Games 231

6 HOW TO USE MIXED STRATEGIES IN PRACTICE 233

7 EVIDENCE ON MIXING 234

- A. Zero-Sum Games 234
- B. Non-Zero-Sum Games 237

SUMMARY 238

KEY TERMS 239

EXERCISES 239

APPENDIX: Probability and Expected Utility 251

1 THE BASIC ALGEBRA OF PROBABILITIES 251

- A. The Addition Rule 253
- B. The Modified Addition Rule 254
- C. The Multiplication Rule 255
- D. The Modified Multiplication Rule 255
- E. The Combination Rule 256
- F. Expected Values 257

2 ATTITUDES TOWARD RISK AND EXPECTED UTILITY 258

SUMMARY 261

KEY TERMS 261

8

Simultaneous-Move Games with Mixed Strategies II: Some General Theory 262

1 BEST-RESPONSE ANALYSIS 263

A. Best-Response Analysis of the Tennis Point 263

B. Best-Response Analysis in Non-Zero-Sum Games 266

2 MIXING WHEN ONE PLAYER HAS THREE OR MORE PURE STRATEGIES 268

A. A General Case 269

B. Exceptional Cases 272

C. Case of Domination by a Mixed Strategy 273

3 MIXING WHEN BOTH PLAYERS HAVE THREE STRATEGIES 276

A. Full Mixture of All Strategies 277

B. Equilibrium Mixes with Some Strategies Unused 279

4 MORE COUNTERINTUITIVE PROPERTIES OF MIXED STRATEGIES 281

A. Risky and Safe Choices in Zero-Sum Games 282

B. Counterintuitive Changes in Mixture Probabilities in Non-Zero-Sum Games 284

5 MIXING AMONG ANY NUMBER OF STRATEGIES: GENERAL THEORY 285

SUMMARY 292

KEY TERMS 292

EXERCISES 292

PART THREE

Some Broad Classes of Games and Strategies

9

Uncertainty and Information 307

1 IMPERFECT INFORMATION: DEALING WITH RISK 309

A. Sharing of Risk 309

B. Paying to Reduce Risk 312

C. Manipulating Risk in Contests 313

2	ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION: BASIC IDEAS	315
3	DIRECT COMMUNICATION, OR "CHEAP TALK"	317
	A. Perfectly Aligned Interests	318
	B. Totally Conflicting Interests	319
	C. Partially Aligned Interests	320
4	ADVERSE SELECTION, SIGNALING, AND SCREENING	323
	A. Adverse Selection and Market Failure	323
	B. Signaling in the Labor Market	326
5	EQUILIBRIA IN SIGNALING GAMES	332
	A. Separating Equilibrium	334
	B. Pooling Equilibrium	337
	C. Semiseparating Equilibrium	339
6	EVIDENCE ABOUT SIGNALING AND SCREENING	341
	SUMMARY	344
	KEY TERMS	345
	EXERCISES	345
	APPENDIX: Inferring Probabilities from Observing Consequences	358
	SUMMARY	361
	KEY TERMS	361
10	Strategic Moves	362
1	A CLASSIFICATION OF STRATEGIC MOVES	363
	A. Unconditional Strategic Moves	364
	B. Conditional Strategic Moves	365
2	CREDIBILITY OF STRATEGIC MOVES	366
3	COMMITMENTS	368
4	THREATS AND PROMISES	372
	A. Example of a Threat: U.S.–Japan Trade Relations	373
	B. Example of a Promise: The Restaurant Pricing Game	377
	C. Example Combining Threat and Promise: Joint U.S.–China Political Action	379
5	SOME ADDITIONAL TOPICS	380
	A. When Do Strategic Moves Help?	380
	B. Deterrence Versus Compellence	381

6 ACQUIRING CREDIBILITY	382
A. Reducing Your Freedom of Action	382
B. Changing Your Payoffs	384
7 COUNTERING YOUR OPPONENT'S STRATEGIC MOVES	388
A. Irrationality	388
B. Cutting Off Communication	388
C. Leaving Escape Routes Open	389
D. Undermining Your Opponent's Motive to Uphold His Reputation	389
E. Salami Tactics	389
SUMMARY	390
KEY TERMS	391
EXERCISES	391

11

The Prisoners' Dilemma and Repeated Games 397

1 THE BASIC GAME (REVIEW)	398
2 SOLUTIONS I: REPETITION	399
A. Finite Repetition	400
B. Infinite Repetition	401
C. Games of Unknown Length	405
D. General Theory	406
3 SOLUTIONS II: PENALTIES AND REWARDS	409
4 SOLUTIONS III: LEADERSHIP	412
5 SOLUTIONS IV: ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION	414
A. General Expropriation Game	415
B. Twice-Repeated Game with Asymmetric Information	417
C. Thrice-Repeated Game	422
6 EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE	424
7 REAL-WORLD DILEMMAS	428
A. Evolutionary Biology	428
B. Price Matching	429
C. International Environmental Policy: The Kyoto Protocol	431
SUMMARY	434
KEY TERMS	434
EXERCISES	435
APPENDIX: Infinite Sums	442

12 Collective-Action Games 446

- 1 COLLECTIVE-ACTION GAMES WITH TWO PLAYERS 447
 - A. Collective Action as a Prisoners' Dilemma 448
 - B. Collective Action as Chicken 450
 - C. Collective Action as Assurance 451
 - D. Collective Inaction 451
- 2 COLLECTIVE-ACTION PROBLEMS IN LARGE GROUPS 452
- 3 SPILLOVERS, OR EXTERNALITIES 460
 - A. Commuting and Spillovers 460
 - B. Spillovers: The General Case 461
 - C. Commuting Revisited: Negative Externalities 463
 - D. Positive Spillovers 467
- 4 A BRIEF HISTORY OF IDEAS 471
 - A. The Classics 471
 - B. Modern Approaches and Solutions 472
 - C. Applications 478
- 5 "HELP!": A GAME OF CHICKEN WITH MIXED STRATEGIES 482
- SUMMARY 486
- KEY TERMS 487
- EXERCISES 488

13 Evolutionary Games 494

- 1 THE FRAMEWORK 495
- 2 PRISONERS' DILEMMA 499
 - A. The Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 501
 - B. Multiple Repetitions 505
 - C. Comparing the Evolutionary and Rational-Player Models 506
- 3 CHICKEN 508
- 4 THE ASSURANCE GAME 510
- 5 INTERACTIONS ACROSS SPECIES 513
- 6 THE HAWK-DOVE GAME 516
 - A. Rational Strategic Choice and Equilibrium 517
 - B. Evolutionary Stability for $V > C$ 517

- C. Evolutionary Stability for $V < C$ 518
- D. $V < C$: Stable Polymorphic Population 519
- E. $V < C$: Each Player Mixes Strategies 519
- 7 THREE PHENOTYPES IN THE POPULATION 521
 - A. Testing for ESS 521
 - B. Dynamics 522
- 8 SOME GENERAL THEORY 525
- 9 PLAYING THE FIELD 528
- 10 EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION AND ALTRUISM 528
- SUMMARY 531
- KEY TERMS 532
- EXERCISES 532

14 Mechanism Design

543

- 1 PRICE DISCRIMINATION 544
- 2 SOME TERMINOLOGY 549
- 3 COST-PLUS AND FIXED-PRICE CONTRACTS 550
 - A. Highway Construction: Full Information 550
 - B. Highway Construction: Asymmetric Information 552
- 4 EVIDENCE CONCERNING INFORMATION REVELATION MECHANISMS 555
- 5 INCENTIVES FOR EFFORT: THE SIMPLEST CASE 557
 - A. Managerial Supervision 557
 - B. Insurance Provision 561
- 6 INCENTIVES FOR EFFORT: EVIDENCE AND EXTENSIONS 565
 - A. Nonlinear Incentive Schemes 565
 - B. Incentives in Teams 567
 - C. Multiple Tasks and Outcomes 568
 - C. Incentives over Time 569
- SUMMARY 571
- KEY TERMS 571
- EXERCISES 572

PART FOUR**Applications to Specific Strategic Situations**

15	Brinkmanship: The Cuban Missile Crisis	585
	1 A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF EVENTS	586
	2 A SIMPLE GAME-THEORETIC EXPLANATION	593
	3 ACCOUNTING FOR ADDITIONAL COMPLEXITIES	595
	4 A PROBABILISTIC THREAT	601
	5 PRACTICING BRINKMANSHIP	605
	SUMMARY	609
	KEY TERMS	610
	EXERCISES	610
16	Strategy and Voting	615
	1 VOTING RULES AND PROCEDURES	616
	A. Binary Methods	616
	B. Plurative Methods	617
	C. Mixed Methods	618
	2 VOTING PARADOXES	620
	A. The Condorcet Paradox	620
	B. The Agenda Paradox	622
	C. The Reversal Paradox	623
	D. Change the Voting Method, Change the Outcome	624
	3 GENERAL IDEAS PERTAINING TO PARADOXES	625
	A. Black's Condition	627
	B. Robustness	628
	C. Intensity Ranking	628
	4 STRATEGIC MANIPULATION OF VOTES	629
	A. Plurality Rule	630
	B. Pairwise Voting	632
	C. Strategic Voting with Incomplete Information	635

5 GENERAL IDEAS PERTAINING TO MANIPULATION 638

6 THE MEDIAN VOTER THEOREM 639

- A. Discrete Political Spectrum 640
- B. Continuous Political Spectrum 643

SUMMARY 646

KEY TERMS 646

EXERCISES 647

17 Bidding Strategy and Auction Design 657

1 TYPES OF AUCTIONS 658

- A. Auction Rules 658
- B. Auction Environments 660

2 THE WINNER'S CURSE 661

3 BIDDING STRATEGIES 664

4 VICKREY'S TRUTH SERUM 665

5 ALL-PAY AUCTIONS 668

6 HOW TO SELL AT AUCTION 670

- A. Risk-Neutral Bidders and Independent Estimates 671
- B. Risk-Averse Bidders 672
- C. Correlated Estimates 673

7 SOME ADDED TWISTS TO CONSIDER 675

- A. Multiple Objects 675
- B. Defeating the System 676
- C. Information Disclosure 678

8 AUCTIONS ON THE INTERNET 678

9 ADDITIONAL READING ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUCTIONS 682

SUMMARY 683

KEY TERMS 684

EXERCISES 684

18 Bargaining 692

1 NASH'S COOPERATIVE SOLUTION 694

- A. Numerical Example 694
- B. General Theory 695

2	VARIABLE-THREAT BARGAINING	701
3	ALTERNATING-OFFERS MODEL I: TOTAL VALUE DECAYS	703
4	EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE	706
5	ALTERNATING-OFFERS MODEL II: IMPATIENCE	709
6	MANIPULATING INFORMATION IN BARGAINING	714
7	BARGAINING WITH MANY PARTIES AND ISSUES	717
	A. Multi-Issue Bargaining	717
	B. Multiparty Bargaining	719
	SUMMARY	719
	KEY TERMS	720
	EXERCISES	720

19 Markets and Competition 724

1	A SIMPLE TRADING GAME	726
2	THE CORE	734
	A. Numerical Example	736
	B. Some Properties of the Core	737
	C. Discussion	739
3	THE MARKET MECHANISM	741
	A. Properties of the Market Mechanism	743
	B. Experimental Evidence	745
4	THE SHAPLEY VALUE	746
	A. Power in Legislatures and Committees	748
	B. Allocation of Joint Costs	750
5	FAIR DIVISION MECHANISMS	752
	SUMMARY	754
	KEY TERMS	754
	EXERCISES	755

Glossary 756

Index 775