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JUSTICE IN
THE DISTRIBUTION
OF ECONOMIC
RESOURCES

A critical and normative study

Sozpol

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CONTENTS

Chapter one: THE PROBLEM

1.1. The basic issue	11
1.2. The multiapplicability of justice	11
1.3. A normative ethical problem	13
1.4. Normative ethics and natural language	14
1.5. "Distributive effects of society"	17
1.6. An auxiliary notion: D-structure	18
1.7. The totality of economic goods alias "the economic pie"	20
1.8. The ambiguity of "the economic pie"	20
1.9. Some formal assumptions about distribuenda	21
1.10. The purposes of principles	21
1.11. The plan of this study	24
1.12. A short summary of tentative conclusions	25

Chapter two: FORMAL AND PROCEDURAL EQUALITY

2.1 The Aristotelian model	26
2.2 A formal principle of justice	27
2.3 William Frankena: Justice as procedural equality	30
2.4 The weakness of Frankena's presumptivism	36

Chapter three: DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND UTILITY

3.1. An ancient battlefield	41
3.2 Some limitations of discussion	42
3.3 A short survey of relevantly different forms of utilitarianism	42
3.4 Jan Narveson on optimifictness and distributive justice	44
3.5 The principle of average utility	51
3.6 The principle of effective average utility	53
3.7. Extended utilitarianism	57

Chapter four: DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE PREFERENCES

4.1. The socially desirable as a function of individual preference	64
4.2. Two individualizing factors	66

4.3.	An initial formulation of criteria	67
4.4.	Some different positions as regards the notion of an acceptable social choice function	68
4.5	Whose preferences?	73
4.6	The descriptive inflexibility of preference rankings	76
4.7.	Individual metricized preference	77
4.8.	The interpretation of “preference” and “indifference”	79
4.9.	A notation for preference and indifference	80
4.10.	Actual versus formally idealized preference	81
4.11.	Synoptic versus aspectival preference	81
4.12.	Subjective versus objective preference	82
4.13.	Arrow’s hypothetical, behaviouristic interpretation	83
4.14.	Affective-volitional interpretations	84
4.15.	“Cognitivistic” interpretations	85
4.16.	Mixed interpretations	85
4.17.	Subjective ethical preference	86
4.18.	Some objective interpretations	87
4.19.	On the acceptability of T_0	91
4.20.	Accommodation of the preferences of the less privileged	97
4.21.	Distributive justice and the measurement of taste	98
4.22.	Some remarks on the ethical relevance of subjective preferences	101
4.23.	T_0 under objective interpretations of “preference”	102

Chapter five: THE RAWLSIAN GAME OF FAIR DIVISION

5.1.	Moral philosophy and rational choice theory	106
5.2.	Rawls’s problem	107
5.3.	Rawls’s method of argumentation	111
5.4.	Justice as fairness	112
5.5.	An attempt to assessment I	114
5.6.	An attempt to assessment II	118

Chapter six: IN DEFENCE OF A SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY

6.1.	Justice as equal treatment	121
6.2.	Equal treatment as equality of economic welfare	123
6.3.	Substantive equality	127
6.4.	Equality of opportunity	129
6.5.	Equality of life-qualities	130
6.6.	Equality of economic resources	131
6.7.	Some inequalitarian common-sense conceptions	132
6.8.	Desert, merit, and legitimate claims	134
6.9.	Sacrifice, risk, and-need	140
6.10.	Free consent	141

6.11. Justice and the role of production 142
6.12. Non-humans and justice 144
6.13. Confusion of ideals 145
6.14. Fusion of ideals or the priority problem 147
Bibliographical references 149