
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS STOCKHOLMIENSIS STOCKHOLM STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 6

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JUSTICE IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMIC RESOURCES

A critical and normative study

"Sozpol



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