

Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources

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Contents

| | |
|---------|------|
| Tables | xiii |
| Figures | xv |

Part 1. Theoretical Background

| | |
|--|----|
| Chapter 1. Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resource Problems | 3 |
| <i>Common-Pool Resource Problems</i> | |
| <i>Conceptual Foundations and Key Terms</i> | |
| <i>Classifying CPR Situations: Appropriation and Provision</i> | |
| <i>CPR Situations and CPR Dilemmas</i> | |
| <i>Coordinated Strategies to Resolve CPR Dilemmas</i> | |
| <i>The Central Questions to Be Addressed</i> | |
| <i>The Plan for This Book</i> | |
| Chapter 2. Institutional Analysis and Common-Pool Resources | 23 |
| <i>Models, Theories, and Frameworks</i> | |
| <i>Historical Roots of IAD</i> | |
| <i>The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework</i> | |
| <i>The Action Situation</i> | |
| <i>Actors</i> | |
| <i>Factors Affecting Action Arenas</i> | |
| <i>Linking Action Arenas</i> | |
| <i>Multiple Levels of Analysis</i> | |
| <i>Multiple Levels of Analysis and Solving Higher-Order Dilemmas</i> | |
| <i>Conclusions</i> | |
| Chapter 3. Games Appropriators Play | 51 |
| <i>The Use of Formal Models</i> | |
| <i>CPR Games with Two Players and Two Strategies</i> | |
| <i>Repeated CPR Games</i> | |
| <i>Conclusions</i> | |
| Chapter 4. Rules and Games | 75 |
| <i>How Rules Affect the Structure of a Game</i> | |

Some Empirical Examples of Changes in Authority Rules
Fishing Rules and Fishing Games
Outcome Comparison
Conclusions

Part 2. Experimental Studies

| | |
|---|-----|
| Chapter 5. CPR Baseline Appropriation Experiments | 105 |
| <i>CPR Appropriation</i> | |
| <i>Appropriation Behavior in the Laboratory</i> | |
| <i>Conclusions</i> | |
| <i>Appendix 5.1.: CPR Provision Problems</i> | |
| <i>Zero Provision Environments and a Simple Contribution Mechanism</i> | |
| <i>Discrete Public Goods and VCM</i> | |
| <i>Discrete Public Goods and Alternative Contribution Mechanisms</i> | |
| <i>Appendix 5.2.: Experimental Numbers</i> | |
| <i>Appendix 5.3.: Market 2 Group Investment Decisions</i> | |
| Chapter 6. Probabilistic Destruction of the CPR | 129 |
| <i>Model of a Destructible CPR</i> | |
| <i>Finite Deterministic Repetition of the Constituent Game</i> | |
| <i>The Experimental Design</i> | |
| <i>Experimental Results</i> | |
| <i>Conclusions</i> | |
| <i>Appendix 6.1.: Across Period Behavior: Tokens Invested in Market 2</i> | |
| Chapter 7. Communication in the Commons | 145 |
| <i>Communication: Theoretical Issues</i> | |
| <i>One-Shot Costless Communication</i> | |
| <i>Repeated Costless Communication</i> | |
| <i>Costly Communication</i> | |
| <i>Conclusions</i> | |
| Chapter 8. Sanctioning and Communication Institutions | 171 |
| <i>Sanctioning in the Constituent Game</i> | |
| <i>The Experimental Setting and Results</i> | |
| <i>Conclusions</i> | |
| Chapter 9. Regularities from the Laboratory and Possible Explanations | 195 |
| <i>Why So Much Cooperation in Communication Experiments?</i> | |
| <i>Conclusions</i> | |

Part 3. Field Studies

| | |
|--|-----|
| Chapter 10. Institutions and Performance in Irrigation Systems | 225 |
| <i>by Shui Yan Tang</i> | |
| <i>Comparing Irrigation Systems</i> | |
| <i>Performance Measures and Linkages among Action Arenas</i> | |
| <i>Matching Rules to Physical Domains</i> | |
| <i>Multiple Levels of Institutional Arrangements</i> | |
| <i>Monitoring and Enforcement Arrangements</i> | |
| <i>Conclusions</i> | |
| <i>Appendix 10.1.: Case Profiles</i> | |
| Chapter 11. Fishers' Institutional Responses to Common- Pool Resource Dilemmas | 247 |
| <i>by Edella Schlager</i> | |
| <i>Coastal Fisheries as Common-Pool Resource Dilemmas</i> | |
| <i>CPR Dilemmas, Complexity, and Coastal Fisheries</i> | |
| <i>Fishers' Responses to CPR Dilemmas</i> | |
| <i>Commons Dilemmas and Organized Fishers</i> | |
| <i>Performance of Fishers' Organizations</i> | |
| <i>Conclusions</i> | |
| Chapter 12. Rules, Rule Making, and Rule Breaking: Examining the Fit between Rule Systems and Resource Use | 267 |
| <i>by Arun Agrawal</i> | |
| <i>The Historical Context</i> | |
| <i>The Local Context</i> | |
| <i>Authority Rules Related to Allocation</i> | |
| <i>Monitoring</i> | |
| <i>Sanctioning</i> | |
| <i>Arbitration</i> | |
| <i>Conclusions</i> | |
| Chapter 13. Changing Rules, Changing Games: Evidence from Groundwater Systems in Southern California | 283 |
| <i>by William Blomquist</i> | |
| <i>Groundwater Basins as Common-Pool Resources</i> | |
| <i>The Levels of Action</i> | |
| <i>Linked Action Arenas</i> | |
| <i>Operational-Level Rule Configurations</i> | |
| <i>Operational-Level Rules and Game Structure</i> | |

Rules, Actions, and Outcomes: Evidence from the Cases
Conclusions

| | |
|---|-----|
| Chapter 14. Regularities from the Field and Possible Explanations | 301 |
|---|-----|

by William Blomquist, Edella Schlager, Shui Yan Tang, and Elinor Ostrom

Commonalities across Organized CPRs

Differences across Organized CPRs

Physical Characteristics That Make a Difference

Conclusions

Part 4. Conclusion

| | |
|---|-----|
| Chapter 15. Cooperation and Social Capital | 319 |
| <i>Theoretical Choices in Doing Policy Analysis</i> | |
| <i>Surmounting CPR Dilemmas</i> | |

| | |
|--------------|-----|
| Bibliography | 331 |
|--------------|-----|

| | |
|--------------|-----|
| Contributors | 361 |
|--------------|-----|

| | |
|-------|-----|
| Index | 363 |
|-------|-----|