Lecture Notes
in Economics and
Mathematical Systems

Managing Editors: M. Beckmann and H. P. Künzi

Economic Theory

196

Manfred Nermuth

FB Mathematik TUD
58342289

Information Structures in Economics

Studies in the Theory of Markets with Imperfect Information

Fachbereich Mathematik
Technische Hochschule Darmsta
Bibliothek
Inv.-Nr. B 19110

Springer-Verlag
Berlin Heidelberg New York 1982

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