Representation and Reality

Hilary Putnam

Technische Hochschule Darmstadt Fachbereich 3 Institut für Psychologie Steubenplatz 12, 6100 Darmstadt

Inv.-Nr.9109059

1.4

A Bradford Book The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England

Contents

Preface ix Introduction xi
Chapter 1 Meaning and Mentalism 1 Fodor and Chomsky 4 Three Reasons Why Mentalism Can't Be Right 8 Connections between 1, 2, and 3 15
Chapter 2 Meaning, Other People, and the World 19 The Division of Linguistic Labor 22 Elms, Beeches, and Searle 26 The Contribution of the Environment 30 An Indexical Component 33 Other Natural Kinds 34 Reference and Theory Change 36 Meaning and "Mental Representation" 37
Chapter 3 Fodor and Block on "Narrow Content" 43 Narrow Content as a "Function of Observable Properties" 43 "Narrow Content" and "Conceptual Role" 46 Concluding Remarks 54
Chapter 4 Are There Such Things as Reference and Truth? 57 Why "Folk Psychology" and Not "Folk Logic"? 59 Disquotation, Anyone? 60 The "Semantical Conception" of Truth 61 Disquotation as Disappearance 66

Chapter 5
Why Functionalism Didn't Work 73
Sociofunctionalism 74
What "In Principle" Means Here 76
The Single-Computational-State Version of Functionalism 80
Equivalence 84
Surveying Rationality 87

Chapter 6
Other Forms of Functionalism 91
David Lewis and I 94
Lewis's Theory Further Examined 101
Conclusion 103

Chapter 7

A Sketch of an Alternative Picture 107
Objectivity and Conceptual Relativity 109
Internal Realism as an Alternative Picture 113
My Present Diagnosis of the "Functionalism" Issue 116

Appendix 121 Notes 127 Author Index 135