
The Shapley value

Essays in honor of Lloyd S. Shapley

Edited by Alvin E. Roth





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Contents

	Preface	<i>page</i> vii
1	Introduction to the Shapley value Alvin E. Roth	1
Ι	Ancestral papers	
2	A value for <i>n</i> -person games Lloyd S. Shapley	31
3	A method for evaluating the distribution of power in a committee system Lloyd S. Shapley and Martin Shubik	41
II	Reformulations and generalizations	
4	The expected utility of playing a game <i>Alvin E. Roth</i>	51
5	The Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power indices as probabilities Philip D. Straffin, Jr.	71
6	Weighted Shapley values Ehud Kalai and Dov Samet	83
7	Probabilistic values for games Robert James Weber	101
8	Combinatorial representations of the Shapley value based on average relative payoffs <i>Uriel G. Rothblum</i>	121
9	The potential of the Shapley value Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell	127

Contents vi

10	Multilinear extensions of games Guillermo Owen	139
III	Coalitions	
11	Coalitional value Mordecai Kurz	155
12	Endogenous formation of links between players and of coalitions: an application of the Shapley value <i>Robert J. Aumann and Roger B. Myerson</i>	175
IV	Large games	
13	Values of large finite games Myrna Holtz Wooders and William R. Zame	195
14	Payoffs in nonatomic economies: an axiomatic approach Pradeep Dubey and Abraham Neyman	207
15	Values of smooth nonatomic games: the method of multilinear approximation Dov Monderer and Abraham Neyman	217
16	Nondifferentiable TU markets: the value Jean-François Mertens	235
v	Cost allocation and fair division	
17	Individual contribution and just compensation <i>H. P. Young</i>	267
18	The Aumann-Shapley prices: a survey Yair Tauman	279
VI	NTU games	
19	Utility comparison and the theory of games <i>Lloyd S. Shapley</i>	307
20	Paths leading to the Nash set Michael Maschler, Guillermo Owen, and Bezalel Peleg	321

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