Incentives in Public Decision-Making

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CONTENTS

Introduction to the series	v
Preface	vii
Acknowledgement	xi
Notation	xiii
PART I	
Chapter 1. Incentives in economic systems	3
 1.1. Three roots of this study 1.2. Incentives and public goods 1.3. Some early attempts to solve the free rider problem 1.4. Dynamic planning procedures 1.5. Empirical evidence on the free-rider problem 	3 5 8 9
Chapter 2. Social choice theory	13
2.1. Introduction2.2. Arrow's impossibility theorem2.3. Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem2.4. Possibilities for positive results	13 14 16 19
PART II	
Chapter 3. The basic model	27
 3.1. Decisions about fixed size projects 3.2. Costless projects and financing decisions 3.3. Willingness to pay and the separability assumption 3.4. Social states, allowable transfers and the characterization of optimality 	27 29 31 32
	xiii

xiv	Contents
-----	----------

3.5. Mechanisms as non-cooperative games	34
3.6. The dominant strategy property	35
3.7. Satisfactoriness	37
3.8. The idea behind satisfactory mechanisms	. 38
3.9. Groves mechanisms and the pivotal mechanism	39
3.10. A first characterization theorem	43
Chapter 4. Satisfactory mechanisms	47
4.1. Description of social states and allowable utility functions	47
4.2. Mechanisms	49
4.3. Optimality and characterization theorems: Definitions and objectives	53
4.4. Optimality and characterization theorems: Results	56
4.5. Optimality and characterization theorems: Extensions	66
4.6. Applications: Successful and unsuccessful	70
Chapter 5. On the limitations of dominant-strategy mechanisms	79
5.1. Introduction	79
5.2. Separability	79
5.3. Budget balance	90
5.4. Lower boundedness	97
5.5. Coalition incentive compatibility	115
Chapter 6. Individual rationality	121
6.1. Individual rationality and anonymity	121
6.2. Individual rationality on average	123
6.3. Willingness to participate in the sample	127
Chapter 7. Approaches to incentive compatibility not requiring	
dominance	131
7.1. Introduction	131
7.2. The Dubins mechanism	132
7.3. Problems with bounded consumption in maximin procedures	135
7.4. Mechanisms based on expected utility maximizing strategies	141
7.5. Willingness to participate in processes based on expected utility maximizing	
strategies	146
7.6. The Nash equilibrium approach	148
PART III	
Chapter 8. Large number economies	157
8.1. Public goods and large numbers	157
8.2. Diversity of tastes	158
•	

Contents					XV	

,

	8.3. The validity of asymptotic results	159
	8.4. Large numbers, incentives and personal information	160
	8.5. The role of sampling	161
	8.6. Random social choice	162
	Chapter 9. On the imbalance of the budget	165
	9.1. Introduction	165
	9.2. The surplus for the Clarke mechanism	166
	9.3. The case of normally distributed statements	167
	9.4. The case of uniformly distributed statements	170
	9.5. General distributions of statements	172
	9.6. Asymptotic dominance	175
	9.7. Asymptotic truthfulness without symmetry assumptions	181
	9.8. Asymptotic successfulness	183
	9.9. Conclusion	188
	Chapter 10. Coalition incentive compatibility	189
		100
	10.1. Introduction	189
	10.2. Optimal cheating by a coalition	189
	10.3. Value of optimal cheating	192
	10.4. Generalizations	196
	10.5. Conclusion	199
	Chapter 11. Large numbers and separability	201
	11.1. Biased mechanisms with non-separable preferences	201
	11.2. Symmetry and the elimination of bias	205
	11.3. Direct correction of the bias	206
	Chapter 12. Economies in acquiring information through sampling	213
	12.1. Costs of mechanisms	213
	12.2. Imperfect information of the planner	214
	12.3. Sampling costs constant per capita	217
	12.4. Sampling costs proportional to total transfer payments	218
	12.5. Optimal sample sizes	219
-	12.6. A lower bound for the per capita gain of the experiment	222
	12.7. Simulations	224
	12.8. Sample sizes and asymptotic gains for the Clarke mechanism	226
	12.9. Conclusion	227
	Chapter 13. Imperfect personal information	229
	13.1. Introduction	229
	13.2. The strength of incentives	230
	·	

xvi	Contents
 13.3. Individual behavior 13.4. Optimal sample size 13.5. Informational value of processes with imperfect personal information 13.6. Summary of this model 13.7. A-more general model 13.8. Optimal purchase of information 13.9. Optimal sample sizes 	231 235 237 238 239 241 243
PART IV	
Chapter 14. Dynamic approaches	249
14.1. Procedures14.2. The model14.3. Bowen's procedure14.4. The naive procedure14.5. Conclusions	249 250 251 255 256
Chapter 15. The MDP procedure	259
 15.1. Definition of the MDP procedure 15.2. Stability 15.3. Maximin property 15.4. Neutrality 15.5. Nash equilibria 	259 260 261 264 265
Chapter 16. A new procedure	269
16.1. The procedure16.2. On individual rationality16.3. Several public goods16.4. Other interpretations of procedure A	269 273 274 279
References	283
Author index	287
Subject index	289