Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business

Edited by John W. Pratt and Richard J. Zeckhauser

Harvard Business School Press

Boston, Massachusetts



Contents

_		
Fo	reword	ix
	PART ONE The Agency Relationship	
1.	Principals and Agents: An Overview JOHN W. PRATT AND RICHARD J. ZECKHAUSER	1
2.	The Economics of Agency KENNETH J. ARROW	37
	PART TWO Institutional Responses	
3.	Agency Costs versus Fiduciary Duties ROBERT C. CLARK	55
4.	Insider Trading as an Agency Problem FRANK H. EASTERBROOK	81
5.	Empirical Evidence of Incentive Problems and Their Mitigation in Oil and Gas Tax Shelter Programs MARK A. WOLFSON	101
6.	Agency Costs, Employment Contracts, and Labor Unions RICHARD A. EPSTEIN	127
	PART THREE Agency in Organizations	

VIII CON	TENTS

7. Transfer Pricing as a Problem of Agency ROBERT G. ECCLES	151
8. Agency as Control HARRISON C. WHITE	187
Contributors	213
Notes	215
Index	233