

Oligopoly Pricing

Old Ideas and New Tools

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Contents

Preface xi

| | | |
|----------|---|-----------|
| 1 | Ideas of the Founding Fathers: Oligopoly Theory and Modern Game Theory | 1 |
| 2 | Game Theory Tools | 11 |
| 2.1 | Games in Normal Form and Nash Equilibrium | 12 |
| 2.2 | Supermodular Games and Lattice Programming | 16 |
| 2.2.1 | Lattices and Tarski's Theorem | 17 |
| 2.2.2 | Monotonicity of Optimal Solutions, Lattice Programming, and Complementarity | 23 |
| 2.2.3 | Supermodular Games | 31 |
| 2.3 | Existence Results for Quasi-increasing and Decreasing Best Replies | 39 |
| 2.3.1 | Quasi-increasing Best Replies in Symmetric Games | 39 |
| 2.3.2 | Decreasing Best Replies in n -Player Games | 42 |
| 2.4 | Mixed Strategies | 44 |
| 2.5 | Uniqueness | 47 |
| 2.6 | Stability | 49 |
| 2.6.1 | Dominance Solvability and Rationalizability | 49 |
| 2.6.2 | Tatônnement Stability | 50 |
| 2.7 | Incomplete Information and Bayesian Nash Equilibrium | 58 |
| 2.7.1 | Lattice Programming under Uncertainty | 58 |
| 2.7.2 | Information Structures and Signals | 61 |
| 2.7.3 | Bayesian Equilibrium | 65 |
| | Summary | 69 |
| | Exercises | 70 |

| | | |
|----------|--|------------|
| 3 | Foundations of Partial Equilibrium Analysis | 75 |
| 3.1 | A Canonical Partial Equilibrium Model | 75 |
| 3.2 | Small Expenditure Shares and Small Income Effects | 77 |
| | Appendix: Consumer Surplus Analysis | 85 |
| | Summary | 90 |
| | Exercises | 90 |
| 4 | Quantity Competition: The Cournot Model | 93 |
| 4.1 | The Model and Existence of Equilibrium | 93 |
| 4.2 | Characterization of Smooth Cournot Games | 96 |
| 4.3 | Comparative Statics and Entry | 101 |
| 4.3.1 | Comparative Statics | 101 |
| 4.3.2 | Entry | 107 |
| 4.4 | Large Markets | 110 |
| | Summary | 112 |
| | Exercises | 113 |
| 5 | Price Competition: The Models of Bertrand and Edgeworth | 117 |
| 5.1 | Bertrand Competition | 117 |
| 5.2 | Bertrand-Edgeworth Competition | 123 |
| 5.2.1 | Rationing Rules and Contingent Demand | 124 |
| 5.2.2 | Equilibria: The Existence Problem | 126 |
| 5.2.3 | Mixed Strategies | 128 |
| 5.2.4 | Price Competition and the Cournot Model | 132 |
| 5.2.5 | Large Bertrand-Edgeworth Markets | 136 |
| 5.2.6 | Concluding Remark: The Rationale for Mixed Strategies | 137 |
| | Summary | 138 |
| | Exercises | 138 |
| 6 | Product Differentiation | 143 |
| 6.1 | Demand Systems | 144 |
| 6.2 | Quantity and Price Competition | 148 |
| 6.3 | Characterization and Comparison of Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria | 154 |
| 6.4 | Large Markets and Monopolistic Competition | 160 |
| 6.5 | Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin Competition | 164 |
| 6.6 | Monopolistic Competition and Entry | 167 |
| | Appendix: Product Selection and Complementary Products | 176 |

| | |
|-----------|-----|
| Summary | 177 |
| Exercises | 178 |

| | | |
|----------|---|------------|
| 7 | Conjectures, Reactions, and Commitment | 185 |
| 7.1 | Conjectural Variations | 185 |
| 7.2 | Supply Functions | 187 |
| 7.2.1 | Capacity Determining Competitive Supply | 190 |
| 7.2.2 | Choice of Strategy Space | 192 |
| 7.2.3 | Discussion | 196 |
| 7.3 | Collusion and Facilitating Practices | 197 |
| 7.4 | Commitment and Pricing | 199 |
| 7.4.1 | The Stackelberg Model | 200 |
| 7.4.2 | Entry Deterrence, Limit Pricing, and Incumbency Advantages | 205 |
| 7.4.3 | A Taxonomy of Strategic Behavior | 213 |
| | Summary | 219 |
| | Exercises | 220 |
| 8 | Competition with Asymmetric Information | 225 |
| 8.1 | Static Competition with Incomplete Information | 225 |
| 8.1.1 | Existence of Bayesian Equilibrium | 229 |
| 8.1.2 | The Linear-Normal Model | 230 |
| 8.2 | Monopolistic Competition with Private Information | 234 |
| 8.3 | Information Sharing | 237 |
| 8.3.1 | Information Exchange in Oligopoly | 237 |
| 8.3.2 | Monopolistic Competition: Trade Associations and Disclosure Rules | 245 |
| 8.3.3 | Welfare Analysis | 248 |
| 8.3.4 | Strategic Information Transmission | 252 |
| 8.4 | Information Exchange, Collusion, and Mechanism Design | 262 |
| 8.4.1 | Mechanism Design and Collusion | 263 |
| 8.4.2 | Collusion in a Cournot Market | 264 |
| 8.4.3 | Collusion in a Large Market | 269 |
| 8.4.4 | Information Sharing in Large Markets | 273 |
| 8.5 | Commitment under Uncertainty and Information Manipulation | 277 |
| 8.5.1 | Uncertainty, Flexibility, and Commitment | 277 |
| 8.5.2 | Observability, Commitment, and Private Information | 279 |

| | |
|--|------------|
| 8.5.3 Limit Pricing and Signaling Distortions | 284 |
| 8.5.4 Price Setting and Information Manipulation | 288 |
| Summary | 293 |
| Exercises | 294 |
| 9 Repeated Interaction and Dynamics | 301 |
| 9.1 Repeated Interaction and Collusion | 301 |
| 9.1.1 Finite Horizon | 302 |
| 9.1.2 Infinite Horizon | 305 |
| 9.1.3 Uncertainty and Imperfect Monitoring | 313 |
| 9.1.4 Collusive Pricing and Fluctuations | 316 |
| 9.1.5 Private Information, Communication, and Collusion | 319 |
| 9.1.6 Discussion | 322 |
| 9.2 Dynamic Pricing and Commitment | 323 |
| 9.2.1 Alternating Move Duopoly Games | 325 |
| 9.2.2 A Taxonomy of Strategic Behavior with Adjustment Costs | 330 |
| 9.2.3 Commitment and Pricing in Continuous Time | 336 |
| Summary | 347 |
| Exercises | 348 |
| 10 Epilogue | 353 |
| Notes | 359 |
| References | 385 |
| Index | 415 |