


COERCIVE COOPERATION

EXPLAINING MULTILATERAL
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

Lisa L. Martin



PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

Contents

<i>Figures</i>	vii
<i>Tables</i>	ix
<i>Preface</i>	xi
1. Introduction	3
<i>The Study of Economic Sanctions</i>	4
<i>The Study of International Cooperation</i>	7
<i>Methodology</i>	10
PART ONE: THEORY AND DATA	13
2. Model and Hypotheses	15
<i>A Model of Economic Sanctions</i>	16
<i>Identifying Cooperation Problems</i>	25
<i>What Explains Cooperation?</i>	31
<i>Bandwagoning</i>	40
<i>Conclusion</i>	43
3. Measuring Cooperation and Explanatory Variables	46
<i>Measurement and Description: The Dependent Variable</i>	46
<i>Measurement and Description: Explanatory Variables</i>	54
<i>Conclusion</i>	59
4. Estimating Models of Cooperation	61
<i>Regression Analysis</i>	62
<i>Ordered-Probit Analysis</i>	67
<i>Event-Count Analysis</i>	74
<i>The Effect of Declining Hegemony</i>	86
<i>Conclusion</i>	90
PART TWO: CASE STUDIES	93
5. Human Rights in Latin America: Explaining Unilateral U.S. Sanctions	99
<i>Congress-versus the President: U.S. Human-Rights Policy, 1973-76</i>	101
<i>The Carter Administration</i>	106
<i>Economic Sanctions and the Multilateral Development Banks</i>	111

<i>Attitudes and Responses to U.S. Human-Rights Sanctions</i>	119
<i>Pinochet's Chile: U.S. Leadership or Resistance?</i>	124
<i>Conclusion</i>	128
6. The Falkland Islands Conflict	131
<i>The Falklands Crisis, 1982</i>	132
<i>The Falklands and the European Community</i>	138
<i>Sanctions and War: The Case of Ireland</i>	153
<i>Responses of the United States, Latin America, and Others</i>	159
<i>Conclusion</i>	166
7. Western Technology-Export Controls	169
<i>American, European, and Japanese Views on East-West Technology Transfer</i>	171
<i>Institutional Coordination of Export Controls: CoCom</i>	185
<i>Responding to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, 1980</i>	191
<i>Responding to Dissident Trials, 1978</i>	198
<i>Conclusion</i>	202
8. The Polish Crisis and Gas-Pipeline Sanctions	204
<i>Martial Law in Poland and the Siberian Gas Pipeline</i>	206
<i>The Effect of Declining Hegemony</i>	225
<i>Siberian Gas and European Preferences</i>	228
<i>The Grain Embargo: Why It Mattered</i>	234
<i>Conclusion</i>	239
9. Conclusion	241
<i>Explaining International Cooperation on Economic Sanctions</i>	241
<i>Additional Findings</i>	247
<i>Implications for Theories of International Cooperation and Economic Sanctions</i>	248
Notes	253
Bibliography	277
Index	293