

ECONOMIC THEORY AND EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCES

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CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
1. A PREVIEW	1
2. RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN A TIMELESS WORLD	11
Introduction	11
1. Equilibrium Concepts	11
2. The Prisoner's Dilemma: An Example	18
3. Competitive Equilibrium of a Private Ownership Economy	22
4. Competitive Equilibrium and Pareto Efficiency	31
Bibliographical Notes	37
3. EXTERNALITIES	39
Introduction	39
1. Market Equilibrium and Pareto Efficiency	39
2. Markets for Externalities	44
3. Pigouvian Taxes for Correcting Externalities	52
4. Common Property Resource or the Problem of the 'Common'	55
5. Some Examples of Common Property Resources	73
6. Asymmetrical Externalities and the Multiplicity of Tax Equilibria	78
7. Conclusions	92
Bibliographical Notes	93
4. INTERTEMPORAL EQUILIBRIUM	95
1. A Basic Result	95
2. Consistent Preference: A Mild Digression	98
3. The Basic Result: An Interpretation	99
4. Time Dated Commodities and Forward Markets:	
A General Account	100
5. Durables	103
6. The Arbitrage Equation	105
7. Commentary on Intertemporal Equilibrium	107
5. RENEWABLE RESOURCES: SOME ECOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL MODELS	113
1. Population Growth Curves	113
2. The Own Rate of Return	118
3. Exploitation in the Absence of Regulations	119
4. Present Value Profit Maximizing Catch Policy 1: Catch obtained Costlessly	126
5. Present Value Profit Maximizing Catch Policy 2: Catch Requires Resources	134

Chapter	Page
6. Optimal Regulatory Policy	141
7. Blue Whales: An Application	144
8. Revocable and Irrevocable Processes	148
Bibliographical Notes	151
6. EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCES: AN INTRODUCTION	153
1. Extraction from a Single Competitive Industry:	
The Pure Royalty Case	153
2. A Socially Managed Exhaustible Resource	163
3. Resource Exhaustion in Finite Time	166
4. Extraction from a Single Competitive Industry:	
The Presence of Extraction Costs	167
Conclusions	190
Bibliographical Notes	192
7. PRODUCTION WITH EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCES	193
1. Production Possibilities and Intertemporal Programmes	193
2. Essential and Inessential Exhaustible Resources	196
3. Static Efficiency—Economic and Thermodynamic	208
4. Efficient and Inefficient Programmes	213
5. The Social Rate of Return on Investment	220
6. Conclusion	224
Bibliographical Notes	225
8. RESOURCE DEPLETION AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION IN A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY	227
1. The Perfect Myopic Foresight Case	227
2. The Measurement of Net National Product	244
3. Imperfect Short-run Foresight	246
4. Conclusions	253
Bibliographical Notes	253
9 MEASURABILITY, COMPARABILITY AND THE AGGREGATION OF INTERGENERATIONAL WELFARES	255
1. Market Mechanism and Intergenerational Distribution of Welfare	255
2. The Setting	258
3. Classical Utilitarianism	260
4. The Existence of a Utilitarian Optimum	265
5. Choice behind the Veil of Ignorance	269
6. Intuitionist Conceptions	275
7. Conclusion	281
Bibliographical Notes	281
10. THE OPTIMAL DEPLETION OF EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCES	283
1. A General Argument	283
2. The Maxi-min Programme	288

Chapter	Page
3. The 'Utilitarian' Optimum	292
4. Commentary on the Implications of 'Utilitarian' and Maxi-min Criteria	308
5. Extension to an Open Economy	313
Bibliographical Notes	320
11. IMPERFECT COMPETITION AND EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCES	323
Introduction	323
1. Monopoly: the Basic Issues	323
2. The Role of Elasticity of Demand	325
3. Extraction Costs and Monopoly	333
4. Monopsony	334
5. Imperfect Competition	336
6. Asymmetrically placed Oligopolists: The Phenomenon of Limit Pricing	340
7. Resource-owning Cartel and Resource-owning Fringe	345
8. Oligopolistic Resource Markets: An Application on OPEC and the Oil Market	351
9. Conclusions	357
Bibliographical Notes	358
12. TAXATION OF EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCES	361
Introduction	361
1. A Sales Tax	363
2. A Profits Tax	365
3. Royalties	367
4. A Capital Gains Tax	368
5. The Depletion Allowance	368
6. True Depletion Allowance	370
7. The U.K. Petroleum Revenue Tax	371
8. A Dynamic Version of the Problem of the Common Bibliographical Notes	372 375
13. UNCERTAINTY, INFORMATION AND THE ALLOCATION OF RISK	377
Introduction	377
1. Risk Sharing, Fair Insurance Contracts and the Law of Large Numbers	378
2. Information and Its Value	388
3. Types of Uncertainty	395
4. Irrevocable Decisions and Option Values	397
5. Optimal Environmental Programmes under Uncertainty	400
Bibliographical Notes	409
14. UNCERTAINTY AND THE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES	411
1. The Arrow-Debreu Theory of Contingent Markets	411

Chapter	Page
2. The Production of Information: Research and Development	418
3. Uncertainty in Reserves and the Social Value of Exploration	427
4. Private Incentives for Exploration Bibliographical Notes	433 437
15. PRICE MOVEMENTS IN RESOURCE MARKETS	439
Introduction	439
1. Externalities in a Dynamic Context	439
2. Absence of Forward Markets	440
3. Uninsurable Risks	448
4. The Price of Oil	449
5. Simulation Studies	452
6. Conclusions on Oil	453
7. The Influence of Interest Rates	454
8. The Work of Barnett and Morse	464
9. Conclusions Bibliographical Notes	469 469
16. CONCLUSIONS	471
Introduction	471
1. The Behaviour of Markets	471
2. Planning	474
3. Research and Development	475
4. Are There Exhaustible Resources?	478
5. Final Remarks Bibliographical Notes	479 480
BIBLIOGRAPHY	481
INDEX	497