## THE PALESTINIAN ENTITY 1959–1974

## Arab Politics and the P L O

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## Contents

Preface	X1
Acknowledgments	xvi
List of Abbreviations	xvii
Glossary	xix
I. THE PROBLEM OF THE PALESTINIAN ENTITY,	
1959–1963	
The Egyptian Initiative	2
Qasim's Reaction	8
The Ba'th: Inactivity	14
Jordan's Reaction	19
The Arab Higher Committee for Filastin	28
Prolonged Standstill in the Arab League Forums	30
Conclusion	34
II. THE STRUGGLE OVER PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATI IN THE ARAB AND PALESTINIAN ARENAS, 1964–1967	ON
Part I The Founding of the PLO, 1964	40
Shuqayri's Concept of Representation	40
Arab and Palestinian Attitudes	44
Conclusion	53
Part II The Struggle Over PLO Representation of the Palestinians	,
1965–1967	55
Egypt: Support for the PLO	56
The Syrian Position	62
Jordan: Confrontation with the Palestinian Entity	67
The Struggle for Representation in the Palestinian Arena,	
1965–1967	80
Conclusion	92

## III. THE "PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE": REPRESENTATION AND CONFRONTATION, 1968-1971

Egypt	97
Egypt's Strategy for "Elimination of the Traces of Aggression"	98
Egypt's Attitude towards the Issue of the Palestinian Entity The First Confrontation: The Rogers Initiative	103 108
Syria	110
Syria's Strategy towards the Conflict Syria's Position on the Issue of the Palestinian Entity	112 113
Iraq	121
The Ba'th's Strategy towards the Conflict The Ba'th's Position on the Issue of the Palestinian Entity	121 122
Jordan	128
Jordanian Strategy Position of the "Palestinian Resistance": Violent	128
Coexistence	131
Relations between the Regime and the "Resistance" The Crisis of September 1970	133 140
The Regime's Policy after September 1970	146
Reaction of the Organizations: Liquidation of the Regime	148
Change in the Position of PLO/Fatah after July 1971	150
The Palestinian Arena	152
The Representative Composition of the PLO Institutions The West Bank: The Rise and Decline of the Traditional	152
Leadership	167
Conclusion	179
IV. THE PLO: CRISES AND ACHIEVEMENTS, 1972-1974	
Part I The Crises, 1972 - September 1973	182
Sadat's Policy	185
The Elements of Sadat's Stand on the Conflict	185
The Egyptian Attitude towards Jordan	191
Sadat and the Question of the Palestinian Entity	194

Contents	ix
Syria: Asad's Policy	201
Asad's Strategy Regarding the Conflict	203
The Regime's Position Regarding the Palestinian Entity	206
Jordan	217
Husayn's Strategy towards the Conflict	218
Jordan and the Palestinian Entity	221
Action Taken by the PLO and the Organizations	226
The Palestinian Arena: The Crisis	233
The PLO: Efforts at "National Unity"	233
Policy Turnabout in the PDFLP	248
Deceleration on the West Bank	249
The Municipal Elections	250
The Traditional Leadership	257
Changes in PLO Tactics	261
Conclusion	266
Part II Achievements, October 1973 – November 1974	270
The Algiers Summit: The "Phased Strategy" or the "Interim Aim" (Hadaf Marhali)	272
Egypt's Policy	274
The Palestinian Entity	275
Sadat's Efforts to Convene a Geneva Conference	275
Syria	277
Syrian Strategy after the War	277
The Palestinian Entity	279
Jordan	281
Objection to the Algiers Summit Resolution	281
Jordan's Efforts to Sign a Disengagement Agreement	283
PLO: The "Phased Programme" (al-Barnamij al-Marhali)	285
Egyptian Pressure, October 1973 – May 1974 The 12th PNC Session: Approval of the "Phased	285
Programme"	287
Sadat: Coordination between Jordan and the PLO,	
June-September 1974	296

Egypt: A Return to the Basic Positions	301
The Tripartite Meeting	304
Jordan's Reaction	306
The Rabat Summit, 26-29 October 1974	306
The Arab Foreign Ministers' Conference	306
Summit Deliberations	306
Summit Resolutions	311
CONCLUSION	316
Notes	325
Bibliography	373
Index	380