Reconstructing the Past

Parsimony, Evolution, and Inference

Elliott Sober

A Bradford Book The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England

Contents

Preface ix Acknowledgments xv Chapter 1 The Biological Problem of Phylogenetic Inference 1 1.1. When Is History Knowable? 1 1.2. Pattern and Process 6 1.3. Objects and Properties 13 1.4. Character Incongruence and the Problem of Homoplasy 28 Chapter 2 The Philosophical Problem of Simplicity 37 2.1. Local and Global Parsimony 37 2.2. Two Kinds of Nondeductive Inference 40 2.3. A Lapsed Ontological Tradition 51 2.4. The Methodological Critique 55 2.5. The Raven Paradox 58 2.6. Hume Was Half-Right 67 Chapter 3 The Principle of the Common Cause 71 3.1. Two Pitfalls for Pheneticism 72 3.2. Correlation, Common Cause, and Screening-Off 78 3.3. An Ontological Difficulty 83 3.4. Epistemological Difficulties 89 3.5. Likelihood and the Problem of Nuisance Parameters 102 3.6. Concluding Remarks 110 Chapter 4 Cladistics and the Limits of Hypothetico-Deductivism 113 4.1. The Problem Emerges 114 4.2. Falsifiability 121 4.3. Explanatory Power 131

4.4. Minimizing Assumptions versus Assuming Minimality 135

- 4.5. Stability 141
- 4.6. The Distinction between Observation and Hypothesis 143

Chapter 5

Parsimony, Likelihood, and Consistency 149

- 5.1. The Nuisance of Nuisance Parameters 150
- 5.2. Two Best-Case Expedients 157
- 5.3. Statistical Consistency 166
- 5.4. Why Consistency? 172
- 5.5. Evil Demons and Reliability 183
- 5.6. Necessity and Sufficiency 187
- 5.7. Concluding Remarks 197

Chapter 6

- A Model Branching Process 199
- 6.1. Desiderata 199
- 6.2. Matches Confirm 206
- 6.3. The Smith/Quackdoodle Problem 212
- 6.4. History Redux 216
- 6.5. Character Polarity 220
- 6.6. Robustness 229
- 6.7. Models and Reality 237
- 6.8. Appendix: The Smith/Quackdoodle Theorem for Three Taxa 239

References 253 Index 261